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(54) **MODULE WITH A CONTROLLER FOR A CHIP CARD**

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See application file for complete search history.

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
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(57) **ABSTRACT**

In a module with a controller for a chip card, the controller having first and second I/O pads for data input and output, and the module having one I/O pad. Both of the first and second I/O pads of the controller are connected to only the one I/O pad of the module. In this manner, data output via one of the first and second I/O pads of the controller may be read and monitored by the controller via the other of the first and second I/O pads of the controller.

**5 Claims, 1 Drawing Sheet**



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
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**1****MODULE WITH A CONTROLLER FOR A  
CHIP CARD****CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED  
APPLICATIONS**

This application claims priority from German Patent Application No. 102006045906.7, which was filed on Sep. 28, 2006, and is incorporated herein in its entirety by reference.

**TECHNICAL FIELD**

The present invention generally relates to a semiconductor device and specifically to a module with a controller for a chip card and to a method for detecting an attack on a controller of a module for a chip card.

**BACKGROUND**

Chip cards mostly possess eight contact pads, five of which are typically used. They are the electric interface between, for example, a terminal and the controller of the chip card. One of these contact pads is a so-called I/O pad for communicating with external systems. Controllers typically also have at least one I/O pad for communicating with the exterior and are connected to the contact pad of the chip card. On modern safety controllers, there are at least two I/O pads, of which, however, typically only one is connected to the respective pad of the chip-card module. The second I/O port of the controller therefore generally remains unused in the final assembly.

In conventional safety controllers, it is very difficult to check which data actually reaches the exterior from the safety controller via an I/O pad. If the program flow of the safety controller is altered e. g. by an attack from the exterior, confidential data may unnoticeably reach the exterior. As a rule, attempts are made to protect the program flow by appropriate software counter-measures. These software counter-measures, however, provide limited protection only. In addition, a variety of sensors for detecting attacks are known. These detect a large proportion of the attacks, but also do not accomplish actual verification of the correct situation of the data output.

**BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWING**

Embodiments of the present invention will be detailed subsequently referring to the appended drawing, in which:

FIG. 1 is a principle diagram of an embodiment of an inventive module with a controller for a chip card.

**DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

An embodiment may have a module with a controller for a chip card, wherein the controller has first and second I/O pads for data input and output, and the module has an I/O pad, and the first and second I/O pads of the controller are connected to only the one I/O pad of the module.

Another embodiment may have a method for detecting attacks on a controller of a module for a chip card, wherein the controller has first and second I/O pads for data input and output, and the module has an I/O pad for data input and output, and wherein the first and second I/O pads of the controller are connected to only the one I/O pad of the module, the method comprising monitoring data transmitted via the first I/O pad of the controller using data received via the second I/O pad of the controller.

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One aspect of the present invention is connecting the first and second I/O pads of the controller to only the one I/O pad of the module of the chip card.

By the connection of the first and second I/O pads of the controller with only the one I/O pad of the module, the data transmitted from the first I/O pad may be verified by the controller by means of the second I/O pad.

The controller of the chip card may, in a further embodiment, be a safety controller.

A further embodiment of the module for a chip card involves being configured such that it detects false data or a response time that is too long by means of the controller and, in this case, initiates an alarm.

Further, it can be advantageous if the module of the chip card deactivates itself in a case of an attack or a response time that is too long, thus rendering an attack obsolete.

In a controller with first and second I/O pads for data input and output and a module with a I/O pad, the first and second I/O pads of the controller being connected to only the one I/O pad of the module, the transmitted data of the first I/O pad of the controller is monitored by the controller by means of data received via the second I/O pad of the controller.

A further embodiment of the method involves an alarm being initiated on detection of false data or a response time that is too long.

Furthermore, an embodiment of the present invention, which induces deactivation of the entire chip-card module on detection of false data or a response time that is too long, may be contemplated.

FIG. 1 is a representation of a module 1 with a controller 2 for a chip card according to an embodiment of the invention. On the chip-card controller 2, pads 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 3, 4 are illustrated, only five pads 12, 13, 15, 3, 4 of which, however, are typically utilized. Two I/O pads 3, 4 are provided for data input and output on the controller 2.

Further pads 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18 are illustrated on the module 1. There is a connection of the two controller I/O pads 3, 4 to one I/O pad 5 of the module 1 via two connections 6, 7.

If, for example, data is output between the I/O pad 3 of the controller 2 and the I/O pad 5 of the module 1 via the connection 7, a verification as to whether the correct data is present at the I/O pad 5 of the module 1 may be made by the controller 2 by means of the other connection 6 between the I/O pad 5 of the module 1 and the second I/O pad 4 of the controller 2.

If, vice-versa, data is transmitted between the I/O pad 4 of the controller 2 and the I/O pad 5 of the module 1 via the connection 6, a verification as to whether the correct data is present at the I/O pad 5 may be made by the controller 2 via the other connection 7 between the I/O pad 5 of the module 1 and the second I/O pad 3 of the controller 2. If the controller 2 detects that the data at the I/O pad 5 are not correct, it will deactivate or enter an alarm state.

While this invention has been described in terms of several embodiments, there are alterations, permutations, and equivalents which fall within the scope of this invention. It should also be noted that there are many alternative ways of implementing the methods and compositions of the present invention. It is therefore intended that the following appended claims be interpreted as including all such alterations, permutations and equivalents as fall within the true spirit and scope of the present invention.

What is claimed is:

1. A chip card module with a controller, wherein the controller comprises a first I/O pad for data input and output and a second I/O pad for data input and output, and the chip card module comprises an I/O pad, and the first and second I/O

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pads of the controller are connected to the same I/O pad of the chip card module, wherein data transmitted via the first I/O pad of the controller is monitored and verified by the controller by means of the second I/O pad, and wherein the chip card module is adapted to detect false data or a response time that is too long, and to initiate an alarm.

2. The chip card module according to claim 1, wherein the controller is a safety controller.

3. The chip card module according to claim 1, adapted to detect false data or a response time that is too long, and to deactivate the controller.

4. A method for detecting attacks on a controller of a chip card module, wherein the controller comprises a first I/O pad for data input and output and a second I/O pad for data input

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and output, and the chip card module comprises an I/O pad for data input and output, and wherein the first and second I/O pads of the controller are connected to the same I/O pad of the chip card module, the method comprising monitoring and verifying data transmitted via the controller via the first I/O pad by the controller using data received via the second I/O pad of the controller, wherein an alarm is initiated on detection of false data or a response time that is too long.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the controller is deactivated on detection of false data or a response time that is too long.

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