

US011924345B2

(12) **United States Patent**
White et al.

(10) **Patent No.:** **US 11,924,345 B2**
(45) **Date of Patent:** ***Mar. 5, 2024**

(54) **SERVER-CLIENT KEY ESCROW FOR APPLIED KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND PROCESS**

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(*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 123 days.

This patent is subject to a terminal disclaimer.

(21) Appl. No.: **17/214,504**

(22) Filed: **Mar. 26, 2021**

(65) **Prior Publication Data**

US 2021/0226786 A1 Jul. 22, 2021

Related U.S. Application Data

(63) Continuation of application No. 15/067,084, filed on Mar. 10, 2016, now Pat. No. 10,965,459.

(60) Provisional application No. 62/300,699, filed on Feb. 26, 2016, provisional application No. 62/300,687, filed on Feb. 26, 2016, provisional application No. 62/300,717, filed on Feb. 26, 2016, provisional application No. 62/300,352, filed on Feb. 26, 2016, provisional application No. 62/300,521, filed on Feb. 26, 2016, provisional application No. 62/300,670, filed on Feb. 26, 2016, provisional application No. 62/133,172, filed on Mar. 13, 2015.

(51) **Int. Cl.**
H04L 9/08 (2006.01)

(52) **U.S. Cl.**
CPC **H04L 9/0897** (2013.01)

(58) **Field of Classification Search**
CPC H04L 9/0897
USPC 380/286
See application file for complete search history.

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
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(57) **ABSTRACT**

Embodiments described herein relate to apparatuses and methods for registering and storing a local key associated with a local application of a communication device, including, but not limited to, receiving a request from the communication device to register and store the local key, evaluating the request based on at least one first policy, and sending the request to register and store the local key to a secure key storage.

20 Claims, 15 Drawing Sheets



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


FIG 1




FIG 2





FIG 3






FIG 5




FIG 6




FIG 7




FIG 8




FIG 9




FIG 10




FIG 11




FIG 12




FIG 13




FIG 14




FIG 15




FIG 16




FIG 17

1

**SERVER-CLIENT KEY ESCROW FOR
APPLIED KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
AND PROCESS**

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENT
APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation application of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/067,084, filed Mar. 10, 2016, now U.S. Pat. No. 10,965,459, granted Mar. 30, 2021, which claims priority from U.S. Provisional Application 62/133,172, filed Mar. 13, 2015, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. This application is related to U.S. application Ser. No. 14/506,346, titled System And Method For Encryption Key Management Federation And Distribution, and filed Oct. 3, 2014, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,352, titled Policy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Complex Logical Operations, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,521, titled Policy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Ephemeral Policies, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,670, titled Structure Of Policies For Evaluating Key Attributes Of Encryption Keys, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,687, titled Linking Encryption Key Management With Granular Policy, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,699 titled System And Method For Associating Encryption Key Management Policy With Device Activity, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,717, titled System And Method For Hierarchy Manipulation In An Encryption Key Management System, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

1. Field of the Invention

Embodiments of the present invention relate generally to security objects used in communication systems and, more specifically, to generation, management, distribution, federation, and/or applied key management of security objects.

2. Background

In security systems, an encryption key refers to a parameter or data that dictates how plain data may be translated into encrypted data during an encryption process and encrypted data into plain data during a decryption process. Typically, the encryption key is made available both of a source device (e.g., a transmitting device) and a target device (e.g., a receiving device) in a communication transaction. Given that encryption keys are used pervasively, effective management of the encryption keys (as well as

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other security objects) to defend and respond to threats against the security systems is of paramount importance.

Traditionally, encryption key management is initiated and executed at the device level (e.g., by the source device and/or the target device that are involved in the communication transaction). Communication management, on the other hand, is traditionally centrally managed at a higher level (e.g., by a server for the source device and target device). The end result may be that the encryption management is procedurally unsynchronized with communications management. Thus, loose controls of encryption keys, as demonstrated in current public key infrastructure (PKI) instances, may result. In addition, loose controls of symmetric keys generated and distributed in an enterprise may also occur. Accordingly, an end result may be a breakdown in communication management or communication security. Similar problems confront other types of encryption objects.

Various tools for full disk encryption may require gathering keys in a location for management. Conventionally, no mechanism exists to automate gathering and storing of keys across various local user applications, for example, as a part of recovery operations. Secure Shell (SSH) and other interface/protocol for system access conventionally focus on localized generation of encryption keys for user authentication. Local applications may use local keys to unlock application functionalities as a part of software licensing on a client. Some applications such as, but not limited to, messaging, communication application, and the like may require separate distribution of symmetric and/or asymmetric keys for encrypted communication. Storage or distribution of encrypted information may require separate key management and distribution activities.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

Embodiments described herein relate to providing a client-based service for integrating local applications, servers, and/or infrastructure with applied key management operations (including evaluations based on policies) provided by an applied key management system or server. A client (e.g., a communication device) may have local applications, servers, and/or infrastructure that do not have defined encryption key management capacities or interfaces natively. Thus, the client-based service may serve as an interface between the applied key management system and one or more of the local applications, servers, and/or infrastructure of the client.

In some embodiments, the client-based service may include an applied key management client interface to enable automated collection of key file materials in the client. Uses of the key file materials may include, but are not limited to, local user disk encryption, secure communication, application license keys, and the like. Accordingly, embodiments described herein are concerned with interfacing with the applied key management system to enable centralized escrow of key file material local to the client based on the policies.

In some embodiments, a method for registering and storing a local key associated with a local application of a communication device includes sending a request to an applied key management system to register and store the local key at a secure key storage and receiving a response from the applied key management system. Registering and storing the local key at the secure key storage are authorized by at least one first policy.

In some embodiments, the local key is one or more of a locally-generated encryption key or locally-stored encryption key.

In some embodiments, the local key includes one or more of a key file for secure data storage, key data for SSH, or license key for an application.

In some embodiments, the secure key storage is one or more of a Hardware Security Module (HSM), key management server, or secure data storage.

In some embodiments, the request is sent over a network link. The response is received over the network link.

In some embodiments, the method further includes determining whether the local key needs to be registered and stored.

In some embodiments, determining whether the local key needs to be registered and stored includes determining whether the local key has been previously registered and stored.

In some embodiments, the method further includes sending a recovery request to the applied key management system to recover the local key from the secure key storage and receiving the local key from the applied key management system, wherein recovering the local key from the secure key storage is authorized by at least one second policy.

In some embodiments, a communication device includes a local key store, a memory, and a processor implementing a client interface. The client interface is configured to send a request to an applied key management system to register and store the local key at a secure key storage and receive a response from the applied key management system, wherein registering and storing the local key at the secure key storage are authorized by at least one first policy.

In some embodiments, a non-transitory processor-readable medium having processor-readable instructions, such that, when executed, causes a processor to send a request to an applied key management system to register and store the local key at a secure key storage and receive a response from the applied key management system, wherein registering and storing the local key at the secure key storage are authorized by at least one first policy.

In some embodiments, a method for registering and storing a local key associated with a local application of a communication device, including receiving a request from the communication device to register and store the local key evaluating the request based on at least one first policy, and sending the request to register and store the local key to a secure key storage.

In some embodiments, the request is received from the communication device via a first network link and the request is sent to the secure key storage via a second network link.

In some embodiments, the request is received from the communication device via a first network link. The request is sent to the secure key storage locally.

In some embodiments, the request includes one or more of key attributes of the local key, application identifier identifying the local application, user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, device identifier identifying the communication device, or time at which the local key is collected.

In some embodiments, evaluating the request based on the at least one policy includes evaluating one or more of the key attributes of the local key, application identifier identifying the local application, user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, device identifier identifying the communication device, or time at which the local key may be collected based on the at least one first policy.

In some embodiments, the method further includes receiving a recovery request from the communication

device, the recovery request corresponds to recovering the local key from the secure key storage, evaluating the recovery request based on at least one second policy, sending the recovery request to the secure key storage, receiving the local key from the secure key storage, and sending the local key to the communication device.

In some embodiments, the recovery request received from the communication device includes one or more of key attribute of the local key, application identifier identifying the local application associated with the local key, user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, device identifier identifying the communication device, or time at which the local key is collected.

In some embodiments, evaluating the recovery request based on the at least one policy includes evaluating one or more of the key attribute of the local key, application identifier identifying the local application associated with the local key, user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, device identifier identifying the communication device, or time at which the local key is collected based on the at least one second policy.

In some embodiments, an applied key management system, including a memory and a processor, the processor configured to receive a request from a communication device to register and store a local key, evaluate the request based on at least one first policy, and send the request to register and store the local key to a secure key storage.

In some embodiments, a non-transitory processor-readable medium having processor-readable instructions, such that, when executed, causes a processor to receive a request from a communication device to register and store a local key, evaluate the request based on at least one first policy, and send the request to register and store the local key to a secure key storage.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a general applied key management system according to various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system according to various embodiments.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key federation system as implemented in various embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a communication device consuming applied key management services according to some embodiments.

FIG. 5 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a request authentication process for issuing requests and receiving encryption keys according to some embodiments.

FIG. 6 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a communication device registration process implemented in various applied key management systems according to various embodiments.

FIG. 7 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a key management and distribution process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 8 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a key federation process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 9 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key management and distribution process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of relationship between a communication device,

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applied key management system, and secure key storage according to various embodiments.

FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of the communication device according to some embodiments.

FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system according to some embodiments.

FIG. 13 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 14 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 15 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 16 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 17 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key recovery method according to various embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description of various embodiments, reference is made to the accompanying drawings which form a part hereof and in which are shown by way of illustration specific embodiments in which the embodiments may be practiced. It is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized, and structural changes may be made without departing from the scope of the various embodiments disclosed in the present disclosure.

Embodiments described herein generally relate to security object applied key management. The security object applied key management may include management, distribution, and federation of the security object. Security objects may include encryption keys and other sensitive objects (such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random number generator data, user authentication information, policy components, other components associated with organization security component, and/or the like). In the present disclosure, encryption key-based applied key management is described in various embodiments as examples of the security object applied key management systems and methods. It should be appreciated that the applied key management systems and methods are likewise applicable to other security objects, including those described above.

As used herein, “applied key management” may refer to a combination of key management, key federation, and key distribution activities in one or more enterprises. For example, embodiments described may be associated with the applied key management of encryption key information correlated with utilizing encryption in the one or more enterprises. “Enterprise key management” may include managing and/or overseeing the multiple uses of asymmetric and symmetric keys required for encrypting data, signing emails, authenticating web services, and/or other potential uses. This may also include encryption management for communications systems to include radio, cellular, satellite and internet protocol based communications. “Enterprise key federation” may include coordinating and negotiating the federation of key information to a plurality of disparate applied key management platforms (each associated with

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disparate federating organizations) based on established trust between the federating organizations (e.g., the enterprises). “Key distribution” may refer to a centralized distribution (e.g., pushing or forwarding) of key material to support encryption operations within a local enterprise and/or a foreign enterprise. In particular, key distribution may be concerned with assigning or otherwise transmitting the appropriate encryption keys to an appropriately associated device (e.g., the communication device, which may either be a source device or a target device).

Embodiments of applied key management (e.g., an applied key management device such as a management request handler coupled to a request handler and various supporting databases) may provide control of encryption key management, federation, and distribution through a centralized user interface. Such applied key management devices may provide centralized systems and/or methods of managing encryption keys associated with communications, infrastructure, and applications. Such applied key management devices may also manage device enrollment, monitor device health related to encryption capabilities, and monitor status for applied key management activities. Such capabilities may allow robust transaction reporting to support audit activities associated with communications, application, and infrastructure management.

Applied key management may be leveraged for additional systems other than the communication systems. Other implementations of applied key management may include application encryption management, virtualization encryption management, storage encryption management, and/or user identity encryption management. In short, if applications, communications, or infrastructures require use of encryption (or other types of security mechanisms using security objects) and keys (or security objects), applied key management may be applied to provide advantages as described. Communication systems may include, but are not limited to, radio communications, cellular communications, transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) based communications, satellite communications equipment, and the like. Application systems may include, but are not limited to voice-over-internet protocol VOIP applications, virtualization, identification and authentication, messaging, local storage. Infrastructure systems may include, but are not limited to storage solutions, physical security infrastructure, and medical equipment.

In particular embodiments, an applied key management device may enable encryption key lifecycle activities across multiple types of communication devices in a centralized manner. The applied key management device may leverage industry standards for key management for interoperability with existing systems and may use, for example, protocols for applied key management as a part of applied key management. A distinction between applied key management and key management alone may be demonstrated in encryption key management and key distribution for communication systems. Given the requirement to make new encryption connections before breaking existing connections, typical communication systems cannot utilize rekey commands as it would break communications before management steps are taken to establish new lines of communications. However, rekey commands may work for infrastructure—to include storage, applications and virtualization solutions—where services can be reestablished without loss of centralized control of the managed capability.

The system architecture of applied key management can be configured to allow for use of a standard-based approach for supported systems such as key management interoper-

ability protocol (KMIP), for example, but also the capability to develop support interfaces for non-standardized systems such as physical security infrastructure, virtualization applications, satellite communications systems, and medical equipment. This may be accomplished by architecturally separating message handling from support interfaces. Using a purely KMIP example, a storage device may receive a “rekey” command, a communication equipment may receive “put-and-notify” commands, and cellular devices may request queued “notify” commands informing the cellular devices to send “get messages” to the applied key management device to be relayed to key management and generation system components. Example systems implementing such features are discussed below.

Embodiments described herein may include an applied key management device to implement centralized, top-down enterprise encryption key management encryption keys (e.g., such as, but not limited to symmetric key encryption, asymmetric key encryption, and the like) as well as other security objects used in security systems. Such centralized, top-down control of encryption may be for a given enterprise. Embodiments may include implementing coordinated KMIP on enterprise key management, communications systems, applications, and infrastructure for encryption key lifecycle functions implementing at least one of: device registration, user registration, system and user initialization, key material installation, key establishment, key registration, operational use, key storage, key distribution, key update, key recovery, key de-registration, key destruction, key revocation, and the like.

As referred to herein, a “key attribute” (attribute, encryption attribute, and/or the like) associated with an encryption key may refer to a characteristic associated with the encryption key, cryptographic or security characteristics of the encryption key, the cryptographic algorithms of the encryption key, a device generating/transmitting/receiving the encryption key, a user of the device, and/or the like. Each encryption key may be associated with at least one key attribute. The encryption key may be transmitted and/or received with its associated key attributes represented in data values.

As referred to herein, a “policy” may be a rule managing an encryption key based on key attribute(s) associated with that encryption key. In particular embodiments, a policy may dictate whether the particular encryption key is an acceptable encryption key. Such acceptability may be based on the security and cryptographic considerations as to whether the encryption key (e.g., as shown from the key attributes associated with the encryption key) may be secure enough. In other words, the encryption key generated for a particular communication transaction may be presented for inspection by the policy to be evaluated as to whether the encryption key is to be allowed or denied for that communication transaction.

Some embodiments include an interface for applied key management for mobile communication devices (e.g., a wireless device, and/or the like), or provide an interface for applied key management for radio/satellite communications systems to include telemetry and payload in satellite communications. Particular implementations of the embodiments may include interfaces for banking applications such as, but not limited to, automated teller machines (ATMs), bank account interfaces, and the like. The interfaces for banking applications may be implemented on any mobile or non-mobile devices. Embodiments may provide an interface for applied key management for applications that include virtualization or providing an interface for applied key

management for network infrastructure to include routers, switches, virtual private network (VPN) appliances, firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), intrusion prevention system (IPSs), tokenizers, and/or the like.

For example, a centralized encryption management may be provided for symmetric encryption keys or asymmetric encryption keys, in both private and/or public contexts. In some embodiments, existing network infrastructure information may be consumed to distribute encryption keys based on active/inactive status of network infrastructure or distributing and managing encryption keys for network infrastructure based on equipment that can readily accept encryption keys (e.g., existing hardware/software may be installed on the equipment for accepting encryption keys).

Embodiments may queue encryption key transaction information for communication devices not available at the point of a given encryption management operation (e.g., in a push-key event). In addition, embodiments described herein may centrally display encryption key lifecycle information (for supported infrastructure) and successful encryption key management transactions. In addition to or as an alternative, failure message and/or a cause of unsuccessful encryption key management transactions may be displayed.

In some embodiments, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new asymmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. In addition, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new symmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. In some embodiments, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new asymmetric keys on user initiated basis may be provided. In various embodiments, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new symmetric keys on a user initiated basis may be provided. Also, federated distribution of encryption keys based on established trust based key exchange between two or more key management and applied key management devices may be provided as described.

In some embodiments, distributing federated symmetric key to local enterprise infrastructure based on configurations for federated symmetric key distribution may be provided. In various embodiments, distributing federated asymmetric key to local enterprise infrastructure based on configurations for federated asymmetric key distribution may be provided. In addition, implementing federated trust model by using multiple devices and split key distribution may be provided to establish trust between two untrusted entities that need to communicate securely.

The applied key management device (e.g., the management request handler and associated components) may include sub-modules including a business logic module, authentication and authorization module, policy enforcement module, system consistency/validation module, and/or the like for performing functions described herein.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an example of a general applied key management system **100** as implemented in various embodiments. In various embodiments, an applied key management device **110** may be coupled to at least one source device **150a** and at least one target device **150b**. The applied key management device **110** may include at least one desktop computer, mainframe computer, laptop computer, pad device, smart phone device or the like, configured with hardware and software to perform operations described herein. For example, the applied key management device **110** may include computation systems having suitable processing capabilities, memory, user interface (e.g., display and input) capabilities, and communication capabilities configured with suitable software to perform operations

described herein. Thus, particular embodiments may be implemented, using processor devices that are often already present in many business and organization environments, by configuring such devices with suitable software processes described herein. Accordingly, such embodiments may be implemented with minimal additional hardware costs. However, other embodiments of the applied key management device **110** may relate to systems and processes that are implemented with dedicated device hardware/devices specifically configured for performing operations described herein.

Generally, the source device **150a** may be a communication device transmitting data (or initiating communication) for which encryption (and therefore an encryption key) may be required or preferred. The target device **150b** may be a communication device for receiving data that may have been encrypted (e.g., with an encryption key). According to various embodiments, the source device **150a** and/or the target device **150b** may be an ATM. The source device **150a** and/or the target device **150b** may also be any server or device for storing bank account information and executing banking functions. In particular embodiments, each of the source device **150a** and the target device **150b** may include a mobile smart phone (such as, but not limited to an iPhone™, an Android™ phone, or the like) or other wireless mobile communication devices with suitable processing and encryption capabilities. Typical modern mobile communication devices include telephone communication electronics as well as some processor electronics, one or more display devices and a keypad and/or other user input device. In further embodiments, each of the source device **150a** and the target device **150b** may include any suitable type of mobile phone and/or other type of portable electronic communication device, such as, but not limited to, an electronic smart pad device (such as, but not limited to an iPad™), a portable computer, or the like. It should be noted that an encryption key may originate from either the source device **150a** or the target device **150b**, and/or both. In other words, either of the source device **150a** or the target device **150b** may be a key source **170**. The source device **150a** and the target device **150b** may be associated with a same enterprise or separate enterprises. In other embodiments, one or both of the source device **150a** and the target device **150b** may be a wired device suitable for communication with a wired or wireless device.

In some embodiments, the applied key management device **110** may be a part of the enterprise associated with the source device **150a** and target device **150b**. An enterprise may be an organization or security unit having dominance over at least one source device **150a** and/or target device **150b**. With respect to communication between the source device **150a** and the target device **150b** associated with disparate enterprises, the source device **150a** may be associated with a first enterprise and the target device **150b** may be associated with a second disparate enterprise. An enterprise may be a company, subgroup within a company, autonomous and independent entity, a communication group, security provider, various entities, organizations, and/or the like. Each applied key management device **110** may perform applied key management activities for a plurality of devices such as the source device **150a** and the target devices **150b**, establishing a hierarchical model for applied key management.

In other embodiments, the applied key management device **110** may be a third party server coupled to the enterprise associated with the source device **150a** and/or target device **150b**. Thus, various embodiments may affect

centralization of applied key management with existing communication systems and protocols of the enterprise. In other words, the applied key management device **110** may be implemented to cooperate with the existing encryption technology for communications, applications, and infrastructure. Applied key management (e.g., by a third party or otherwise) may interact with both the sources and targets of key information (e.g., the encryption key and the associated key attributes **160**). Accordingly, a top-down control of applied key management may be achieved, while maintaining a request model in which the source device **150a** and the target device **150b** may request key information.

In some embodiments, a key source **170** may be coupled to the applied key management device **110**. The key source **170** may be any source by which an encryption key (or any other types of security objects) may be generated. In some embodiments, the key source **170** may be a part of the applied key management device **110** (e.g., a module or database within the applied key management device **110** or coupled to the applied key management device **110**). In other embodiments, the key source **170** may be a source external to the applied key management device **110**. The key source **170** may include the source device **150a** and/or the target device **150b**, one or more of which may be capable of generating encryption keys for the communication therebetween. Alternatively or additionally, the key source **170** may be a key-generating device (other than the source device **150a** and the target device **150b**) internal or external to the same enterprise as the source device **150a** and/or the target device **150b**. In these cases, the key source **170** may be an existing specialized key generating device implemented separately from the applied key management device **110** (e.g., the key generation and management device **230** of FIG. 2). Other examples of the key source **170** may include a management user interface **220** of FIG. 2 (e.g., encryption keys may be generated manually through the management user interface **220**), a key federation interface **260** of FIG. 2 (e.g., encryption keys generated from a disparate enterprise), various databases storing generated encryption keys, and/or the like.

In various embodiments, a request **175** may be sent to the applied key management device **110**. The request **175** may be a request to generate an encryption key. For example, the applied key management device **110** may itself generate (or retrieve from a database coupled to the applied key management device **110**) encryption keys in response to the request **175**. In other examples, the applied key management device **110** may request an encryption key from other devices (e.g., the key source **170**) within the same or a disparate enterprise.

The request **175** may originate from the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**, the applied key management device itself **110**, a third-party device within the same enterprise (e.g., the management user interface **220**, the key management interface **240**, and the like), a third-party device in a disparate enterprise (e.g., from the key federation interface **260** of FIG. 2), and/or the like. Embodiments of the applied key management device **110** may therefore serve as an intermediary device between the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**, the requesting device (which issues the request **175**), the key source **170**, and/or the like. Accordingly, key management, distribution, and federation may effectively be managed for various devices in a same or disparate enterprise.

Various components within the general applied key management system **100** (e.g., the applied key management device **110**, the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**,

the applied key management device itself **110**, the device that issues the request **175**, the key source **170**, and/or the like) may be connected via any suitable wired or wireless network. The network may be secured or unsecured. For example, the network may be a wide area communication network, such as, but not limited to, the internet, or one or more intranets, local area networks (LANs), ethernet networks, metropolitan area networks (MANs), a wide area network (WAN), combinations thereof, or the like. In particular embodiments, the network may represent one or more secure networks configured with suitable security features, such as, but not limited to firewalls, encryption, or other software or hardware configurations that inhibits access to network communications by unauthorized personnel or entities.

In some embodiments, key attributes **160** may refer generally to characteristics associated with the encryption key itself, characteristics of a device associated with the encryption key, and/or the like. In other words, the key attributes **160** may refer to when, where, how, for what, with what device the encryption key has been or is about to be generated. Examples of the key attributes **160** may include, but not limited to, encryption key size, a classification of the encryption key, a time at which the encryption key has been or about to be generated (e.g., by the key source **170**), a location in which the encryption key has been or about to be generated (e.g., by the key source **170**), a role associated with the key source **170**, a role associated with the source device **150a**, a role associated with the target device **150b**, a role associated with a key generating/storage device, a role associated with a user of the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**, the key generating/storage device, the source **170**, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes **160** may include the key size. Typically, the larger the key size (i.e., the longer the encryption key), the more security it may provide for the communication. The key attributes **160** may also include the classification of the encryption key. In various embodiments, the classification of the encryption key may refer to its utilization e.g., what the encryption key may be used for. Examples of the utilization may include (e.g., for communication systems) whether an encryption key is a global hopping key, whether the encryption key is a secret key, whether the encryption key is symmetrical or asymmetrical, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes **160** may include a time and/or location at which the encryption key has been or about to be generated. As described, the time and/or location at which the encryption key may be generated may be defined from the perspective of the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**, and/or any other key sources **170**. For example, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent, received), a corresponding time of the device (e.g., the key sources **170**) generating (and/or sending, receiving) the encryption key may be determined. The encryption key may be transmitted/stored with a time stamp representing the time. Similarly, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent, received), a corresponding geo-location of the device (e.g., the key sources **170**) generating (and/or sending, receiving) the encryption key may be determined. The encryption key may be transmitted/stored with the geo-location.

In various embodiments, the key attributes **160** may include role(s) associated the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**, the key source **170**, the other key generating/storage device, as well as their associated user. Particularly, a role may refer to a group/classification (e.g., based on

predefined assignment, time, geo-location of the device, whether the device is generating encryption keys, whether the device is transmitting the encryption key, whether the device is receiving the encryption keys, and/or the like) in which the device/user is assigned to, a level of security clearance, the type of the device/user, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In particular examples, each device/user may be associated with at least a security group (e.g., assigned to a server). Within each security group, subgroups may exist to further subdivide the devices/users. The groups/subgroups may be predetermined by any suitable personnel. In other or further embodiments, the groups/subgroups may be defined when the encryption key is generated (e.g., based on current characteristics of the device such as geo-location, time of the day, and/or the like).

It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that one or more key attributes **160** may be associated with a given encryption key. In fact, as implemented in various embodiments, an encryption key may be associated with a plurality of key attributes **160**. The encryption key may be transmitted along with the associated key attributes **160** to a device (e.g., the applied key management device **110**). The encryption key and the key attributes **160** associated with the encryption key may be inspected according to at least one policy related to the key attributes **160**. Such process may be referred to as “shooting” the key attributes **160** against the relevant policies or “presenting” the key attributes **160** for “inspection” by the policy.

The encryption keys may generally be managed by a set of policies **115**. As implemented in various embodiments, a policy may refer to at least one defined rules governing the criteria for the key attributes **160**. In some embodiments, a policy engine (e.g., as embedded in the applied key management device **110** and/or other devices as described herein) may receive the encryption key and the key attributes **160** associated with the encryption key as input. The policy engine may output a response as to whether the encryption key may be allowable based on the key attributes **160**. In particular embodiments, the policy engine may output a binary response (e.g., accepted or denied).

The encryption key and the associated key attributes **160** may be presented for inspection one or more times per communication transaction. In some embodiments, the encryption key and the associated key attributes **160** may only be required to be presented for inspection by policy **115** once per communication transaction (e.g., at the initiation stage before the communication transaction has taken place but after the encryption key has been generated). In other or further embodiments, the encryption key and the associated key attributes **160** may be required to be presented for inspection by the policies **115** periodically and/or every time the encryption key has been altered for a given communication transaction. In some case several encryption keys may be presented for inspection by the policies **115** for a given communication transaction.

The policy engine may identify the key attributes **160** received. The policy engine may retrieve relevant policy **115** from a local or remote storage database. In other embodiments, the policy engine may inspect particular key attributes **160** (or sometimes all key attributes **160**) associated with the encryption key as the policy engine determines acceptability based on the predefined set of policies **115**. For example, the policy engine may determine, based on the relevant policy **115**, whether the encryption key should be accepted for the communication transaction for which the encryption key may be generated.

In one non-limiting example, the policies **115** may dictate that a size of the encryption key must be within a predetermined range (e.g., the size of the encryption key must exceed and/or be below 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits, and/or the like). In some cases, the policy **115** may dictate that the size of the encryption keys must be a particular key size (e.g., 256-bit, and/or the like).

The policies **115** may require that the geo-location attribute of the key attributes **160** to be associated with (or not associated with) a predetermined location and/or within (or not within) a predetermined area. For example, when the geo-location attribute of the encryption key (e.g., as defined by the geo-location of the generating, transmitting, and/or receiving device of the encryption key) is associated with a “danger” zone, the policy engine may deny the encryption key. This is because there may be a high likelihood that the encryption key may be compromised in the danger zone. On the other hand, when the geo-location attribute of the encryption key is associated with a “safe” zone, then the encryption key may be allowed for the communication transaction. This is because there may be at most a low likelihood of included security keys. In further embodiments, a “neutral” zone may be a safe zone, or, in the alternative, a zone associated with an intermediate likelihood of included security keys.

In another non-limiting example, the policies **115** may require the time attribute of the key attributes **160** to be within (or not within) a predetermined time period. The policy **115** may deny the encryption key on the basis that the time attribute (e.g., a time stamp) associated with the creation, transmission, and/or reception of the encryption key may be outside of a predetermined time period (for example, at 3:00 am, where acceptable creation, transmission, and/or reception time of the encryption key may be between 9:00 am-5:00 pm).

In various embodiments, the policies **115** may allow the encryption key, when the role attribute of the key attributes **160** is associated with the encryption key generating/transmitting/receiving device (and the device’s associated user) is within a predetermined accepted group. In some examples, the source device **150a** (the target device **150b** or other source devices **170**) associated with a first security group within an enterprise may generate an encryption key and present the encryption key for inspection by the policy **115**. The policy engine may determine whether the first security group may be a part of the accepted group. When the policy engine determined that the source device **150a** (the target device **150b** or other source devices **170**) is a part of the accepted group (e.g., the first security group falls within the accepted group), the encryption key may be allowed for the communication transaction for which the encryption has been created for.

It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that a plurality of policies **115** may act in concert for a comprehensive encryption key management scheme. This means that, the plurality of policies **115**, each of which may regulate at least one disparate key attribute **160**, may be aggregated into a set of policies **115** for regulating encryption keys presented to the policy engine.

In other examples, other key sources **170** (e.g., other than the source device **150a** and the target device **150b**) may generate an encryption key to be distributed (or pushed) to the source device **150a** and/or the target device **150b** for a communication transaction between those devices. The policy engine (e.g., the applied key management device **110**) may inspect the key attributes **160** to determine whether the encryption key is allowable. In response to the encryption

key being determined to be allowable, the applied key management device **110** may determine to distribute the encryption key to the source device **150a** and/or the target device **150b** for the communication transaction.

In various embodiments, when the policy engine denies the encryption key, the policy engine may transmit a rejection indicator (e.g., a “denied” message) to the key source **170**. The key generating device may redesign a second encryption key to be presented (along with the key attributes **160** associated with the second encryption key) to the policy engine for a second round of inspection. In other embodiments, when the policy engine denies the encryption key, the policy engine may transmit a “denied” message to the key source **170** along with a cause of failure (e.g., a hint) as to which the key attribute **160** caused the denial and/or what it should be.

For example, an encryption key with key attributes **160** including a time attribute of 4:49 am, geo-location attribute of “safe zone,” and role attribute of “security group A” may be presented to a set of policies **115**. The policy engine may allow the encryption key when the encryption key is generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m., in either a “safe zone” or a “neutral zone,” and for security groups A-C. Such encryption key may be denied, given that it is not generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m. The policy engine may transmit the “denied” message along with a time attribute hint (e.g., to generate the encryption key after 5:00 a.m., in 11 minutes).

Accordingly, the applied key management device **110** may be configured to manage encryption keys and distribute the encryption keys. In other words, the applied key management device **110** may serve as an intermediary between the source devices **150a**, the target devices **150b**, other key sources **170**, and/or the like as these devices themselves may lack the capability to distribute and manage encryptions in the manner set forth with respect to the applied key management device **110**. The applied key management device **110** may include a plurality of modules (or may be coupled to remote modules) for each feature as described herein. In addition, the general applied key management system **100** may be coupled with at least one other similar general applied key management system **100** to make up the encryption key federation scheme as described herein.

FIG. 2 is schematic diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system **200** according to various embodiments. In some embodiments, the applied key management system **200** may illustrate a particularized implementation of the general applied key management system **100**. From an architectural perspective, embodiments as illustrated for the applied key management system **200** may be centered around message handling and interoperability with key generation technology, other applied key management devices, supported communications systems, applications, and infrastructure.

The applied key management device **110** may include at least a management request handler **205**, a request handler **210**, a support structure **215**, a key federation interface **260**, as well as the associated databases (e.g., a local key database **270**, transactions database **275**, policy database **280**, local user repository **285**, configuration database **290**, device inventory database **295**).

In various embodiments, the management request handler **205** may include (or is) the policy engine that may be implemented for policy-based encryption key management, distribution, and federation. As the management request handler **205** can be an intermediary layer between the various components described, rapid integration of the

policy-based encryption key management, distribution, and federation may be added to an existing system without having to make changes to the system level message handling. The management request handler **205** may provide a top-down management for various communication devices (e.g., a cellular device **250a**, a network device **250b**, . . . , a device N **250n**, and/or the like) associated with a given enterprise. In various embodiments, each of the cellular device **250a**, the network device **250b**, . . . , and the device N **250n** may be the source device **150a** or the target device **150b** depending on the particular communication transaction for which the encryption key is generated.

The management request handler **205** and the request handler **210** may be of an agent-interface relationship. That is, the request handler **210** may serve as the interface between the management request handler **205** and the various communication devices associated with the enterprise (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, the network device **250b**, . . . , the device N **250n**, and/or the like). The communication between the management request handler **205** and the request handler **210** may be facilitated by the support structure **215**. The support structure **215** may provide suitable communication protocol, management application, infrastructure, communication application program interface (API), configurations, translations, and/or the like for interfacing between the management request handler **205** and the request handler **210**.

The request handler **210** may receive key generating requests **175** and/or encryption keys from the various communication devices and relate them to the management request handler **205** with the assistance from the support structure **215**. The request handler **210** may also relate the response of the management request handler **205** (including the hint in some embodiments) and/or encryption keys to the various communication devices with the assistance from the support structure **215**.

In various embodiments, the management request handler **205** may receive the request **175** for generating an encryption key. Various components may be capable of transmitting the request **175** to the management request handler **205**. In some embodiments, the management request handler **205** may receive the request **175** from the various communication devices associated with the enterprise (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, network device **250b**, . . . , device N **250n**, and/or the like). The request **175** may be related by the request handler **210**, which may serve as the interface between the devices and the management request handler as described. The key federation interface **260**, the management user interface **220**, and the key management interface **240** may also transmit the request **175** to the management request handler.

In non-request-driven embodiments, the management request handler **205** may receive encryption keys from at least one key source **170**. The key source **170** may be the key generation and management device **230**, which may be any suitable existing encryption key generating apparatus implemented within the enterprise. In other words, the key generation and management device **230** may represent any existing schemes internal or external to the communication systems of the enterprise. For example, the key generation and management device **230** may be any suitable native protocol associated with safe net equipment.

Embodiments of the key management interface **240** may represent an internal integration of key generation and key management capabilities as well as an external interface with existing solutions. This is because the key management interface **240** may be poised between the key generation and

management device **230** (which may generate encryption keys) and the management request handler **205** (which inspects key attributes **160** of the encryption keys based on policies **115**). For example, the key management interface **240** may be a translation interface that maintains a standard encryption management messaging language with the applied key management device **110**. This can allow enterprise interoperability between existing solutions (e.g., the key generation and management device **230**) and the applied key management platform (e.g., the management request handler **205**). Accordingly, the policy-based applied key management systems and methods may be implemented with various types of security object (e.g., encryption key) generation protocols.

Additionally or alternatively, in request-driven embodiments, the management user interface **220** may transmit the request **175** to the management request handler **210**. The management user interface **220** may utilize the same API as other components described herein to assure interoperability. The management user interface **220** may include suitable user input and display devices to receive and display data to a designated managing user. In particular embodiments, the management user interface **220** may include a mobile device such as a smartphone or a tablet. The management user interface **220** may also include a wired device.

In some embodiments, the key federation interface **260** may transmit the request **175** to the management request handler **205**. The key federation interface **260** may be in communication with a second key federation interface (such as, but not limited to, the key federation interface **260**) associated with a disparate enterprise (which may utilize the same or similar applied key management systems and methods described). When one of the various communication devices (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, network device **250b**, . . . , device N **250n**, and/or the like) wishes communicate with another device from the disparate enterprise (or vice versa), the request **175** may be transmitted (from the key federation interface **260** of the second enterprise) to the key federation interface **260** of the current enterprise. In some embodiments, the request **175** may be directly transmitted to the management request handler **205** when the key federation interface **260** has designated the relationship between the enterprises to be trusted.

In some embodiments, instead of or in addition to the request **175**, encryption keys as well as the “allowed” and “denied” messages may be transmitted and received between the key federation interface **260** (of the current and the second enterprise). The encryption key and its associated attributes **160** may be stored in the local key database **270**, which may be accessible by the management request handler **205** (for policy inspection) and/or the request handler **210** (for distribution).

The request **175** may be transmitted with further instructions related to generating the encryption key. The further instructions include, but are not limited to, a source of encryption keys, the encryption keys themselves, key attributes **160** associated with the encryption keys, and/or the like.

In various embodiments, in response to receiving the request **175**, the management request handler **205** may generate or facilitate the generation of the encryption key. For example, where the request **175** may be silent as to where the encryption key is to be generated (e.g., the key source **170**), the management request handler **205** itself may generate the encryption key. The management request handler **205** may generate the encryption key based on the set of policies **115** stored in the policy database **280**. In other

words, the management request handler **205** may generate the encryption keys with key attributes **160** that would not have violated any policies **115** set forth in the policy database **280**.

Where the request **175** may be silent as to where the encryption key is to be generated (e.g., the key source **170**), or specifies that a particular key source **170** to generate the encryption key, the management request handler **205** may retrieve or otherwise request the encryption key from a suitable key source **170**. The management request handler **205** may request encryption keys from the management user interface **220**, the key federation interface **260**, the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, network device **250b**, . . . , device N **250n**, source device **150a**, and target device **150b**), key management interface **240**, and/or the like.

The management request handler **205** may retrieve encryption keys from a designated database storing encryption keys (e.g., the local key database **270**). The local key database **270** may be coupled to other key sources **170** (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, network device **250b**, . . . , device N **250n**, source device **150a**, target device **150b**, the key generation and management device **230** the key federation interface **260**, and/or the like) and store cached encryption keys on behalf of the other key sources **170**. The management request handler **205** may retrieve encryption keys from the local key database **270** instead of requesting encryption keys from the key sources **170**. This is so that transaction time for retrieving/generating the encryption key may be improved, and that network problems would not hinder the ability of the management request handler **205** to obtain encryption keys, given that the local key database may be local to (e.g., residing on a same network node) the management request handler **205**. As the management request handler **205** is retrieving encryption keys from the local key database **270**, a verification request may be sent to the key source **170** to ensure whether the encryption key to be retrieved has been altered by the key source **170**. A confirmation or an updated encryption key may be sent to the local key database **270** in response, so that the management request handler **205** may accordingly receive the encryption key.

In some embodiments, the management request handler **205**, upon receiving encryption keys (whether requested or not) in any manner as described, may cache the encryption key along with the key source identifier and the associated key attributes **160** at the local key database **270**. The encryption key, the key source identifier, and the key attributes **160** may be stored in case that the communication is lost or when the encryption key source of the encryption key is not authoritative. Whereas in some embodiments, the encryption key may not be transmitted with the key attributes **160**. In such embodiments, the management request handler **205** may determine the key attributes **160** from various sources such as, but not limited to, the local user repository **285**, the device inventory database **295**, and/or the like.

The management request handler **205** may then inspect the key attributes **160** associated with the encryption key received based on the set of policies **115** stored in the policy database **280**. The management request handler **205** may retrieve all policies **115** or only the relevant policies (e.g., based on some or all key attributes **160**) from the policy database **280**. In some embodiments, the encryption keys generated by the management request handler **205** or at the direction of the management request handler **205** may be spared from inspection by policies **115** when they are

created based on the policies **115**. In other embodiments, all encryption keys generated by the management request handler **205** or at the direction of the management request handler **205** may be inspected by the policies **115**. Encryption keys allowable based on the policies **115** may be allowed while unacceptable encryption keys may be denied, in the manner described. The management request handler **205** may be configured to update or add policies stored in the policy database **280** (e.g., as directed by the management user interface **220**).

The local user repository **285** may be a database storing information related to local users of the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, network device **250b**, device N **250n**, and/or the like) within the enterprise. In various embodiments, the local user repository **285** may store characteristics/information of the users that would constitute key attributes **160**. The characteristics include, but not limited to, privileges, security groups, assigned roles, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The security groups may be stored in a hierarchical tree. The management request handler **205** may access the local user repository **285** for such characteristics and utilize them as key attributes **160** associated with encryption keys requested, transmitted, or received by that device corresponding to such characteristics. The management request handler **205** may add or alter information stored in the local user repository **285**. A copy of the information stored in the local user repository **285** may be sent to the local key database **270** as key attributes **160** to be stored in the local key database **270**.

In some embodiments, the transaction database **275** may store various communication transactions or potential communication transactions. In some embodiments, the transaction database **275** may store encryption key transmission instances (i.e., instances where encryption keys are to be distributed) to one or more devices. For example, when a particular encryption key cannot/should not be forwarded (e.g., pushed to a communication device) for any reason, the forwarding transaction (e.g., a job) may be queued or otherwise stored within the transactions database **275** for forwarding the encryption key at a later some. The transaction database **275** may also store a status of each particular encryption key transmission instance, which may later be read by the request handler **210**. For example, the request handler **210** may at a later time attempt to transmit all or some encryption keys to corresponding communication devices for all “unsent” encryption key transmission instances. The transactions database **275** may be coupled to the local key database **270** to gain access of the keys to be forwarded to each communication device that the encryption key may be generated for.

In further embodiments, the transaction database **275** may be coupled to the request handler **210** and may store the communication transactions (for which the encryption key may be requested, transmitted, or received) and/or the associated key attributes **160**. For example, the request handler **210** may transmit such information to the transactions database **275**. The transaction database **275** may be coupled to the local key database **270**. The communication transactions (as the associated details) may be associated with the encryption keys stored in the local key database **270**. The management request handler **205** may need to access only the local key database **270** for the encryption keys and the associated key attributes **160**.

The configuration database **290** may store supporting instructions for the key applied key management system **200**. In some embodiments, the configuration database **290** may store internal network, configuration of clients, con-

figuration of applications, IP address allocations, various component configurations, device privileges, device communication pathways, credentials, and/or the like. The configuration database 290 may be coupled to the management request handler 205, which may require the instructions stored within the configuration database 290 for operations. The management request handler 205 may also add or alter the information stored in the configuration database 290.

In some embodiments, the device inventory database 295 may store information related to the communication devices associated with the given enterprise. For example, information stored may include, but not limited to, security group, security level, geo-location, identification number, internal classification, device specifications, time stamp in which an encryption has been created, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The request handler 210 may be coupled to the device inventory database 295 to store such data therein. The management request handler 205 may be coupled to the device inventory database 295 for accessing such device information. The device inventory database 295 for associating particular cached keys with the corresponding device information as key attributes 160. A copy of the information stored in the device inventory database 295 may be sent to the local key database 270 as key attributes 160.

The key federation interface 260 may allow one applied key management device 110 to federate encryption key information with one or more other applied key management devices 110 (through their associated respective key federation interfaces 260) based on an established trust relationship. Each enterprise may include by an applied key management device 110. As such, the key federation interface 260 may maintain a trust relationship with the communication systems of at least one other enterprise. It is, in other words, a gateway to extend trust.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of an encryption key federation system 300 as implemented in various embodiments. The key federation system 300 may implement the applied key management device 110 as set forth with respect to FIGS. 1-2. The key federation system 300 may be based on extra-enterprise communication relationship and key federation enabled by the applied key management device 110 (e.g., the management request handler 205 and the associated components).

Encryption keys (e.g., asymmetric encryption keys, symmetric encryption keys, and/or the like) generated by components within one enterprise (e.g., enterprise A 390a) may be distributed to a disparate applied key management device (e.g., the applied key management device 110, the management request handler 205, and its associated components, and/or the like) of another enterprise (e.g., enterprise B 390b) pursuant to inspection by the policies 115 of either (or both) enterprises. This can enable secured communications or data exchange with outside entities (e.g., enterprises) based on the federated trust model. This can also allow encryption management to parallel communications management in supporting external communications to enable symmetric key encryption for communications. Accordingly, performance of the communications platform may be improved, given that utilization of asymmetric encryption may be expensive from a processing perspective as compared to symmetric encryption.

In the key federation system 300, each enterprise (e.g., the enterprise A 390a or the enterprise B 390b) may be associated with a respective one of an applied key management device A 310a and an applied key management device B 310b). Each of the applied key management device A 310a and the applied key management device B 310b may be the

applied key management device 110. The applied key management device A 310a and the applied key management device B 310b may be in communication with one another through any suitable network. In particular, the key federation interfaces (e.g., the key federation interface 260) of each of the applied key management device A 310a and the applied key management device B 310b may be in communication with one another.

In various embodiments, the key management server A 330a and the key management server B 330b may be a device such as, but not limited to, the key generation and management device 230 and the key management interface 240. Each of the key management server A 330a and the key management server B 330b may be coupled to their respective key federation interfaces 206 within their respective enterprises in the manner described.

A device A 350a and a device B 350b may attempt to obtain an encryption key for the communication therebetween. Each of the device A 350a and the device B 350b may be the source device 150a, the target device 150b, the cellular device 250a, the network device 250b, . . . , the device N 250n, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

An encryption key may be generated within one enterprise (e.g., enterprise A 390a) from any suitable key source 170 in the manner described. The encryption key may be generated by the enterprise A 390a (e.g., by a key source 170 in the enterprise A 390a) with or without a request 170 from either enterprise B 390b or within enterprise A. The encryption key may likewise be generated by the enterprise B 390b in a similar manner. The encryption key and its associated key attributes 160 may be presented to the policy engine of enterprise A 390a (e.g., the applied key management device A 310a, which may include the management request handler 205 and its associated components) for inspection in the manner described. In response to the policy engine of enterprise A 390a determining the encryption key is accepted based on the encryption key attributes 160, the applied key management device 310a (e.g., the key federation interface 260) of enterprise A 390a may relate the encryption key as well as its associated key attributes 160 to the applied key management device B 310b (e.g., the key federation interface 260) of enterprise B 390b.

Upon receiving the encryption key and its associated key attributes 160, the encryption key and its associated key attributes 160 may be presented to the policy engine of enterprise B 390b (e.g., the applied key management device B 310b, which may also include the management request handler 205 and its associated components) for inspection in the manner described. The encryption key may be forwarded to both the device A 350a and the device B 350b when the applied key management device B 310b determines that the encryption key is consistent with its policies 115 defined for enterprise B 390b. In other words, the encryption key (as defined by its key attributes 160) may be allowed only if it is consistent with both sets of policies 115 of enterprise A 390a as well as enterprise B 390b. At least some of the set of policies 115 of enterprise A 390a may be different from at least some of the set of policies 115 of enterprise B 390b. Whereas the encryption key is found not allowable by either the applied key management device A 310a or the applied key management device B 310b, the encryption key may be returned back to the key source 170 with the "denied" message and/or the hint in the manner described.

In other embodiments, acceptance by policies 115 associated with only one enterprise (e.g., either enterprise A 390a or enterprise B 390b) may be sufficient for encryption key to be allowed. In such cases, the trust extends to some or

sometimes all of the policies **115**. In addition, each enterprise may include a set of policies **115** for the federated instances (e.g., each enterprise may have agreed with the other regarding a set of policies **115** used when communications between the communication devices of the enterprises are to occur. Accordingly, each enterprise may store (e.g., in each respective policy database **280**) a same set of federated (mutual and reciprocal) policies for the federated schemes. The federated policies may be the same for both the enterprise A **390a** and the enterprise B **390b**. Thus, allowance by one applied key management device associated with one enterprise may be sufficient for the encryption key to be forwarded for usage for communication between both enterprises.

In various embodiments, enterprise federation policies may be stored within each policy database **280**. The enterprise federation policies may specify the manner in which the encryption keys may be federated. For example, the enterprise federation policies may specify the federated policies, which applied key management device may inspect the key attributes **160**, which enterprise may issue a request **175** for an encryption key, which enterprise may generate an encryption key, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The enterprise federation policies allow flexibility in policy defining. For example, the enterprise federation policies may specify that enterprises may each include its own policies **115** in addition to the federated policies, where at least a part the policies **115** of each enterprise may be disparate.

In some embodiments, a communication platform A **320a** and a communication platform B **320b** of each respective enterprise may be in communication with one another via any suitable network. Such communication between the communication platforms may be encrypted communications, where the encryption key corresponding to such communication may also be presented for inspection by policies **115** similar to described with respect to the devices (e.g., the device A **350a**, the device B **350b**, and/or the like). Each communication platform may be in communication to a respective device, such that configurations related to the applied key management systems may be exchanged.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a communication device **400** consuming applied key management services as part of the enterprise according to some embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-4, the communication device **400** may be a device such as, but not limited to, the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**, the cellular device **250a**, the network device **250b**, . . . , the device N **250n**, the device A **350a**, the device B **350b**, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In some embodiments, the communication device **400** leverages applied key management to receive encryption keys (or key updates) associated with applications such as, but not limited to, an Email application **410a**, voice-over-internet protocol (VOIP) application **410b**, storage encryption **410c**, and/or other encryption applications **410d** on the communication device **400**.

The communication device **400** may be registered with an applied key management platform to receive applied key management services. The communication device **400** may provide an application interface **420** based configured to receive with encryption key distribution and encryption key management messages (e.g., the “allowed” message, the “denied” message, the hint, and/or the like) from the applied key management device **110**. The application interface **420** may be coupled to each of the Email application **410a**, voice-over-internet protocol (VOIP) application **410b**, storage encryption **410c**, and/or other encryption applications **410d** to forward the accepted encryption key to them.

This communication device **400** may also utilize KMIP by a KMIP proxy **430** to receive KMIP type commands from the applied key management device **110**. The KMIP proxy **430** may be connected to the key store **440** for managing the encryption keys stored therein. The KMIP proxy **430** may also be connected to a device-end cryptographic unit **450**. The device-end cryptographic unit **450** may be configured to generate encryption keys. In response to the “denied” message, the device-end cryptographic unit **450** may generate a different encryption key to present to the policy engine for inspection. Whereas the hint is given, the device-end cryptographic unit **450** may generate a different encryption key based on the hint. The device-end cryptographic unit **450** may cache its encryption keys in the key store **440**. The device-end cryptographic unit **450** may be coupled to the application interface **420**. The application interface **420** may transmit the encryption keys generated along with the key attributes **160** to the policy engine and forward the response of the policy engine to the device-end cryptographic unit **450** e.g., when the response is negative.

Accordingly, operation-level policy inspection may be achieved. Given that the communication device **400** may be capable to interact with the policy engine regarding the encryption keys, the ability to service the request for an encryption key (or inspect the encryption key) by a third-party device (e.g., the policy engine residing in the applied key management device **110**) acting as administrating may be achieved. The request **175** for an encryption key or the encryption key may be serviced each communication transaction.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a request authentication process **500** for issuing requests **175** for encryption keys in various applied key management systems according to some embodiments. The request authentication process **500** may be internal to the applied key management device **110**, when the applied key management device **110** (e.g., the management request handler **205**, the applied key management device A **310a**, the applied key management device B **310b**, and/or the like) itself generates the encryption keys. In other embodiments, the request authentication process **500** may be external to the applied key management device **110** to support integration with existing key management and key generation infrastructure (e.g., the key generation and management device **230**, the key management server A **330a**, the key management server B **330b**, and/or the like).

First, at block **B510**, the applied key management device **110** may provide authentication information to a key source **170**. As described, such key source **170** may be the applied key management device **110** itself, the key generation and management device **230**, the management user interface **220**, the key federation interface **260**, the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, network device **250b**, . . . , device N **250n**, source device **150a**, target device **150b**, device A **350a**, device B **350b**, communication device **400**, a combination thereof, and/or the like), and/or other external key sources. The authentication information may be any suitable authentication method, such as username/passcode request, security handshake algorithms, biometric request, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

Next, at block **B520**, the applied key management device **110** may receive authentication response from the key source **170**. The applied key management device **110** may authenticate the response and establish trusted relationship between the key source **170** and the applied key management device **110**. Next at block **B530**, the applied key management device **110**, the management user interface **220**, the key generation and management device **230**, the

communication devices, and other API calls may issue a key management/generation request (e.g., the request **175**) to the key source **170**. In some embodiments, the applied key management device **110** may forward the request **175** from a trusted third party (e.g., the communication devices, the management user interface **220**, the key federation interface **260**, and/or other third-party devices) to the key source **170**. In some embodiments, the request **175** may be directly sent to the key source **170**. The applied key management device **110** may be configured to determine whether to generate encryption keys itself or forward the request to another key source **170** when the request **175** does not identify the key source **170**. Next, at block **B540**, the applied key management device **110** may receive response (e.g., the encryption keys as requested) from the key source **170**.

Subsequently, the encryption keys obtained by the applied key management device **110** may be evaluated based on the key attributes **160** and the policies **115** in the manner described. When allowed, the encryption keys may be distributed to the communication devices associated with the corresponding communication transaction. When denied, the applied key management device **110** may transmit the “denied” message (and in some instances, the hint) and standby for new encryption keys.

In some embodiments, multiple requests may be sent to a plurality of key sources **170**, each request may correspond to a single communication transaction. In response, the multiple responses (e.g., encryption keys) may be received from the key sources **170**. In other embodiments, multiple requests may be sent to a plurality of key sources **170**, where two or more requests may correspond to a same communication transaction. As the applied key management device **110** may receive two or more encryption keys from the key sources **170**. The applied key management device **110** may determine one of the two or more encryption keys for the communication transaction based on the policies **115** (e.g., the most secure out of the two or more encryption keys).

Accordingly, large scale distribution by the applied key management device **110** may be possible in systems including at least one source for the encryption keys and multiple recipient communication devices.

FIG. **6** is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a communication device registration process **600** implemented in various applied key management systems according to various embodiments. Blocks **B610**, **B620**, **B630** may be executed simultaneously or sequentially in that order. First, at block **B610** the communication device may be discovered (e.g., by the request handler **210**). The request handler **210** may detect that the communication device is present within the enterprise (e.g., the networks associated with the enterprise) automatically.

At block **B620**, the communication device may be registered (e.g., by the request handler **210**). In some embodiments, configuration information related to the applied key management systems may be transmitted to the communication device. Device information of the communication device may be transmitted to the local user repository **285**, device inventory database **295**, and/or the like. At block **B630**, the communication device may be enrolled (e.g., by the request handler **210**). For example, the communication device may transmit a server authentication request the request handler **210** and receiving a positive authorization response.

Next, at block **B640**, the communication device may be accepted (e.g., by the request handler **210**). For example, the request handler **210** and/or the management request handler **205** may check existing policies **115** based on the device

information to determine whether the communication device has been classified in the appropriate group, whether the applied key management device **110** may be capable of managing the communication device, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

Next, at block **B650**, the request handler **210** may provide device authentication information to the communication device. The authentication information may include configurations (e.g., credentials, passcodes, and/or the like) to access the applied key management device **110**. Next, at block **B660**, the request handler **210** and/or the management request handler **205** may define applied key management rules for the communication device. Following block **B660** at block **B670** a corresponding identifier, the communication device has been added to an applied key management registration. Subsequently, the communication device may request for encryption keys, generate encryption keys, receive approved encryption keys, and/or the like in the manner described. Such process ensures that the communication device utilizing services provided by the applied key management device **110** may meet the operable standards of the applied key management device **110**.

FIG. **7** illustrates an example of a key management and distribution process **700** according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. **1-7**, the key management and distribution process **700** may be implemented with communication devices registered, discovered, and/or enrolled with the applied key management device **110**.

First, at block **B710**, the management request handler **205** may define key management command. A key management command may be a particularized command for a key management event (e.g., “job”). The key management event may be an event triggering a set of algorithms to create encryption keys based on the policies **115** and distribute (e.g., push) the encryption keys to at least one of the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device **250a**, network device **250b**, . . . , device **N 250n**, source device **150a**, target device **150b**, device **A 350a**, device **B 350b**, communication device **400**, a combination thereof, and/or the like).

In some embodiments, the key management event may be based on time. For example, the management request handler **205** may be configured to rekey for at least some (sometimes all) of the communication devices associated with the enterprise (or another enterprise) periodically (e.g., every day, every week, every month, and/or the like). In various embodiments, the key management event may occur automatically through an API call. The API call may be issued from any components internal and/or external to the applied key management device **110** within a same or disparate enterprise.

The key management event may also be user-defined. For example, the management user interface **220** may receive user input from the designated user to generate encryption keys immediately for at least one communication device. In such examples, such user-defined key management events may be initiated in response to a sudden event, including cyber-attacks, security breaches, change to the policies **115**, and/or the like. The management user interface **220** may also alter the policies **115** stored within the policy database **280** in response to these key management events. The new encryption keys created must follow the altered set of policies **115**.

The key management command may include providing encryption key to some or all communication devices within the same or a disparate enterprise, re-transmitting a same or different encryption key to some or all communication devices within the same or disparate enterprise, a combina-

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tion thereof, and/or the like. In various embodiments, the management request handler **205** may define for a plurality of key management commands, each of which may correspond to a communication transaction and/or communication device associated with the enterprise. In further embodiments, the management request handler **205** may define key management commands for communication devices associated with a disparate enterprise when allowed by the federation model. The management commands (e.g., encryption keys) may be transmitted via the key federation interfaces **260** associated with each enterprise.

Next, at block **B720**, the management request handler **205** may build a key management command queue. A job created in response to the key management event may include a plurality of key management commands, each of which may correspond to a communication device and/or a communication transaction. Accordingly, where the key management commands are generating new encryption keys and distributing to two or more communication devices, the key management commands may be queued (e.g., stored within the transactions database **275**) for execution, given the volume of the key management commands. As such, a composite command may correspond to key management commands for multiple key sources to issue encryption keys to multiple encryption key receiving communication devices. The composite command may be associated with a plurality of key management commands, and may be stored as a whole in the transaction database **275** awaiting distribution. Thus, even if a server (e.g., the management request handler **205**) is shut off before all the key management commands are executed/distributed, the process may resume as soon as the sever is switched on.

Key management command associated with inactive communication devices (e.g., communication devices that may be turned off and/or off the network) may be stored in the transactions database **275** for future distribution (e.g., when the inactive communication devices are switched on) by the management request handler **205** at block **B730**. On the other hand, for active devices (e.g., communication devices that may be turned on and/or on the network), the key management command may be executed by the management request handler **205** at block **B740**.

For example, the management request handler **205** may request encryption keys from key sources **170** based on the key management commands at block **B750**. For example, the key management commands may specify one or more key sources **170** to issue encryption keys to the communication devices. Accordingly, some communication devices may receive encryption keys from a first key source while other communication device may receive encryption keys from a second different key source. Next, at block **B760**, the management request handler **205** may distribute encryption keys to the communication devices. In some embodiments, the management request handler **205** may perform encryption key inspection based on the key attributes **160** and the set of policies **115** in the manner described. Once approved, the management request handler **205** may forward the encryption keys to the corresponding communication devices through the request handler **210**.

Next, at block **B770**, the management request handler **205** may receive response to the distribution from the communication devices. For example, the management request handler **205** may determine, based on the responses of the communication devices, whether such distribution was successful at block **B780**. Whereas the management request handler **205** determines that the distribution was successful with respect to a given communication device (e.g., that

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communication device has received the encryption key distributed to it), positive feedback may be provided to the management request handler **205** at block **B795**.

On the other hand, whereas the management request handler **205** determines that the distribution was unsuccessful (e.g., that communication device has not received the encryption key distributed to it) for a given communication device, a negative response of that communication device may be provided to the management request handler **205** at block **B790**. The management request handler **205** may then determine whether to attempt to execute the key management command again at a later time for that communication device based on preexisting algorithms or user input at block **B798**.

When management request handler **205** determines that execution of the key management commands (e.g., the distribution of the encryption) is not to be attempted again (**B798:NO**), the process ends. On the other hand, whereas the management request handler **205** determines that key management commands not successfully distributed are to be attempted again (**B798:YES**), the key management commands may be stored at block **B730** (e.g., in the transactions database **275**) for future distribution.

In some embodiments, when distribution of the key management commands may be unsuccessful, the management request handler **205** may determine to retry distribution of the unsuccessful key management commands (**B780:RETRY**). For example, the management request handler **205** may again execute key management commands for active devices at block **B740**.

FIG. **8** is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key federation process **800** according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. **1-8**, applied key management devices **110** (e.g., both in a same local enterprise and in a foreign enterprise) may mutually authenticate and distribute encryption keys based on the policies **115** implemented for applied key management devices **110** or each enterprise for federating encryption keys from one enterprise to another enterprise. In addition, the encryption key federation process **800** may also include the receiving of encryption keys from a foreign applied key management device as a result of the federation policy of the foreign applied key management device.

First, at block **B810**, the local applied key management device (e.g., the applied key management device **A 310a**) may provide authentication information to a foreign applied key management device (e.g., the applied key management device **B 310b**). The authentication information may be any suitable authentication prompt and/or request for federation. Next, at block **B820**, the local applied key management device may receive authentication response from the foreign applied key management device agreeing to initiation the federation model. The blocks **B810** and **B820** may represent typical security credential handshakes, where federation trust has been established between the two enterprises.

Next, at block **B830**, the local applied key management device may provide trust policy information to the foreign applied key management device. At block **B840**, the local applied key management device may receive trust policy information from the foreign applied key management device. The trust policy information may include any configurations, settings, extent of trust, mutually agreed policies, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

Next, at block **B850**, the local applied key management device and the foreign applied key management device may manage and distribute key information (e.g., the encryption

key, the associated key attributes **160**, a combination thereof, and/or the like) in the manner described.

In particular embodiments, the foreign applied key management device transmit the request **175** to the local applied key management device for generating the encryption key for a communication transaction between a communication device associated with the foreign applied key management device and a communication device associated with the local applied key management device. The encryption key may be generated by the local applied key management device and inspected by local policy engine. The encryption key may be transmitted to the foreign applied key management device for inspection by the foreign policy engine in some embodiments, but not others.

In some embodiments, instead of the request **175**, the foreign applied key management device may transmit a generated encryption key (which may or may not have been inspected by policy engine of the foreign applied key management device depending on trust policy information specified). The local applied key management device may or may not inspect the encryption key and its associated key attributes **160** by policies **115** based on the trust policy information specified between the enterprises.

FIG. **9** is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key management and distribution process **900** according to various embodiments. In various embodiments, the encryption key management and distribution process **900** may incorporate elements of applied key management, including key management, key distribution, and key federation.

First, at block **B910**, a set of policies **115** may be defined, where each policy **115** may relate to one or more key attributes **160**. The policies **115** may be defined by designed personnel and stored in the policy database **280** for future retrieval and update. Next, at block **B920**, the management request handler **205** may receive encryption key and at least one key attribute associated with the encryption key from the key source **170** in the manner described.

Next, at block **B930**, the management request handler **205** may determine acceptability of the encryption key received based, at least in part, on the at least one key attribute and the set of policies **115** that relate to one of the at least one key attribute. For example, the management request handler **205** may check a value corresponding to a key attribute **160** to determine whether the value is within an acceptable range as defined by the policies **115** in the manner described.

Next, at block **B940**, the management request handler **205** may determine whether the encryption key is acceptable. Whereas the encryption key is acceptable (**B940:YES**), the management request handler **205** may distribute the encryption key to the communication devices requiring the key for the communication transaction therebetween, at block **B950**. On the other hand, whereas the encryption key is unacceptable (**B940:NO**), the management request handler **205** may transmit the “denied” message to the key source **170** at block **B960**. Optionally, the management request handler **205** may transmit the hint to the key source to facilitate key generation at block **B970**. The management request handler **205** may then standby until receiving a second encryption key (and associated key attributes **160**) at block **B920**.

The applied key management system (e.g., the applied key management device **110**, the management request handler **205**, applied key management device **A 310a**, applied key management device **B 310b**, and/or the like) described herein may be implemented on any suitable computing devices having a processor and a memory device. The processor may include any suitable data processing device,

such as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a microprocessor), but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The memory may be operatively coupled to the processor and may include any suitable device for storing software and data for controlling and use by the processor to perform operations and functions described herein, including, but not limited to, random access memory RAM, read only memory ROM, floppy disks, hard disks, dongles or other RSB connected memory devices, or the like.

The applied key management device **110**, the management request handler **205**, applied key management device **A 310a**, and/or applied key management device **B 310b** may be implemented on suitable operating systems (OS) such as, but not limited to, the Linux OS, Windows, the Mac OS, and the like. Additionally, the applied key management device **110**, the management request handler **205**, applied key management device **A 310a**, and/or applied key management device **B 310b** may be implemented on small form factors such as embedded systems.

The embodiments described herein relate to encryptions keys. It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skills in the art that, in other embodiments, the systems and methods directed to the applied key management device **110** involving management, distribution, and federation may be likewise implemented for other sensitive objects such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random number generator data, user authentication information, policy components, other components associated with organization security component, and/or the like.

Some embodiments described herein relate to an automated mechanism for key escrow operations in relation to applications, servers, and/or infrastructure local to a client (e.g., a communication device). An interface (e.g., an applied key management client interface) may be provided to the client for interfacing with an applied key management system. The applied key management system may represent a unified platform providing encryption key management, federation, and/or distribution in the manner described. The applied key management system may represent a centralized server for key escrow services.

Key escrow services may refer to operations of collecting local keys from a client and registering and/or storing the local keys at a third party location (e.g., in a secure key storage). The client may request the collected local key in the event that the collected local key may no longer be available to the client. The key escrow services may be performed by the applied key management system. In some embodiments, the applied key management system may facilitate key escrow services between the communication device and a third-party secure key storage external to the applied key management system. That is, the applied key management system may act as an interface between the communication device and the third-party secure key storage. In other embodiments, the secure key storage may be local to the applied key management system. In some embodiments, the secure key storage may be one or more of a Hardware Security Module (HSM), key management server, secure data storage, or the like.

As referred to herein, a “local key” may be an encryption key that is locally generated or locally stored. A locally-generated encryption key may be an encryption key installed or created as a part of licensing for an application of the client. A locally-stored encryption key may include any encryption key stored on the client (e.g., in a local key store of the client) that can be used for one or more applications on the client. The local key may be generated or stored on the client as an authoritative source of encryption key information for communication applications, storage applications, as well as other types of applications of the client. In some embodiments, a local key (or information of a local key) may include, but not limited to, key file for secure data storage on the client, key data for Secure Shell (SSH) on the client, license key for an application on the client, and/or the like.

The applied key management client interface may be tasked with reading the local key store and selecting a local key to be stored in and/or registered with the secure key storage. The applied key management client interface may send the request to register and/or store the local key to the applied key management system. The applied key management system may evaluate the request against at least one (e.g., first policy) of the policies **115** to determine whether the request is authorized. In response to determining that the request is authorized, the applied key management system may register and/or store the local key in or with the secure key storage.

In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface provided to the client may be a Microsoft Windows Service, Linux Daemon, or other suitable interfaces for providing a platform for local activities at the client and to provide an integration point with the applied key management system. In some embodiments, an application-specific plugin may be provided to query the local key store in the client for determining whether a local key should be registered and/or stored. In other embodiments, the plugin may not be provided to the communication device, and the applied key management client interface may determine whether a local key should be registered and/or stored. Thus, the applied key management client interface and/or the plugin can allow automated requests for local key escrow based on need.

FIG. **10** is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of relationship between a communication device **1000**, applied key management system **1010**, and secure key storage **1020** according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. **1-10**, the communication device **1000** may be the client. In some embodiments, the communication device **1000** may be a device such as, but not limited to, the source device **150a**, the target device **150b**, the cellular device **250a**, the network device **250b**, . . . , the device **N 250n**, the device **A 350a**, the device **B 350b**, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The applied key management system **1010** may be a server or system such as, but not limited to, the general applied key management system **100**, applied key management system **200**, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the secure key storage **1020** may be any storage device that the applied key management system **1010** may be in communication with for registering/storing local keys originating from the communication device **1000**. For example, the secure key storage **1020** may include any suitable storage devices including, but not limited to, a HSM, key management server, secure data storage, or the like. The secure key storage **1020** may utilize Public-Key Cryptography Standard #11, KMIP, or other Certificate Authority services with which the applied key

management system **1010** can interface and communicate via a secure key storage interface **1260** (FIG. **12**). In some embodiments, the applied key management system **1010** and the secure key storage **1020** may be connected via a network (e.g., the applied key management system **1010** and the secure key storage **1020** may reside in different network nodes). In other embodiments, the secure key storage **1020** may be local to the applied key management system **1010** (e.g., the applied key management system **1010** and the secure key storage **1020** may reside in a same network node).

In some embodiments, the communication device **1000** may determine whether a local key needs to be registered and/or stored and send a request to register and/or store the local key to the applied key management system **1010**. The applied key management system **1010** may determine whether the request is authorized according to some (e.g., first policies) of the policies **115**. In response to determining that the request is authorized, the applied key management system **1010** may communicate with the secure key storage **1020** to register and/or store the local key.

The communication device **1000** may be connected to the applied key management system **1010** via any suitable first (wired or wireless) network link. The applied key management system **1010** may be connected to the secure key storage **1020** via any suitable second (wired or wireless) network link. The network links may be secured or unsecured. For example, the network links may each be a wide area communication network, such as, but not limited to, the internet, or one or more intranets, LANs, ethernet networks, MANs, a WAN, combinations thereof, or the like. In particular embodiments, the network links may represent one or more secure network links configured with suitable security features, such as, but not limited to firewalls, encryption, or other software or hardware configurations that inhibits access to network communications by unauthorized personnel or entities. In other embodiments, the applied key management system **1010** may be connected to the secure key storage **1020** locally.

FIG. **11** is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of the communication device **1000** of FIG. **10** according to some embodiments. Referring to FIGS. **1-11**, the communication device **1000** may include a local application **1105**, application plugin **1110**, applied key management client interface **1120**, file kernel driver **1125**, and local key store **1130** in some embodiments. In some embodiments, the communication device **1000** may correspond to the communication device **400**. For example, the local application **1105** may correspond to one or more of the email application **410a**, VOIP application **410b**, storage encryption **410c**, and/or other encryption applications **410d**. The local key store **1130** may correspond to the key store **440**. The application plugin **1110** may correspond to the application interface **420**. The applied key management client interface **1120** may correspond to support configurations and/or interfaces between the KMIP Proxy **430** and one or more of the application interface **420**, key store **440**, or device end cryptographic unit **450**.

In some embodiments, the communication device **1000** may be a desktop computer, mainframe computer, server computer, laptop computer, pad device, smart phone device or the like, configured with hardware and software to perform operations described herein. For example, the communication device **1000** may include a typical desktop Personal Computer (PC) or Apple™ computer devices, having suitable processing capabilities, memory, user interface (e.g., display and input) capabilities, and communica-

tion capabilities, when configured with suitable application software (or other software) to perform operations described herein. Thus, particular embodiments may be implemented, using processor devices that are often already present in many business and organization environments, by configuring such devices with suitable software processes described herein. Accordingly, such embodiments may be implemented with minimal additional hardware costs. However, other embodiments of the communication device **1000** may include to dedicated device hardware specifically configured for performing operations described herein.

In some embodiments, the application plugin **1110** may access the local key store **1130** to determine whether a local key associated with the local application **1105** may need to be registered and/or stored. In response to determining that a local key need to be registered and/or stored, the application plugin **1110** may notify the applied key management client interface **1120** to initiate a request for registering and/or storing the local key. In other embodiments, the application plugin **1110** may not be provided, and the applied key management client interface **1120** may access the local key store **1130** to determine whether a local key associated with the local application **1105** may need to be registered and/or stored.

In some embodiments, the local key store **1130** may be a memory device (e.g., a cache, a database, and/or the like) used to store security objects such as local keys on the communication device **1000**. In some embodiments, the local application **1105** may use the local keys stored in the local key store **1130**. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the local key store **1130** may be a Microsoft key store, Mozilla key store, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface **1120** may be a communication component (e.g., a service module or daemon) of the communication device **1000** for communicating with the applied key management system **1010**. The applied key management client interface **1120** may be provided to the communication device **1000** as a software component for installation and/or update to enable interfacing with the applied key management system **1010**, given that the communication device **1000** may not have capacity to support direct communication with the applied key management system **1010** natively.

The applied key management client interface **1120** may communicate with one or more of the application plugin **1110**, local key store **1130**, or the applied key management system **1010** (e.g., an applied key management server interface **1210** of FIG. **12**) via Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, or the like. In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface **1120** may communicate with one or more of the application plugin **1110**, local key store **1130**, or the applied key management system **1010** (e.g., an applied key management server interface **1210** shown in FIG. **12**) via KMIP protocol or other suitable communication protocols.

In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface **1120** may support key management operations on the communication device **1000** such as, but not limited to, sending requests for registering and/or storing the local key to the applied key management system **1010**. In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface **1120** may be connected to the local key store **1130** for reading local keys stored in the local key store **1130** and determining whether the local keys need to be registered and/or stored. The applied key management client interface

1120 may send the requests in response to determining that the local keys need to be registered and/or stored.

Alternatively, the applied key management client interface **1120** may receive the local keys that need to be registered and/or stored from the application plugin **1110**. The applied key management client interface **1120** may send the requests in response to the application plugin **1110** determining that the local keys need to be registered and/or stored.

In some embodiments, the file kernel driver **1125** may be a driver and/or kernel for establishing connection with the applied key management system **1010**. In other words, the file kernel driver **1125** may be a software module for providing configurations related to file access operations concerning security objects such as encryption keys (e.g., the local keys). In particular, the file kernel driver **1125** may configure the applied key management client interface **1120** to communicate with the applied key management system **1010** via KMIP-based or class X-based connections. The file kernel driver **1125** may configure the applied key management client interface **1120** to send the request to the applied key management system **1010** in some embodiments.

In some embodiments, the file kernel driver **1125** may configure the applied key management client interface **1120** to open connection with the applied key management system **1010**, read or get a file from the applied key management system **1010**, register/enroll the communication device **1000** with the applied key management system **1010** (in a manner such as, but not limited to, described with respect to the communication device registration process **600**), close connection with the applied key management system **1010**, and/or the like. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the file kernel driver **1125** may be a Linux Kernel Driver, Windows File Driver, or the like. The file kernel driver **1125** may be connected to the applied key management client interface via an interface such as, but not limited to, Net link.

One or more of the local application **1105**, application plugin **1110**, applied key management client interface **1120**, or file kernel driver **1125** may be implemented by a processor **1140**. The processor **1140** may include any suitable data processing device, such as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a microprocessor). In the alternative, the processor **1140** may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor **1140** may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a Digital Signal Processor (DSP) and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The processor **1140** may be configured with processor-readable instructions to perform features and functions of various components of the communication device **1000** as described herein.

A memory **1150** may be operatively coupled to the processor **1140** and may include any suitable non-transitory computer-readable device for storing software and data for controlling the processor **1140** to perform operations and functions described herein. The memory **1150** may include, but not limited to, a Random Access Memory (RAM), Read Only Memory (ROM), floppy disks, hard disks, dongles, or Reconfigurable Sensory Board (RSB) connected memory devices, or the like. In some embodiments, the memory **1150** may be implemented with cloud storage. In some embodiments, local key store **1130** may be separate from the memory **1150**. In other embodiments, the local key store **1130** may be a part of the memory **1150**.

In some embodiments, the communication device **1000** may include a user interface **1160**. The user interface **1160**

may include at least one output device. The output device may include any suitable device that provides a human-perceptible visible signal, audible signal, tactile signal, or any combination thereof, including, but not limited to a touchscreen, Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), Light Emitting Diode (LED), Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), plasma, or other suitable display screen, audio speaker or other audio generating device, combinations thereof, or the like.

In some embodiments, the user interface **1160** may include at least one input device that provides an interface for operator (such as enterprise employees, technicians, or other authorized users) to access the communication device **1000**. The input device may include any suitable device that receives input from a user including, but not limited to, one or more manual operator (such as, but not limited to a switch, button, touchscreen, knob, mouse, keyboard, keypad, slider or the like), microphone, or the like. In some embodiments, the input device may allow the operator to input information related to operating the local application.

FIG. **12** is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system **1010** according to some embodiments. Referring to FIGS. **1-12**, the applied key management system **1010** may include an applied key management server interface **1210**, request agent **1220**, action module **1230**, policy engine **1240**, agent **1250**, and secure key storage interface **1260**. In some embodiments, the applied key management system **1010** may correspond to the applied key management system **200** in some embodiments. For example, the applied key management server interface **1210** may correspond to the request handler **210**. The request agent **1220**, action module **1230**, policy engine **1240**, and agent **1250** may be implemented with the management request handler **205**.

In some embodiments, the applied key management server interface **1210** may communicate with the communication device **1000** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) via TCP, TLS protocol, SSL protocol, or the like. The applied key management server interface **1210** may receive communications (e.g., requests) from the communication device **1000**. In some embodiments, the request corresponding to a local key may include one or more of the local key (e.g., the key attributes **160** of the local key), application identifier identifying an application (e.g., the local application **1105**) associated with the local key, user identifier (e.g., a user account or credential) identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device **1000**, time at which the local key may be collected by the application plugin **1110** or the applied key management client interface **1120**, or the like.

The applied key management server interface **1210** may additionally receive a recovery request from the communication device **1000** for recovering (e.g., obtaining) a previously registered and/or stored local key. The applied key management system **1010** may request the previously registered and/or stored local key from the secure key storage **1020**. The applied key management server interface **1210** may then send the previously registered and/or stored local key to the communication device **1000**.

In some embodiments, the applied key management server interface **1210** may have capacity to communicate with multiple devices such as, but not limited to, the communication device **1000** for the activities described herein, enabling an “N-to-1” interface.

The applied key management server interface **1210** may send the received request for registering and/or storing a local key to the request agent **1220**. In some embodiments,

the request agent **1220** may receive the request for registering and/or storing a local key from the applied key management server interface **1210** and generate an action request (or job request) based on the request. In other words, the request agent **1220** may be an interface between the applied key management server interface **1210** and the action module **1230**. The action request may correspond to the request of the communication device **1000** for registering and/or storing a local key. For example, the action request may include one or more of the local key (e.g., the key attributes **160** of the local key), application identifier identifying an application (e.g., the local application) associated with the local key, user identifier (e.g., a user account or credential) identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device **1000**, time at which the local key may be collected by the application plugin **1110** or the applied key management client interface **1120**, or the like.

In some embodiments, an action module **1230** may receive the action request sent by the request agent **1220** and process the action request. For example, the action module **1230** may send information included in the action request to the policy engine **1240** for evaluation based on the policies **115** (e.g., the first policies). The first policies may include some of the policies **115** used to evaluate whether with the request to register and/or store the local key at the secure key storage **1020** can be authorized. In response to determining that registration and/or storage of the local key is authorized according to the first policies, the action module **1230** may send a request to the secure key storage **1020** through the secure key storage interface **1260**. An agent **1250** may be coupled to the action module **1230** to provide configuration for the action module **1230**. In some embodiments, the agent **1250** may perform some or all of the functions of the action module **1230** described herein.

In some embodiments, the action module **1230** may include a job management module, job module, and transaction module. The job management module may control creation, updating, executing, and deletion of the jobs or action requests. In some embodiments, the job management module may present the action request for inspection by the policy engine **1240** based on the first policies. In particular, the policy engine **1240** may determine whether the communication device **1000** identified by the device identifier is authorized to make any registration and/or storage request based on the relevant first policies stored in the policy database **280** or a cache memory. In response to determining that the communication device **1000** is authorized, the job management module may generate an action based on the action request and send the action to the job module.

In some embodiments, the job module may manage a composite set of actions (e.g., various queued actions) for various devices, including the communication device **1000**. For each action in a queue maintained by the job module, the job module may create a transaction to connect to a given secure storage for registering and/or storing the local key. The job module may group two or more of the transactions into composite transactions. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, transactions to register and/or store the local keys to a same secure key storage may be grouped into a composite transaction. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, transactions to register and/or store local keys in a given time interval may be grouped into a composite transaction. Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, transactions to register and/or store local keys for a same device (e.g., the communication device **1000**) may be grouped into a composite transaction. In some embodiments,

the job module may present the composite transactions and/or singular transactions to the policy engine 1240 for evaluation based on the first policies. In response to determining that a given transaction is authorized based on the first policies, the job module may send the transaction to the transaction module for execution.

The transaction module may receive the transaction from the job module and execute the transaction. For example, the transaction module may request the secure key storage 1020 via the secure key storage interface 1260 to register and/or store local keys requested by the communication device 1000. In response to determining that the transaction cannot be completed or in response to determining that the transaction fails, the transaction module may present the failure to the policy engine 1240 for evaluation based on the first policies. The first policies may indicate a post-failure transaction based on one or more of a type of failure, the identity of the communication device 1000, the identity of the particular secure key storage (e.g., the secure key storage 1020), or the like. Post-failure transaction may be, for example, retransmitting the request to the secure key storage 1020 periodically for the next 10 seconds if the failure is a communication failure (e.g., faulty network connection) to reach the secure key storage 1020 known to be currently active. In another example, the post-failure transaction may be sending the communication device 1000 a failure message if the secure key storage 1020 is currently offline or if the first policies do not authorize registering/storing the local key.

The secure key storage interface 1260 may be any suitable interface that can connect with the secure key storage 1020. The secure key storage interface 1260 may send requests to the secure key storage 1020 for obtaining a local key. The secure key storage interface 1260 may receive the requested local key from the secure key storage 1020. The secure key storage interface 1260 may receive a failure message from the secure key storage 1020 in the event that the secure key storage 1020 cannot issue the requested local key.

In response to receiving a failure message from the secure key storage 1020 indicating that the secure key storage 1020 cannot register/store the local key, the secure key storage interface 1260 may relay the failure message to the action module 1230. The action module 1230 may relay the failure message to the request agent 1220. The request agent 1220 may relay the failure message to the applied key management server interface 1210, which may send the failure message to the communication device 1000.

In response to receiving a recovery request from the communication device 1000, the secure key storage interface 1260 may request the previously-stored local key from the secure key storage 1020. Upon receiving the previously-stored local key, the secure key storage interface 1260 may relay the previously-stored local key to the action module 1230. The action module 1230 may relay the previously-stored local key to the request agent 1220. The request agent 1220 may relay the local key to the applied key management server interface 1210, which may send the local key to the communication device 1000.

One or more of the applied key management server interface 1210, request agent 1220, action module 1230, policy engine 1240, agent 1250, or secure key storage interface 1260 may be implemented by a processor 1270. The processor 1270 may include any suitable data processing device, such as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a microprocessor). In the alternative, the processor 1270 may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor 1270 may also be imple-

mented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The processor 1270 may be configured with processor-readable instructions to perform features and functions of various components of the applied key management system 1010 as described herein.

A memory 1280 may be operatively coupled to the processor 1270 and may include any suitable non-transitory computer-readable device for storing software and data for controlling the processor 1270 to perform operations and functions described herein. The memory 1280 may include, but not limited to, a RAM, ROM, floppy disks, hard disks, dongles, or RSB connected memory devices, or the like. In some embodiments, the memory 1280 may be implemented with cloud storage.

FIG. 13 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method 1300 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-13, the local key registration method 1300 may be performed by the processor 1140 of the communication device 1000 according to some embodiments.

At block B1310, the processor 1140 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) may determine whether a local key needs to be registered and/or stored. For example, the processor 1140 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) may search the local key store 1130 for any local key that has not been registered and/or stored. In some embodiments, in response to a local key being registered and/or stored, a tag or another indicator associated with the local key may be changed to indicate that the local key has been registered and/or stored at the secure key storage 1020. Otherwise, the tag or indicator may indicate that the local key has not been registered and/or stored at the secure key storage 1020. The processor 1140 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) may search the local key store 1130 for any local key having a tag or indicator indicating that the local key has not been registered and/or stored. In some embodiments, in response to a local key being generated or obtained, the applied key management client interface 1120 may determine that the newly generated or obtained local key needs to be registered and/or stored.

In other embodiments, instead of the applied key management client interface 1120, the application plugin 1110 (e.g., the processor 1140) may determine whether a local key needs to be registered and/or stored in a manner similar to described with respect to the applied key management client interface 1120. Once the application plugin 1110 determines that a local key needs to be registered and/or stored, the application plugin 1110 may send the local key to the applied key management client interfaced 1120 for requesting the applied key management system 1010.

In some embodiments, the processor 1140 (e.g., the application plugin 1110 or the applied key management client interface 1120) may determine whether a local key needs to be registered and/or stored (by searching the local key store 1130) periodically (e.g., every hour, day, week, or month). In some embodiments, the processor 1140 (e.g., the application plugin 1110 or the applied key management client interface 1120) may determine whether a local key needs to be registered and/or stored (by searching the local key store 1130) in response to that local key being generated, obtained, or stored. In some embodiments, the processor 1140 (e.g., the application plugin 1110 or the applied key management client interface 1120) may determine whether

a local key needs to be registered and/or stored (by searching the local key store **1130**) in response to receiving a command to search the local key store **1130** from the applied key management system **1010**.

In response to determining that no local key needs to be registered and/or stored (**B1310:NO**), the method **1300** ends. On the other hand, in response to determining that a local key needs to be registered and/or stored (**B1310:YES**), the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may send a request for the registering and/or storing the local key to the applied key management system **1010**, at block **B1320**. In some embodiments, the request may include one or more of the local key (e.g., the key attributes **160** of the local key), application identifier identifying an application (e.g., the local application **1105**) associated with the local key, user identifier (e.g., a user account or credential) identifying a user authorized to use the local key on the communication device **1000**, a device identifier identifying the communication device **1000**, time at which the local key may be collected by the application plugin **1110** or the applied key management client interface **1120**, or the like.

At block **B1330**, the processor **1140** may receive a response from the applied key management system as to whether the registration and/or storage attempt is successful in some embodiments. At block **B1340**, the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may determine whether the registration and/or storage is successful based on content of the response in some embodiments.

In response to determining that the local key has not been successfully registered and/or stored at the secure key storage **1020** (**B1340:NO**), the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may resend the request at block **B1320** in some embodiments. In some embodiments, the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may notify the user (e.g., the operator of the communication device **1000**) of the failure. For instance, the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may configure the output device of the user interface **1160** to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the operator notifying the operator of the failure.

On the other hand, if the local key has been successfully registered and/or stored at the secure key storage **1020** (**B1340:YES**), the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may recover the local key (e.g., the previously registered and/or stored local key). For example, at block **B1350**, the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120** or the application plugin **1110**) may determine whether to recover the local key from the secure key storage **1020**. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120** or the application plugin **1110**) may determine that recovery of the local key is needed in response to determining that the local key stored in the local key store **1130** may be corrupt, deleted, expired, or otherwise unavailable.

In response to determining that the local key previously registered and/or stored at the secure key storage **1020** need to be recovered (**B1350:YES**), the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may send a recovery request to the applied key management system **1010** to recover the local key at block **B1360**. At block **B1370**, the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may receive the recovered local

key from the applied key management system **1010**. In some embodiments, the processor **1140** (e.g., the applied key management client interface **1120**) may add the recovered local key to the local key store **1130** and associate the recovered local key with the local application **1105**. At block **B1380**, the processor **1140** (e.g., the local application **1105**) may use the recovered local key for encryption.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the local key previously registered and/or stored at the secure key storage **1020** does not need to be recovered (**B1350:NO**), the method **1300** ends.

FIG. **14** is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method **1400** according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. **1-14**, each of blocks **B1410-B1420** may correspond to one or more of blocks **B1310-B1380**. At block **B1410**, the processor **1140** may request the applied key management system **1010** to register and/or store a local key associated with an application (e.g., the local application **1105**).

At block **B1420**, the processor **1140** may receive the response from the applied key management system **1010** as to whether registration and/or storage to the secure key storage **1020** are successful. The registration and/or storage of the local key may be authorized by the applied key management system **1010** according to at least one first policy.

FIG. **15** is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method **1500** according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. **1-15**, the local key registration method **1500** may be performed by the processor **1270** of the applied key management system **1010** according to some embodiments. At block **B1510**, the processor **1270** (e.g., the applied key management server interface **1210**) may receive the request to register and/or store the local key from the communication device **1000** (e.g., from the applied key management client interface **1120**) in some embodiments. The request may include one or more of the local key (e.g., the key attributes **160** of the local key), application identifier identifying an application (e.g., the local application **1105**) associated with the local key, user identifier (e.g., a user account or credential) identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device **1000**, time at which the local key may be collected by the application plugin **1110** or the applied key management client interface **1120**, or the like.

At block **B1520**, the processor **1270** may determine whether the request is authorized by the first policies. For instance, the request agent **1220** may receive the request from the applied key management server interface **1210** and generate an action request based on the request. The action request may include one or more of the local key (e.g., the key attributes **160** of the local key), application identifier identifying an application (e.g., the local application **1105**) associated with the local key, user identifier (e.g., a user account or credential) identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device **1000**, time at which the local key may be collected by the application plugin **1110** or the applied key management client interface **1120**, or the like. The action module **1230** may present the action request to the policy engine **1240** for inspection by the first policies.

In some embodiments, the policy engine **1240** may determine whether the particular communication device **1000** may be authorized to request registration and/or storage of a local key based on the first policies. For instance, the communication device **1000** may be associated with a particular node within a hierarchical structure or a particular

group/classification. Based on the identifier of the communication device **1000**, the policy engine **1240** may determine the associated node and/or group of the communication device **1000**. The policy engine **1240** may then determine whether the node (or parent node(s)) and/or group associated with the communication device **1000** may be associated with authorization to request registration and/or storage of a local key. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, at least one of the first policies may indicate that if the communication device **1000** is associated with node B or Group 2, then the action request corresponding to the communication device **1000** may be denied. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, at least one of the first policies may indicate that if the node (e.g., node B) associated with the communication device **1000** has a particular parent node (e.g., node A), then the action request corresponding to the communication device **1000** may be denied.

Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the policy engine **1240** may determine whether an action request for the particular application (identified by the application identifier identifying the local application **1105**) may be authorized. At least one of the first policies may indicate that an action request for an application may not be authorized in some embodiments. For instance, one of the first policies may indicate that if the application associated with an action request is an email application, then the action request corresponding to the email application may be denied.

Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, the policy engine **1240** may determine whether an action request for the particular user account (identified by the user identifier identifying the user of the local application **1105**) may be authorized. At least one of the first policies may indicate that an action request for a given user may not be authorized in some embodiments. For instance, one of the first policies may indicate that if the user associated with an action request is "User_1," then the action request corresponding to the user may be denied.

Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, the policy engine **1240** may determine whether an action request may be authorized based on one or more other suitable key attributes **160** such as, but not limited to, key size of the local key, classification of the local key, time at which the local key has been requested, preferred secure key storage, role associated with the communication device **1000**, name of the local key, or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes **160** including, but not limited to, the key size of the local key, classification of the local key, time at which the local key has been requested, preferred secure key storage, role associated with the communication device **1000**, name of the local key, and/or the like may be included as a part of the request received by the applied key management system **1010** (e.g., a block **B1510**). In some embodiments, such key attributes **160** may be determined by the processor **1270** (e.g., the request agent **1220**, the action module **1230**, agent **1250**, or policy engine **1240**) based on one or more of the application identifier, user identifier, device identifier, or the like. For example, the processor **1270** (e.g., the request agent **1220**, the action module **1230**, agent **1250**, or policy engine **1240**) may determine the key attributes **160** for the local key by checking a look-up table stored in the memory **1280**.

In response to determining that the action request may not be authorized by the policies **115** (**B1520:NO**), the processor **1270** may be configured to send a failure message to the communication device **1000**, at block **B1530**. For example, the policy engine **1240** may send a failure message to the action module **1230** in response to determining failure based

on the first policies. The action module **1230** may forward the failure message to the request agent **1220**. The request agent **1220** may forward the failure message to the applied key management server interface **1210**. The applied key management server interface **1210** may send the failure message to the communication device **1000**.

The communication device **1000**, in response to receiving the failure message, may notify the user (e.g., the operator of the communication device **1000**) of the local application **1105** of the failure. For instance, the processor **1140** (e.g., the application plugin **1110**) may configure the output device of the user interface **1160** to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the user notifying the user of the failure.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the action request may be authorized by the first policies (**B1520:YES**), the processor **1270** may be configured to connect to the secure key storage **1020**, at block **B1540**. For example, the processor **1270** (e.g., the secure key storage interface **1260**) may interface with the secure key storage **1020** via suitable standards to initiate communication with the secure key storage **1020**. At block **B1550**, the processor **1270** (e.g., the secure key storage interface **1260**) may send a request to register and/or store the local key corresponding to the action request to the secure key storage **1020**. The secure key storage interface **1260** may act on behalf of the communication device **1000** to request registration and/or storage to the secure key storage **1020**.

At block **B1560**, the processor **1270** (e.g., the secure key storage interface **1260**) may determine whether the local key is successfully registered and/or stored at the secure key storage **1020**. The secure key storage interface **1260** may receive a success message if the secure key storage **1020** can register and/or store the local key. The secure key storage interface **1260** may receive a failure message from the secure key storage **1020** if the secure key storage **1020** cannot register and/or store the local key.

In response to determining that the registration and/or storage attempt is unsuccessful (**B1560:NO**), the processor **1270** may send a failure message to the communication device **1000**, at block **B1530**. For example, the secure key storage interface **1260** may send a failure message to the action module **1230** in response to receiving the failure message. The action module **1230** may forward the failure message to the request agent **1220**. The request agent **1220** may forward the failure message to the applied key management server interface **1210**. The applied key management server interface **1210** may send the failure message to the communication device **1000**.

The communication device **1000**, in response to receiving the failure message, may notify the user (e.g., the operator of the communication device **1000**) of the failure. For instance, the processor **1140** (e.g., the application plugin **1110**) may configure the output device of the user interface **1160** to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the user notifying the user of the failure to register and/or store the local key.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the registration and/or storage attempt is successful (**B1560:YES**), the processor **1270** may send a success message to the communication device **1000**, at block **B1570**. For example, the secure key storage interface **1260** may send the success message to the action module **1230** in response to receiving the success message. The action module **1230** may forward the success message to the request agent **1220**. The request

agent 1220 may forward the success message to the applied key management server interface 1210. The applied key management server interface 1210 may send the success message to the communication device 1000.

At block B1580, the processor 1270 may log the request and store the action in the memory 1280. The action module 1230 may store information related to the action, including the application identifier, user identifier, device identifier, time at which the local key may be collected, time at which the request is sent to the secure key storage 1020, identifier (e.g., a Universal Unique Identifier (UUID) of the operation or action corresponding to the registration and/or storage, relevant policies 115 (e.g., the first policies) used for evaluating the registration and/or storage, and/or the like.

FIG. 16 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key registration method 1600 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-16, each of blocks B1610-B1630 may correspond to one or more of blocks B1510-B1580. At block B1610, the processor 1270 may receive the request from the communication device 1000 to register and/or store the local key with the secure key storage 1020 for an application (e.g., the local application 1105) according to some embodiments.

At block B1620, the processor 1270 may evaluate the request based on the at least one first policy. For example, the processor 1270 may present one or more of the application identifier, user identifier, device identifier, time at which the local key may be collected, or other suitable key attributes 160 to be inspected by the at least one first policy. At block B1630, the processor 1270 may send the request to register and/or store the local key to the secure key storage 1020.

In other embodiments in which the secure key storage 1020 may be local to the applied key management system 1010, instead of sending the request to the secure key storage 1020 via a network (e.g., via the second network link), the processor 1270 may send the request locally to the secure key storage 1020, for example, at blocks B1540 and B1550. Additionally, the processor 1270 may receive success/failure messages from the secure key storage 1020 locally in such embodiments.

FIG. 17 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a local key recovery method 1700 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-17, the local key recovery method 1600 may be performed by the processor 1270 of the applied key management system 1010 according to some embodiments. At block B1710, the processor 1270 (e.g., the applied key management server interface 1210) may receive the recovery request to recover a previously registered and/or stored local key from the communication device 1000 (e.g., from the applied key management client interface 1120) in some embodiments. The request may include one or more of the local key (e.g., the key attributes 160 of the local key), application identifier identifying an application (e.g., the local application 1105) associated with the local key, user identifier (e.g., a user account or credential) identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device 1000, time at which the local key may be collected by the application plugin 1110 or the applied key management client interface 1120, or any other identifier identifying the previously registered and/or stored local key.

At block B1720, the processor 1270 may determine whether the recovery request is authorized by the policies 115 (e.g., second policies). The request agent 1220 may receive the recovery request from the applied key management server interface 1210 and generate an action request

based on the recovery request. The action request may include one or more of the local key (e.g., the key attributes 160 of the local key), application identifier identifying an application (e.g., the local application 1105) associated with the local key, user identifier (e.g., a user account or credential) identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device 1000, time at which the local key may be collected by the application plugin 1110 or the applied key management client interface 1120, or any other identifier identifying the previously registered and/or stored local key. The action module 1230 may present the action request to the policy engine 1240 for inspection by the second policies.

In some embodiments, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether the particular communication device 1000 may be authorized to make a recovery request based on the second policies. The second policies may be some of the policies 115 used to evaluate whether request recovery or retrieval of a previously registered and/or stored local key is authorized. The policy engine 1240 may then determine whether the node (or parent node(s)) and/or group associated with the communication device 1000 may be associated with authorization to make a recovery request for a local key. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, at least one of the second policies may indicate that if the communication device 1000 is associated with node B or Group 2, then the action request for recovering a local key corresponding to the communication device 1000 may be denied. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, at least one of the second policies may indicate that if the node (e.g., node B) associated with the communication device 1000 has a particular parent node (e.g., node A), then the action request for recovering a local key corresponding to the communication device 1000 may be denied.

Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether an action request (for recovering a local key) for the particular application (identified by the application identifier identifying the local application 1105) may be authorized. At least one of the second policies may indicate that an action request (for recovering a local key) for an application may not be authorized in some embodiments. For instance, one of the second policies may indicate that if the application associated with an action request is an email application, then the action request (for recovering a local key) corresponding to the email application may be denied.

Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether an action request for the particular user account (identified by the user identifier identifying the user of the local application 1105) may be authorized to make a request for recovering a local key. At least one of the second policies may indicate that an action request (for recovering a local key) for a given user may not be authorized in some embodiments. For instance, one of the second policies may indicate that if the user associated with an action request (for recovering a local key) is "User_1," then the action request corresponding to the user may be denied.

Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether an action request (for recovering a local key) may be authorized based on one or more other suitable key attributes 160 such as, but not limited to, key size of the local key, classification of the local key, time at which the local key has been requested, preferred secure key storage, role associated with the communication device 1000, name of the local key, or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes **160** including, but not limited to, the key size of the local key, classification of the local key, time at which the local key has been requested, preferred secure key storage, role associated with the communication device **1000**, name of the local key, and/or the like may be included as a part of the recovery request received by the applied key management system **1010** (e.g., a block **B1710**). In some embodiments, such key attributes **160** may be determined by the processor **1270** (e.g., the request agent **1220**, the action module **1230**, agent **1250**, or policy engine **1240**) based on one or more of the application identifier, user identifier, device identifier, or the like. For example, the processor **1270** (e.g., the request agent **1220**, the action module **1230**, agent **1250**, or policy engine **1240**) may determine the key attributes **160** for the local key by checking a look-up table stored in the memory **1280**.

In response to determining that the action request may not be authorized by the second policies (**B1720:NO**), the processor **1270** may be configured to send a failure message to the communication device **1000**, at block **B1530**. For example, the policy engine **1240** may send a failure message to the action module **1230** in response to determining failure based on the policies **115**. The action module **1230** may forward the failure message to the request agent **1220**. The request agent **1220** may forward the failure message to the applied key management server interface **1210**. The applied key management server interface **1210** may send the failure message to the communication device **1000**.

The communication device **1000**, in response to receiving the failure message, may notify the user (e.g., the operator of the communication device **1000**) of the local application **1105** of the failure. For instance, the processor **1140** (e.g., the application plugin **1110**) may configure the output device of the user interface **1160** to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the user notifying the user of the failure to recover the local key.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the action request may be authorized by the second policies (**B1720:YES**), the processor **1270** may be configured to connect to the secure key storage **1020**, at block **B1740**. For example, the processor **1270** (e.g., the secure key storage interface **1260**) may interface with the secure key storage **1020** via suitable standards to initiate communication with the secure key storage **1020**. At block **B1750**, the processor **1270** (e.g., the secure key storage interface **1260**) may send a recovery request to recover the local key corresponding to the action request from the secure key storage **1020**. The secure key storage interface **1260** may act on behalf of the communication device **1000** to recover the previously registered and/or stored local key from the secure key storage **1020**.

At block **B1760**, the processor **1270** (e.g., the secure key storage interface **1260**) may determine whether the local key is successfully recovered from the secure key storage **1020**. The secure key storage interface **1260** may receive the previously registered and/or stored local key message if the recovery attempt is successful. The secure key storage interface **1260** may receive a failure message from the secure key storage **1020** if the recovery attempt is unsuccessful.

In response to determining that the recovery attempt is unsuccessful (**B1760:NO**), the processor **1270** may send a failure message to the communication device **1000**, at block **B1730**. For example, the secure key storage interface **1260** may send a failure message to the action module **1230** in response to receiving the failure message. The action mod-

ule **1230** may forward the failure message to the request agent **1220**. The request agent **1220** may forward the failure message to the applied key management server interface **1210**. The applied key management server interface **1210** may send the failure message to the communication device **1000**.

The communication device **1000**, in response to receiving the failure message, may notify the user (e.g., the operator of the communication device **1000**) of the failure. For instance, the processor **1140** (e.g., the application plugin **1110**) may configure the output device of the user interface **1160** to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the user notifying the user of the failure to recovery the previously registered and/or stored local key.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the recovery attempt is successful (**B1760:YES**), the processor **1270** may send the recovered local key to the communication device **1000**, at block **B1770**. For example, the secure key storage interface **1260** may send the recovered local key to the action module **1230** in response to receiving the recovered local key. The action module **1230** may forward the recovered local key to the request agent **1220**. The request agent **1220** may forward the recovered local key to the applied key management server interface **1210**. The applied key management server interface **1210** may send the recovered local key to the communication device **1000**.

At block **B1780**, the processor **1270** may log the recovery request and store the action in the memory **1280**. The action module **1230** may store information related to the action, including the application identifier, user identifier, device identifier, time at which recovery of the local key may be request, time at which the recovery request is sent to the secure key storage **1020**, identifier (e.g., a UUID of the operation or action corresponding to the recovery, relevant second policies used for evaluating the recovery, and/or the like).

In other embodiments in which the secure key storage **1020** may be local to the applied key management system **1010**, instead of sending the recovery request to the secure key storage **1020** via a network (e.g., via the second network link), the processor **1270** may send the request locally to the secure key storage **1020**, for example, at blocks **B1740** and **B 1750**. Additionally, the processor **1270** may receive the recovered local key from the secure key storage **1020** locally in such embodiments.

The various embodiments illustrated and described are provided merely as examples to illustrate various features of the claims. However, features shown and described with respect to any given embodiment are not necessarily limited to the associated embodiment and may be used or combined with other embodiments that are shown and described. Further, the claims are not intended to be limited by any one example embodiment.

The foregoing method descriptions and the process flow diagrams are provided merely as illustrative examples and are not intended to require or imply that the steps of various embodiments must be performed in the order presented. As will be appreciated by one of skill in the art the order of steps in the foregoing embodiments may be performed in any order. Words such as “thereafter,” “then,” “next,” etc. are not intended to limit the order of the steps; these words are simply used to guide the reader through the description of the methods. Further, any reference to claim elements in the singular, for example, using the articles “a,” “an” or “the” is not to be construed as limiting the element to the singular.

The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present invention.

The hardware used to implement the various illustrative logics, logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented or performed with a general purpose processor, a DSP, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but, in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. Alternatively, some steps or methods may be performed by circuitry that is specific to a given function.

In some exemplary embodiments, the functions described may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software, the functions may be stored as one or more instructions or code on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium or non-transitory processor-readable storage medium. The steps of a method or algorithm disclosed herein may be embodied in a processor-executable software module which may reside on a non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage medium. Non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage media may be any storage media that may be accessed by a computer or a processor. By way of example but not limitation, such non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage media may include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, FLASH memory, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that may be used to store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that may be accessed by a computer. Disk and disc, as used herein, includes Compact Disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, Digital Versatile Disc (DVD), floppy disk, and blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above are also included within the scope of non-transitory computer-readable and processor-readable media. Additionally, the operations of a method or algorithm may reside as one or any combination or set of codes and/or instructions on a non-transitory processor-readable storage medium and/or computer-readable storage medium, which may be incorporated into a computer program product.

The preceding description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these

embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to some embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the following claims and the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

What is claimed is:

1. A method for recovering a local key associated with a local application of a communication device, comprising:
 - receiving a recovery request from the communication device to recover a local key from a secure key storage of an applied key management system;
 - wherein the recovery request received comprises one or more of key attributes of the local key, an application identifier identifying the local application associated with the local key, a user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device, or a time at which the local key is collected;
 - evaluating authorization of the recovery request based on one or more policies relating to at least one key attribute of the local key;
 - determining to recover the local key from the secure key storage in response to the local key being authorized by at least one or more policies, the one or more policies being based on at least one key attribute indicating one or more security and cryptographic considerations of the local key; and
 - cryptographic considerations of the local key and sending the local key to the communication device in response to determining to recover the local key.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the local key is one or more of a locally-generated encryption key or locally-stored encryption key.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the local key comprises one or more of a key file for secure data storage, key data for Secure Shell (SSH), or license key for an application.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure key storage is one or more of a Hardware Security Module (HSM), key management server, or secure data storage.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the recovery request is sent over a network link.
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
 - receiving a request from the communication device to register and store the local key, the request including the local key retrieved from a local key store of the communication device;
 - determining acceptability of the local key based on at least one key attribute associated with the local key conforming to one or more first policies, the at least one key attribute indicating security and cryptographic considerations;
 - evaluating the request based on the one or more first policies to determine authorization of the request; and
 - sending the request to register and store the local key to the secure key storage in response to determining that the local key is acceptable and that the request is authorized.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein determining to recover the local key from the secure key storage in response to the local key being authorized by the one or more policies comprises evaluating one or more of the key attributes of the local key, an application identifier identifying the local application, a user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the com-

munication device, or a time at which the local key may be collected based on the at least one first policy.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein determining to recover the local key from the key storage in response to the local key being authorized by the one or more policies comprises: 5
generating an action request based on the recovery request received from the communication device, wherein the action request comprises the at least one key attribute of the local key, the application identifier identifying the local application, the user identifier identifying the user authorized to use the local key, the device identifier identifying the communication device, or the time at which the local key is collected; and
presenting the action request to a policy engine for inspection based on the one or more policies.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the recovery request recovers a registered and stored local key in the secure key storage, the registration and storage of the local key being in response to at least one key attribute associated with the local key conforming to one or more first policies, wherein the at least one key attribute indicates that security and cryptographic considerations of the local key are acceptable based on the one or more first policies.

10. A non-transitory processor-readable medium having processor-readable instructions, when executed, causes a processor to:

receive a recovery request from a communication device to recover a local key from a secure key storage of an applied key management system;

evaluating authorization of the recovery request based on one or more policies relating to at least one key attribute of the local key;

wherein the at least one key attribute comprises at least one of a key size of the local key, a classification of the local key, a time at which the local key has been requested, a name of the local key, or a time at which the local key is collected;

determining to recover the local key from the secure key storage in response to the local key being authorized by at least one or more policies the one or more policies being based on at least one key attribute indicating one or more security;

and cryptographic considerations of the local key, and send the local key to the communication device in response to determining to recover the local key.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one key attribute comprises at least one of a key size of the local key, a cryptographic algorithm of the local key, a utilization of the local key, a time at which the local key has been requested, or a time at which the local key is collected.

12. An applied key management system, comprising:
a secure key storage;
a memory;

and a processor, the processor configured to:

receive a recovery request from a communication device to recover a local key from the secure key storage of the applied key management system;

wherein the recovery request comprises one or more of the key attributes of the local key, an application identifier identifying the local application associated with the local key, a user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device, or a time at which the local key is collected;

evaluating authorization of the recovery request based on one or more policies relating to at least one key attribute of the local key;

determine to recover the local key from the key storage in response to the local key being authorized by the one or more policies the one or more policies being based on at least one key attribute indicating one or more security and cryptographic considerations of the local key, and

send the local key to the communication device in response to determining to recover the local key.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein in determining to recover the local key from the key storage in response to the local key being authorized by the one or more policies, the processor is configured to evaluate one or more of the key attributes of the local key, an application identifier identifying the local application, a user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device, or a time at which the local key may be collected based on the at least one first policy.

14. The method of claim 13, wherein in determining to recover the local key from the key storage in response to the local key being authorized by the one or more policies, the processor is configured to:

generate an action request based on the recovery request received from the communication device, wherein the action request comprises the at least one attribute of the local key, the application identifier identifying the local application, the user identifier identifying the user authorized to use the local key, the device identifier identifying the communication device, or the time at which the local key is collected; and

present the action request to a policy engine for inspection based on the one or more policies.

15. The method of claim 12, wherein in determining to recover the local key from the secure key storage in response to the local key being authorized by the one or more policies, the processor is configured to determine whether the communication device is associated with a node within a hierarchical structure or a classification.

16. The method of claim 12, wherein in determining to recover the local key from the key storage in response to the local key being authorized by the one or more policies, the processor is configured to determine that the local key is authorized to be registered and stored at the secure key storage based on the at least one first policy.

17. The method of claim 12, wherein the recovery request is sent via a first network link.

18. The method of claim 12, wherein the recovery request recovers a registered and stored local key in the secure key storage, the registration and storage of the local key in response to accepting the local key based on at least one key attribute associated with the local key conforming to the one or more policies and the registering and storing of the local key at the secure key storage being authorized by at least one second policy of the one or more policies, wherein the at least one key attribute indicates that security and cryptographic considerations of the local key are acceptable based on the one or more policies.

19. The method of claim 15, wherein the recovery request received comprises one or more of key attributes of the local key, an application identifier identifying the local application associated with the local key, a user identifier identifying a user authorized to use the local key, a device identifier identifying the communication device, or a time at which the local key is collected.

20. The method of claim 10, wherein the at least one key attribute is included in the recovery request.