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(54) **METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VERIFYING THE AUTHENTICITY OF A FIRST COMMUNICATION PARTICIPANTS IN A COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK**

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(58) **Field of Classification Search** **455/410-411; 380/247, 270; 713/182, 186**

See application file for complete search history.

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
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(57) **ABSTRACT**

In the method and the arrangement for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, a first fault information item is formed in the first communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item. In a second communication subscriber in the communications network, a second fault information item is formed using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information relating to the random data item. The authenticity of the first communication subscriber is checked using the first fault information and the second fault information.

20 Claims, 4 Drawing Sheets



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


FIG. 1

FIG 2





FIG 3






FIG. 4
PRIOR ART

**METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VERIFYING
THE AUTHENTICITY OF A FIRST
COMMUNICATION PARTICIPANTS IN A
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK**

Matter enclosed in heavy brackets [] appears in the original patent but forms no part of this reissue specification; matter printed in italics indicates the additions made by reissue.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED
APPLICATIONS

This application is based on and hereby claims priority to German Application No. 19927 271.9 filed on Jun. 15, 1999 in Germany, and PCT Application No. PCT/DE00/01788 filed on May 31, 2000, the contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference. This application is a reissue of 10/009/975, patent 6,980,796.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates to a method and an arrangement for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network.

In a communications network, data is generally transmitted between communication subscribers, for example a service provider and a service user. In order to protect a communications network against penetration of an unauthorized communication subscriber into the communications network, the authenticity of each communication subscriber is generally checked.

3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Draft Standard, 3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security, Security Architecture, 05/1999 ("the 3G reference") discloses a method and an arrangement for checking the authenticity of a communication subscriber, in particular of a service provider or of a service user in a communications network.

The method known from the 3G reference and the corresponding arrangement are based on what is referred to as 3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Draft Standard, which describes a security architecture of a mobile phone system.

In FIG. 4, the procedure during the checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber, such as is known from the 3G reference is illustrated symbolically and parts thereof will be explained below briefly.

A transmission of data is illustrated in FIG. 4 by an arrow in each case. A direction of an arrow characterizes a transmission direction during a data transmission.

FIG. 4 shows a mobile phone system 400, comprising a user 401 of a communication service, for example a mobile phone, and a provider 402 of a communication service. The provider 402 comprises a dial-in network 403 with a dial-in network operator from which the user 401 locally requests a communication service, and a home network 404 with a home network operator with which the user 401 is signed on and registered.

In addition, the user 401, the dial-in network 403 and the home network 404 each have a central processing unit with a memory, for example a server (central computing unit), with which processing unit the procedure described below is monitored and controlled and on which memory data is stored.

The dial-in network 403 and the home network 404 are connected to one another via a data line over which digital data can be transmitted. The user 401 and the dial-in network

403 are connected to one another via any desired transmission medium for the transmission of digital data.

During a communication, the user 401 dials 410 into the dial-in network 403. At the start of the communication, checking of both the authenticity of the user 401 and the authenticity of the provider 402 is carried out.

To do this, the dial-in network 403 requests 411 what is referred to as authentication data from the home network 404, with which data the authenticity of the user 401 and of the provider 402 can be checked.

The authentication data which is obtained from the home network 404 comprises a random number and a sequential number of the provider 402. The sequential number of the provider 402 is obtained in such a way that a counter of the provider 402 increases the sequential number of the provider 402 by the value 1 at each attempt at communication between the user 401 and the provider 402.

It is to be noted that the random number and the sequential number of the provider 402 only constitute part of the authentication data and are not to be understood as comprehensive. Further authentication data is known from the 3G reference.

The home network 404 transmits 412 the requested authentication data to the dial-in network 403. The dial-in network 403 processes the received authentication data in a suitable way 413, and transmits the processed authentication data to the user 401.

The user 401 checks 415 the authenticity of the provider 402 using a dedicated sequential number, which is handled in a way corresponding to the sequential number of the provider 402, and using the sequential number of the provider 402.

The procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the provider 402 is described in the 3G reference.

A result of the checking of the authenticity of provider 402, "authenticity of provider satisfactory" 416, "authenticity of provider satisfactory but sequential fault has occurred" 417 or "authenticity of provider not satisfactory" 418, is transmitted 419 from the user 401 to the provider 402.

In the case of the result "authenticity of provider satisfactory" 416, the dial-in network 403 checks 420 the authenticity of the user 401 as described in the 3G reference.

In the case of the result "authenticity of provider not satisfactory" 418, the communication is interrupted and/or restarted 421.

In the case of the result "authenticity of provider satisfactory but a sequential fault has occurred" 417, resynchronization takes place in such a way that the home network 404 transmits 422 a resynchronization request to the user 401. The user responds with a resynchronization response in which resynchronization data is transmitted 423 to the home network 404. The sequential number of the provider 402 is changed 424 as a function of the resynchronization response. The authenticity of the user 401 is then checked, as is known from the 3G reference.

The procedure described has the disadvantage that during checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber, in particular during the checking of the authenticity of a service provider, a large amount of data has to be transmitted between the communication subscribers.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

One aspect of the invention is thus based on simplifying and improving the known method and the known arrangement, to yield a simplified and improved arrange-

ment for checking the authenticity of a communication subscriber in a communications network.

In the method for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, a first fault information item is formed in the first communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item. In a second communication subscriber in the communications network, a second fault information item is formed using a fault detection data item of the first communications subscriber and the information relating to the random data item.

The authenticity of the first communication subscriber is checked using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.

In the arrangement for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, the first communication subscriber is set up in such a way that a first fault information item can be formed using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item. In addition, the arrangement has a second communication subscriber in the communications network which is set up in such a way that a second fault information item can be formed using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information relating to the random data item. The authenticity of the first communication subscriber can be checked using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.

The checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber in a communications network is to be understood as meaning method steps which are carried out in the wider sense with checking of the authorization of a communication subscriber for access to a communications network or participation in communication in a communication network.

This thus encompasses both method steps which are carried out within the scope of the checking of the authorization of a communication subscriber for access to a communications network and such method steps which are carried out within the scope of the processing or the administration of data which is used in the checking.

The developments described below relate to the method and to the arrangement.

The development described below can be implemented either using software or hardware, for example using a specific electrical circuit.

In one refinement, the first communication subscriber is a service provider and/or the second communication subscriber is a service user in the communications network.

A sequential number is preferably used as the fault detection data item.

In one refinement, the information relating to the random data item is a random number.

In one development, the checking of the authenticity is simplified by determining a difference between the fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and the fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber.

In one refinement, the checking of the authenticity is further improved with respect to the security of the communications network by limiting the difference.

One development is preferably used within the scope of a mobile phone system. In the mobile phone system, the service user is implemented as a mobile phone and/or the service provider is implemented as a mobile phone network operator.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

These and other objects and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent and more readily appreciated from the following description of the preferred embodiments, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of which:

FIG. 1 shows a mobile phone system;

FIG. 2 shows an outline in which checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber is illustrated symbolically;

FIG. 3 shows a flowchart in which individual method steps are illustrated during checking of the authenticity of a service provider in a communications network; and

FIG. 4 shows an outline in which checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber in accordance with the 3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Standard is illustrated symbolically.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

Reference will now be made in detail to the preferred embodiments of the present invention, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings, wherein like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout.

Exemplary Embodiment: Mobile Phone System

A mobile phone system **100** is illustrated in FIG. 1. The mobile phone system **100** comprises a mobile phone **101**, a local dial-in network **102** with a dial-in network operator **103** and a home network **104** with a home network operator **105**.

The mobile phone **101** is signed on and registered in the home network **104**.

In addition, the mobile phone **101**, the dial-in network **102** and the home network **104** each have a central processing unit **106**, **107**, **108** with a memory **109**, **110**, **111**, with which processing units **106**, **107**, **108** the procedure described below is monitored and controlled, and on which memories **109**, **110**, **111** data is stored.

The dial-in network **102** and the home network **104** are connected to one another via a data line **112** via which digital data can be transmitted. The mobile phone **101** and the dial-in network **102** are connected to one another via any desired transmission medium **113** for transmitting digital data.

The procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the mobile phone **101** and the procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the home network **104** and/or of the home network operator **105** are illustrated symbolically in FIG. 2, and parts thereof will be explained below briefly.

The transmission of data in FIG. 2 is illustrated in each case by an arrow. A direction of an arrow characterizes a transmission direction during a data transmission.

The procedure which is described below and illustrated symbolically in FIG. 2 is based on what is referred to as a 3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Standard, which describes a security architecture of a mobile phone system and is described in the 3G reference.

During a communication, the mobile phone **201** dials **210** into the dial-in network **203**. At the start of the communication, checking both of the authenticity of the mobile phone **201** and of the authenticity of the home network **204** and/or of the home network operator takes place.

To do this, the dial-in network **203** requests **211** authentication data from the home network **204**, with which authen-

tication data the authenticity of the user **201** and of the home network **204** and/or of the home network operator can be checked.

The authentication data which is determined by the home network **204** comprises a random number and a sequential number of the home network **204** (cf. FIG. 3 step **310**). The sequential number of the home network **204** is determined in such a way that a counter of the home network **204** increases the sequential number of the home network **204** by the value 1 at each attempt at communication between the mobile phone **201** and the home network **204**.

It is to be noted that the random number and the sequential number of the home network **204** only constitute part of the authentication data and are not to be understood as comprehensive. Further authentication data is specified in the 3G reference.

The home network **204** transmits **212** the requested authentication data to the dial-in network **203**. The dial-in network **203** processes the received authentication data in a suitable way **213** and transmits the processed authentication data to the mobile phone **201**.

The mobile phone **201** checks **215** the authenticity of the home network **204** using a dedicated sequential number which is handled in a way corresponding to the sequential number of the home network **204**, and using the sequential number of the home network **204**. In a way corresponding to the home network **204**, the mobile phone **201** also has a counter.

The procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the home network **204** is described in the 3G reference. Method steps which differ therefrom are described below.

What is referred to as overflow checking of the counter of the mobile phone **201** is carried out within the scope of the checking of the authenticity of the home network **203**. This overflow checking prevents overflowing of an acceptable numerical range of the counter of the mobile phone **201**.

In the overflow checking, the following conditions are tested:

- 1) sequential number of the home network **204** > sequential number of the mobile phone **201**;
- 2) sequential number of the home network **204** - sequential number of the mobile phone **201** < -predefinable deviation (1,000,000);

the following applying for the predefined deviation:

predefinable deviation is sufficiently large in order to ensure, during normal or fault-free communications operation:

that the sequential number of the home network **204** - sequential number of the mobile phone **201** is not >predefinable deviation;

the maximum permissible sequential number of the mobile phone **201**/predefinable deviation is sufficiently large in order to ensure that the maximum permissible sequential number of the mobile phone **201** is not reached during operation.

The result of the checking of the authenticity of the home network **204**, "authenticity satisfactory" **216**, "authenticity satisfactory but a sequential fault has occurred" **217** or "authenticity not satisfactory" **218** is transmitted **219** to the home network **204** from the mobile phone **201**.

In the case of the result "authenticity satisfactory" **216**, the dial-in network **203** checks **220** the authenticity of the mobile phone **201**, as described in 3G reference.

In the case of the result "authenticity not satisfactory" **218**, the communication is interrupted or restarted **221**.

In the case of the result "authenticity satisfactory but a sequential fault has occurred" **217**, resynchronization **222** takes place. Resynchronization is to be understood as a change of the sequential number of the home network **204**.

For this purpose, the mobile phone **201** transmits **222** resynchronization data to the dial-in network **203**.

The resynchronization data comprises the same random number which was transmitted within the scope of the authentication data, and the sequential number of the mobile phone **201** (cf. FIG. 3 step **320**).

The dial-in network **203** processes the resynchronization data in a suitable way and transmits the processed resynchronization data to the home network **204**.

The home network **204** checks the sequential number of the mobile phone **201** and the sequential number of the home network **204** using the processed resynchronization data, and if appropriate changes **223** the sequential number of the home network **204** (cf. FIG. 3 step **330**).

The home network **204** sequentially transmits new authentication data, which if appropriate comprises the changed sequential number of the home network **204**, to the dial-in network **203**.

In order to illustrate the described procedure, important steps **300** of the procedure are illustrated in FIG. 3.

FIG. 3 shows a first step **310** within the scope of which the authentication data (first fault information) is determined.

The resynchronization data (second fault information) is determined within the scope of a second step **320**.

The sequential number of the mobile phone and the sequential number of the home network are checked within the scope of a third step **330**, using the resynchronization data.

An alternative of the first exemplary embodiment is described below.

In the alternative exemplary embodiment, a method is implemented in which the home network is made more reliable with respect to a data in the event of a system crash.

For this purpose, the current sequential number of the home network is stored in the memory of the home network, in each case at a predefinable time interval. A sequential number of the home network which has been lost during a system crash of the home network is restored in such a way that a predefinable additional value is added to the value of the stored sequential number. The predefinable additional value is dimensional in such a way that exceeding of the sum of the sequential number of the mobile phone and the predefinable deviation is not exceeded.

In the alternative exemplary embodiment, the predefinable additional value is determined in such a way that an average number of authentication attempts on one day by the home network, which number is determined during operation of the communications network, is multiplied by a factor with the value 10.

The invention has been described in detail with particular reference to preferred embodiments thereof and examples, but it will be understood that variations and modifications can be effected within the spirit and scope of the invention.

What is claimed is:

1. A method for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, comprising:

forming a first fault information item in the first communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item which has been transmitted to the first communication subscriber by a second communication subscriber in the communications network;

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transmitting the first fault information to the second communication subscriber by the first communication subscriber,

forming a second fault information item in the second communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information item relating to the random data item;

checking the authenticity of the first communication subscriber in the second communication subscriber using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.

2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein a difference is determined between the fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and the fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber.

3. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the difference is limited.

4. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the first and second communication subscribers are part of a mobile phone system.

5. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the first and second communication subscribers are part of a mobile phone system.

6. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the first and second communication subscribers are part of a mobile phone system.

7. A system for checking authenticity in a communications network, comprising:

a first communication subscriber to form a first fault information using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item which has been transmitted to the first communication subscriber, and to transmit the first fault information;

a second communication subscriber to transmit the information relating to the random data item to the first communication subscriber, to receive the first fault information from the first communication subscriber, to form a second fault information using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information relating to the random data item, and to check the authenticity of the first communication subscriber using the first fault information and the second fault information.

8. The system as claimed in claim 7, wherein the first communication subscriber is a service provider and the second communication subscriber is a service user in the communications network.

9. The system as claimed in claim 8, wherein the service provider is a mobile phone operator and the service user is a mobile phone.

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10. The system as claimed in claim 7, wherein the fault detection data items are sequential numbers.

11. The system as claimed in claim 10, wherein the information relating to the random data item is a random number.

12. The system as claimed in claim 7, wherein the first and second communication subscribers are part of a mobile phone system.

13. The system as claimed in claim 10, wherein the first communication subscriber is a service provider and the second communication subscriber is a service user in the communications network.

14. The system as claimed in claim 13, wherein the service provider is a mobile phone operator and the service user is a mobile phone.

15. The system as claimed in claim 11, wherein the first communication subscriber is a service provider and the second communication subscriber is a service user in the communications network.

16. The system as claimed in claim 15, wherein the service provider is a mobile phone operator and the service user is a mobile phone.

17. The system as claimed in claim 8, wherein the fault detection data items are sequential numbers.

18. The system as claimed in claim 17, wherein the information relating to the random data item is a random number.

19. The system as claimed in claim 18, wherein the service provider is a mobile phone operator and the service user is a mobile phone.

20. *A method for a second communication subscriber to confirm the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, comprising:*

transmitting an information item relating to a random data item to the first communication subscriber;

receiving a first fault information item from the first communication subscriber, the first fault information item being formed using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and the information item relating to the random data item;

forming a second fault information item in the second communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information item relating to the random data item; and

checking the authenticity of the first communication subscriber in the second communication subscriber using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.

* * * * *

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION

PATENT NO. : RE 40,791 E
APPLICATION NO. : 12/004440
DATED : June 23, 2009
INVENTOR(S) : Jorge Cuellar et al.

Page 1 of 1

It is certified that error appears in the above-identified patent and that said Letters Patent is hereby corrected as shown below:

Second Page, Column 1 (Other Publications), Line 1, change "JP-4-24954" to --JP 4-249454--.

Column 1, Line 18, change "10/009/975," to --10/009,975,--.

Column 3, Line 11, change "communications" to --communication--.

Column 3, Line 35, change "in communication in a communication network." to --in communication in a communications network.--.


Column 6, Line 18, change "sequentially" to --subsequently--.

Column 6, Line 37, after "data" insert --loss--.

Column 6, Line 45, change "dimensional" to --dimensioned--.

Signed and Sealed this

Sixth Day of October, 2009



David J. Kappos
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office