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(54) **SEMI-INTERACTIVE ONE-WAY TRANSFER OF DATA TO AN ISOLATED NETWORK**

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H04L 65/60 (2022.01)
H04L 49/9005 (2022.01)
(52) **U.S. Cl.**
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(2013.01); **H04L 9/3226** (2013.01); **H04L**
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H04L 49/9005 (2013.01); **H04L 65/60**
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H04L 47/33; H04L 49/9005; H04L 65/60
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
* cited by examiner

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Stockton LLP

(57) **ABSTRACT**

The present embodiments relate to providing near real-time communications from a public network to a private network. A first computing device in a public network can obtain data packets to be provided to the private network from an application executing on the first computing device. A trust module executed by the first computing device can authenticate the user, application, and the data packets to be provided to the private network and add metadata relating to the sending user, recipient user, etc. The data packets can be forwarded to the private network via a cross-domain system (CDS). The metadata and the digital signature on the data packets can be verified by a trust module executing on a second computing device in the private network. The second computing device can receive the data packets and store the data packets for subsequent actions to be performed in the private network.

22 Claims, 9 Drawing Sheets






FIG. 1A




FIG. 1B




FIG. 2




FIG. 3




FIG. 5






FIG. 6








FIG. 8

SEMI-INTERACTIVE ONE-WAY TRANSFER OF DATA TO AN ISOLATED NETWORK

BACKGROUND

A network environment can include multiple network types within the environment. For example, a network environment can include both a public network and an isolated (e.g., private) network. The public network can allow for data communication between devices in the public network and allow for access to external public networks (e.g., the Internet). While devices in the public network can utilize various methods to increase data security, devices and the transmission of data within the public network can be at risk of unauthorized access. For example, a device in the public network can obtain malware, leading to unauthorized access to the device or data transmitted by the device.

Further, in many instances, entities (e.g., a cloud computing platform) can have portions of data that are to be securely maintained with limited access to that data. Accordingly, such data can be maintained in a private network isolated from the public network and accessible only to authorized users. An administrative user can securely access the private network and maintain/update core components in the private network.

Providing data to the private network may only be allowed via a one-way data communication from an authorized device in the public network to a device in the private network. For example, an administrator can log into a computer on the public network, provide login credentials as an administrator, and provide the data to be provided to the private network.

The data can first be processed by an intermediary system, such as a cross domain system (CDS), prior to being received at the private network. However, data processing can be lengthy (e.g., a multi-hour delay), resulting in delayed receipt of data at the private network. Additionally, the data to be sent to the private network may have to be manually entered by character by an operator with access to the private network, resulting in an increased risk of errors in the data provided to the private network. Such features may result in a poor user experience in interacting with devices in the network environment and performing tasks with the private network.

SUMMARY

The present embodiments relate to secure one-way transmission of data from a public network to a private network. A first exemplary embodiment provides a method. The method can include obtaining a stream of data packets. A first computing device in the public network can obtain the stream of data packets. The method can also include forwarding the stream of data packets and user information associated with a sending user to a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device. The method can also include adding metadata to the stream of data packets. The metadata can include a digital signature generated from a private key specific to the first instance of the trust module and information relating to the user identification, a first application providing the stream of data packets, and a recipient, i.e. user on the private network. The method can also include forwarding the stream of data packets to a second computing device in the private network via a cross-domain system (CDS). The second computing device can be configured to process the metadata of the stream of data packets to verify the identity of the sending user by

verifying the digital signature relating to the first instance of the trust module. The signature validation can be performed using the corresponding public key of the private key used for signing.

Another exemplary embodiment relates to a system. The system can include a first computing device in a public network. The first computing device can include a first processor and a first non-transitory computer-readable medium. The first non-transitory computer-readable medium can include instructions that, when executed by the first processor, cause the first processor to obtain a stream of data packets from a first application executing on the first computing device. The first non-transitory computer-readable medium can further cause the first processor to pass the stream of data packets to a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device.

The first non-transitory computer-readable medium can further cause the first processor to add metadata to the stream of data packets. The metadata can include a digital signature generated from a private key specific to the first instance of the trust module and information relating to user information provided to the first instance of the trust module, the first application, a sending user, and a recipient user. The first non-transitory computer-readable medium can further cause the first processor to forward the stream of data packets to a cross-domain system (CDS) providing one-way communication of data from the public network to a private network.

Another exemplary embodiment relates to a non-transitory computer-readable medium including stored thereon a sequence of instructions. The instructions, when executed by a processor causes the processor to execute a process. The process can include obtaining, by a first computing device in a public network, a stream of data packets from a first application executing on the first computing device. The process can also include passing, by the first computing device, the stream of data packets to a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device. The process can also include adding, by the first instance of the trust module executing on the first computing device, metadata to the stream of data packets. The metadata can be used for validation and auditing to assure the sender, recipient, and applications are not tempered with.

The process can also include forwarding, by the first computing device, the stream of data packets to a second computing device in a private network via a cross-domain system (CDS) providing secure one-way communication of the stream of data packets from the public network to the private network. The second computing device can be configured to process the metadata of the stream of data packets to verify an identity of a sending user and verify a digital signature relating to the first instance of the trust module in the metadata in the stream of data packets. The second computing device can be configured to receive the stream of data packets in a receive buffer maintained by the second computing device responsive to verifying the identity of the sending user and verifying the digital signature. Identification can be done on a per session basis or on a per packet basis.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1A illustrates a block diagram of a network environment including both a public network and a private network, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 1B illustrates a detailed block diagram of a network environment for securely transmitting data one-way from a public network to a private network, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of an example computing device, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a method for secure one-way transmission of data from a public network to a private network, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating one pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementing a cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least one embodiment.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating an example computer system, according to at least one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present embodiments relate to providing near real-time communications from a public network to a private (or isolated) network. A first computing device in a public network can obtain data packets to be sent to the private network from an application executing on the first computing device. A trust module executed by the first computing device can authenticate the user, application, and the data packets to be provided to the private network and add metadata relating to the sending user, recipient user, etc. The trust module can also add a digital signature to the data packets to assure the integrity of sending user, recipient and application. The signature can be generated from a private key that has a corresponding public key on the private network. In some embodiments, the data can be signed with a public key and the signature can be validated by a private key present on the private network. A combination of public and private keys can be configured for both entities to assure integrity between the trust modules on the public and private networks.

The data packets can be forwarded to the private network via a cross-domain system (CDS). The CDS can obtain the data packets and store the data packets in a dynamic buffer unique to a session established between a sending user and a recipient user in the private network. The CDS can also log the data packets and metadata for subsequent auditing of all data being provided to the private network. The metadata and the digital signature on the data packets can be verified by a trust module executing on a second computing device in the private network. The second computing device can receive the data packets and store the data packets for subsequent actions to be performed in the private network, such as to update a core component of a network environment, for example.

The present embodiments can provide a path for digital content (e.g., data packet) transfer to a private region of a network environment with a lowered delay in receipt of the digital content while providing increased data security, compliance, and audit requirements. Further, the transfer of content can have a reduced communication delay (e.g., seconds or milliseconds) to the private network over the

delay provided by other techniques (e.g., hours) to provide efficient near real-time operations support.

The present embodiments can also provide support of operations to forward data packets to a private network via an ingress channel that may not be supported in existing channels. In many cases, other ingress channels can be designed for low frequency digital artifacts that carry significant administrative overhead and a great transfer time across an air-gap. For example, the time to receive data at a private network in many general channels can be measured from minutes to hours, which can prevent the channel being used for near real-time communication required to support operations use cases. Accordingly, supporting operations where high frequency and highly time-sensitive digital artifacts need to be transferred in near real time may be difficult and inefficient.

The present embodiments can create a prioritized channel in a cross domain system (CDS) that comprises a boundary between a private network and a public network. The prioritized channel can allow for expedited processing of data forwarded to the private network to reduce latency in receipt of content at the private network. The data packets provided at a device at the public network can be converted into a data type capable of being processed by the CDS (e.g., scanned and analyzed). For example, the data can be converted into a file using a specific data type (e.g., ASCII). The files can be formatted to allow the CDS to filter the data and avoid covert transmission of data across the CDS.

The present embodiments can allow for authorization of users, applications, and devices providing the data packets to be transmitted to the private network to increase data security. Further, all data transmitted to the private network can be logged for subsequent auditing. Individual data can be logged on a per packet basis and/or session basis. A session can include a user on the public network side initiating a data transfer to a user on the private network side using a specific application. All packets transferred within this context can be associated with the session. Activity, Volume or time limitations can be imposed for a session.

Rather than having to provide content in-line to the private network, the present embodiments can provide a platform that can allow for content to be written or copied into an application on a device in the public network prior to being transmitted to the private network via the CDS. This can reduce errors in the content being transmitted across the network and increase efficiency in providing content to users on the private network. Users on the private network can further process the information such as copying/pasting into command-line or user experience (UX) tools.

In some embodiments, the platform for providing the content can include a one-way clipboard. The clipboard can allow for the user to enter information by typing data or copying data from another source. Responsive to a portion of data being completed (e.g., a user selecting an 'enter' command), the content can be converted into a file and forwarded to the CDS for transmission to the private network as described herein. Another example platform for providing content can include a chat application. For example, a chat application can obtain text content and convert the data into a file to be sent to the private network via the CDS.

In some embodiments, a ticketing system can create tickets to track/log content being forwarded across the CDS. A ticketing system (e.g., JIRA) can be used to enter a ticket for each portion of content being forwarded across the CDS. The ticket can be duplicated into a file and sent to the private network where a new ticket is created on a local instance of

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a ticketing system within the private network. The ticketing system can assist in tracking/logging content across the network and subsequent auditing of data, as described herein.

FIG. 1A illustrates a block diagram of a network environment **100** including both a public network **102** and a private network **106**. The public network **102** can include an electronic communication network allowing data transfer between devices locally across a network (e.g., a local area network (LAN)) and/or across external networks (e.g., devices connected via the Internet). The private network **106**, on the other hand, can include a network that is isolated from external networks except for only authorized devices and networks. In many instances, secure data can be stored in the private network **106** and core administrative tasks to the network environment (e.g., a cloud computing platform) can be executed in the private network **106**. Accordingly, only authorized users may be access the private network and data transferred from the public to the private network may have to be authorized. For example, the private network **106** may only allow a sending user **108a** interacting with a first computing device **110a** to provide one-way data communication to a recipient user **108b** interacting with a second computing device **110b** in the private network **106** via a CDS **104**.

Digital content (e.g., scripts, documents, internet content, instant messaging content, JIRA tickets, identifiers) obtained by devices in the public network **102** can be encapsulated into a format allowing for automated analysis of the content by the CDS **104**. The content can be converted into data packets comprising a format allowing the CDS **104** to analyze the data for any authorized features. The formatted data can be provided to the CDS **104** that can process the data based on requirements specific to the CDS **104** to ensure that the data is valid and secure (e.g. does not contain malware). The CDS **104** can include built in filters and permissible formats that allow for maximizing data transfer efficiency while also maintaining security of data transmitted to the private network.

A sending user **108a** interacting with a first computing device **110a** on the public network **102** can prepare data for transfer to the private network **106**. The sending user **108a** can interact with a source application executing on the first computing device **110a** to obtain or generate the content to be provided to the private network **106**. The content can be forwarded to the CDS **104** with a high priority to send the data on an expedited/prioritized channel. In some embodiments, the transfer of other data can be paused to decrease latency of the prioritized content.

The CDS **104** can verify the digital signature on the content and analyzes the content before delivering the content to an application running on a device in the private network. A receiving user interacting with a device in the private network **106** can obtain the content and perform subsequent actions using the content (e.g., update core infrastructure settings using the received content).

FIG. 1B illustrates a detailed block diagram of a network environment **100** for securely transmitting data one-way from a public network **102** to a private network **106**. The users **108a-b** on both the public network **102** and private network **106** can use applications **112a-d** executing on computing devices **110a-b** to forward data packets from the public network **102** to the private network **106** via a CDS **104**. For example, a sending user **108a** on the public network **102** can provide content to a clipboard application or a command line tool and send the content to the private network **106** via the CDS **104**. In other embodiments, an

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application (e.g., **112a**) can include a ticketing application or a chat application for generating content to be sent to the private network **106**. The application **112a**, **112b** can allow for a user to create, store, and retrieve content in a trusted manner. The sending user **108a** can log into the application **112a**, **112b** using login credentials that can run locally on a computer or remotely on a trusted web server, for example.

A first application (e.g., APP **1** **112a**) can process information from a second application (e.g., APP **1** **112b**) into a file that can be scanned and sent to the private network **106** as described herein. The first application **112a** can ingest data from the second application **112b**, such as a chat application, and process the data into a compliant format. The second application **112b** can then only need to know the destination of the data packets and a user sending the data without knowing how to transmit the data across the CDS **104** to ensure data security.

The application **112a-d** can be executed locally on a computing device or hosted on a web service. A user can log into the application **112a-d** with their credentials, and the application can verify the credentials with an authentication server. In some embodiments, a two-factor authentication can be executed to authenticate and authorize the user. Responsive to the user being authenticated and authorized, the user may select a recipient user which the application can verify as a valid user **108b**. For example, the application can display lists of users to select the recipient user. The receiving user can log into an application on the private network and verify the content to receive the content. Another embodiment can store the content in a dedicated storage area for the user similar to a mailbox. Once the user logs on to the application the content can be automatically retrieved and presented to the user.

Devices in the private network and public network can include trust modules (**114a-b**) that allow for establishing a trust relationship between a sending user in the public network and a receiving user in the private network. For example, a first instance of a trust module **114a** can query for user credentials and verify the credentials prior to allowing content to be forwarded to the CDS **104**.

The trust module **114a-b** can ensure security of users interacting with the private network and security of data provided to the private network. For example, the trust module **114a** can assure that the sending user is an authorized user that is authorized to provide data. The trust module **114a** can also assure that the data source (e.g., the computing device in the public network and the application providing the content) are authenticated and the data is not tampered with or injected by any third party user/device. The trust module can also assure that the receiving device **110b** is authenticated as well. In some embodiments, the trust module can track applications and content being provided to the private network. The trust module **114b** can manage a receive buffer **132** at the public network **102** and manage a session between the computing devices in the public network and private network. A session in this context can be characterized by communication peers (i.e. users **108a**, **108b**), computing devices **110a**, **110b**, and applications **112a-d** and defined with an explicit start and stop. All data transferred within the context of a session can be analyzed by the CDS **104** in its entirety.

The trust module **114a-b** can authenticate applications and data using Public-Private key pairs. The trust module **114a** on the public network can receive data packet(s) from an application and verify that the application is approved to transmit secure data to the private network. User information (e.g., a username, user login credentials) can be provided

with the data packets. The user can log into an application and the application can forward a token to the trust module to authenticate the user.

The user **108a** in the public network **102** can specify a recipient user **108b** in the private network **106**. The trust module **114a** can add metadata to the data packets, identifying a sending user, recipient user, an application originating the packets, and establish a session identifier etc.

The system can establish a session between the computing devices in the private network and the public network. The session can be established explicitly by an indication to establish the session or implicitly with the addition of the metadata. The session may be limited only to devices associated with the sending user and the recipient user and may include a limited time duration (e.g., the session ends after a time duration or a threshold inactivity time). In subsequent packets, it may be sufficient to transmit the session identifier in lieu of user, application etc. The session identifier can include a randomly generated identifier such as a universally unique identifier (GUID) used in computer systems.

The trust module can verify that various conditions are met and then sign the packet with a private key. The trust module can send the content to the expedited path of the CDS. Following analysis of file content and signature the CDS can pass the data to the trust module on the private network side. The data can be inspected and stored in a dynamic buffer created for the session. The data can then be forwarded to the recipient user and an application on the private network. The trust module can first authenticate the identity of the user and authenticate the application prior to receiving the content from the buffer.

In some embodiments, a file type such as JSON or XML can be used as a file type for the data packets to be forwarded to the CDS rather than a linkage to an application. The file format can meet various criteria, such as a data size and encoding type criteria, for example. The trust module can identify whether the content is within specified criteria. In some embodiments, the content can be encrypted for the duration of the session using a session key specific to the session and based on the application transmitting the content and the sending and receiving users.

The CDS **104** can process all data being sent into the private network on a sequential basis, but responsive to identifying content including the digital signature, the existing content can be diverted to allow priority/immediate transfer of the signed content. As additional content is sent between the sender-receiver during a session, the CDS **104** can hold the fast track communication channel open for the lowest latency rate possible for this content. Ongoing communication between sender and receiver during a session within a threshold amount of time (e.g., 90 seconds). The CDS **104** can filter and scan all transferred content during the session as a single stream of content. This can prevent prohibited content from being forwarded through the CDS processing content piece-meal.

The data packets to be transferred to the private network **106** can be multiplexed via a multiplexer (MUX **116**). At the CDS **104**, the data can be demultiplexed via demultiplexer (DEMUX **120**). The data can be forwarded to a transmitter **122** and a one-way transfer device. The data can be processed via a data validator **124** and scanner **126**. In some embodiments, data can be stored in databases **118**, **130**.

In some embodiments, when large amounts of content are sent to the CDS **104**, the CDS **104** may split the data in sequential blocks to maximize speed of throughput for the content. This can increase interactivity experienced by a

receiving user to receive portions of content rather than waiting for all content to be received at once.

Once data is received at the CDS **104**, the CDS **104** can store the data in a receive buffer. The CDS **104** can create a dynamic storage space (e.g., in receive buffer **132**) for each session. The storage can be cleared or archived for audit purposes once the session ends. The storage can be an Object storage for which a bucket is created for each new session. An application (e.g., APP A **112c**, APP B **112d**) on the private network side can access the storage of the current session if user and application have been successfully authenticated.

The CDS **104** also can maintain an audit trail of transferred content, and the sender and the receiver identities. For example, all content transferred to the private network and all metadata can be logged in an auditing storage module **128** at the CDS for subsequent auditing. An audit element can audit all content and/or validate that data is signed by a genuine trust module private key. In some embodiments, the data can be tracked using a ticketing module **134** in the CDS **104** that can add a ticket to data to identify the data and the session for subsequent auditing.

In order to support streaming of information, metadata can be added to the data packets that that can both be easily analyzed by the CDS and reconstructed as needed. The file can include the metadata attached indicating information such as session, sending user, receiving user, application, and amount of information (or sequence in the case of data chunking). An identifier for the request can be added to the metadata to allow synchronization on the far as well as troubleshooting in the case of a failure. This ID can be used on both sides of the system but may be generated by the system sending information across the air gap, therefore causing the identifier to be unclassified. This is also, with proper customer or contract support, allow limited return codes to come back from the private network to allow failures to be fixed without engaging teams with access to a particular private network.

In some embodiments, the CDS **104** can include a ticketing module **134**. The ticketing module **134** can assign tickets to content being forwarded to the private network for tracking of the content during a session. A new ticket can be automatically or manually created with a designated ticket project identifier. The ticket itself can track the reporter, i.e. representing the sending user and may also track the assignee recipient user for subsequent tracking/auditing. The history that can be stored alongside the ticket provide for auditing, even in cases when no explicit assignee (recipient) is marked within the ticket.

In response to receipt of the data packets at the private network **106**, a second computing device **110b** can execute a second instance of the trust module **114b** that can authenticate the data packets and the recipient user **108b**. The second computing device **110b** can receive the data responsive to authenticating the data and can utilize the data for execution of subsequent actions using applications **112c-d**.

FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of an example computing device **200**. The computing device can include a first computing device **110a** in the public network **102** or a second computing device **110b** in the private network **106** as described with respect to FIGS. 1A-1B, for example.

The computing device can include any of a processor **202**, a network interface **204**, and a computer readable medium **206**. The computer-readable medium **206** can include instructions that, when executed by the processor **202**, cause

the processor **202** to perform various steps. For example, the processor **202** can perform steps as provided in FIG. 3 as described below.

The computer-readable medium **206** can include instructions to execute any of a number of applications (e.g., application **1 208**, application **210**). The applications **208**, **210** can include chat applications, cloud computing access applications, a command line application, etc. The applications **208**, **210** can allow for creation or receipt of content to be forwarded to the private network.

A user can log into an application (e.g., **208**) with login credentials specific to the application. The application **208** can forward the login credentials to a trust module **212** using a token for the trust module **212** to validate the user and the application **208**. The application **208**, **210** can also allow for specifying a recipient user to receive the data packets in the private network. The application can verify user login credentials to establish a trust relationship with the user. The application can process the login credentials to perform authentication of the user using permission systems of the public network. The permission systems can be part of computing device **110** or being federated with other authentication providers. To further strengthen security it may use two factor authentication.

The computer-readable medium **206** can also include instructions to execute a trust module **212**. As described above, the trust module **212** can authenticate the user and application generating content. The trust module **212** can add metadata specifying the sending user, recipient user, and the application providing the content. The trust module **212** can also add a digital signature to the content using a private key specific to the trust module.

The trust module can establish a trust relationship with an application in any of the public network and/or private network. The trust module can utilize a mutual authentication procedure to authenticate the application using protocols such as Mutual Transport Layer Security (MTLS) (e.g., where short certificates or shared secret are exchanged at the beginning of a session or alongside each packet). Accordingly, only applications that are registered with the trust module can send packets. Alternatively, packets may be only processed if signed by the application with a trusted application key.

The computing device **200** can also include a network interface **204** for facilitating data communication with various devices in the network environment. For example, the network interface **204** can forward data packets to the CDS to be forwarded to the private network as described herein.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a method **300** for secure one-way transmission of data from a public network to a private network. At step **302**, the method can include obtaining a stream of data packets. The data packets can be received from a first application executing on a first computing device in the public network.

In some embodiments, the stream of data packets are provided to a one-way clipboard allowing content to be written or copied to the one-way clipboard. In other embodiments, a ticket can be assigned to the stream of data packets via a ticketing module of the CDS. The ticket can identify a session between the sending user and the receiving user. In other embodiments, the stream of data packets are sent to the second computing device via the CDS using a one-way chat application.

At step **304**, the method can include forwarding the stream of data packets and user information associated with a sending user to a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device. The user information can

include information identifying the sending user, such as login credentials provided by the user (e.g., via a token provided by an application). The first instance of the trust module can authenticate the sending user and the first application by verifying a token obtained by the first instance of the trust module responsive to the sending user providing the user information to the first application.

At step **306**, the method can include adding metadata to the stream of data packets. The first instance of the trust module can add the metadata including a digital signature including a private key specific to the first instance of the trust module and information relating to the user information, the first application, and a recipient user. In some embodiments, the stream of data packets can be converted into a first file type. The stream of data packets may fall below a threshold data size and may be within a set of encoding criteria.

The metadata can be used in auditing data sent during a session between a sending user and a receiving user. The metadata can also be used in routing data packet(s) to proper applications (e.g., a clipboard, ticketing system). The metadata can identify a sending user, a first application executing on a computing device in the public network, a receiving user, a second application executing on a computing device in the private network, a session identifier identifying the session, and/or a digital signature. The metadata can include a file separate from the stream of data packets or comprise a part of the stream of data packets (e.g., a XML, header).

At step **308**, the method can include forwarding the stream of data packets to a second computing device in the private network via a cross-domain system (CDS). The first stream of data packets can be stored in a dynamic buffer prior to being provided to the second computing device.

In some embodiments, the stream of data packets are forwarded along a priority communication channel in the CDS. Existing traffic in the CDS can be diverted to a second communication channel responsive to forwarding the stream of data packets to the CDS to increase throughput of transmission of the stream of data packets on the priority communication channel.

In some embodiments, the CDS can validate the digital signature including the private key specific to the first instance of the trust module. The CDS can also log the stream of data packets in an auditing computer for subsequent auditing of all content being transmitted to the private network.

At step **310**, the method can include storing the first stream of data packets being store in a dynamic buffer prior to providing the stream of data packets to the second computing device.

At step **312**, the method can include receiving the stream of data packets from the dynamic buffer. The second computing device can receive the data packets from the CDS and identify the metadata stored in the dynamic buffer.

At step **314**, the method can include processing the metadata of the stream of data packets to verify an identity of the sending user and verify the digital signature relating to the first instance of the trust module. The second computer in the private network can process the metadata as described herein.

As noted above, infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is one particular type of cloud computing. IaaS can be configured to provide virtualized computing resources over a public network (e.g., the Internet). In an IaaS model, a cloud computing provider can host the infrastructure components (e.g., servers, storage devices, network nodes (e.g., hardware), deployment software, platform virtualization (e.g., a

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hypervisor layer), or the like). In some cases, an IaaS provider may also supply a variety of services to accompany those infrastructure components (e.g., billing, monitoring, logging, load balancing and clustering, etc.). Thus, as these services may be policy-driven, IaaS users may be able to implement policies to drive load balancing to maintain application availability and performance.

In some instances, IaaS customers may access resources and services through a wide area network (WAN), such as the Internet, and can use the cloud provider's services to install the remaining elements of an application stack. For example, the user can log in to the IaaS platform to create virtual machines (VMs), install operating systems (OSs) on each VM, deploy middleware such as databases, create storage buckets for workloads and backups, and even install enterprise software into that VM. Customers can then use the provider's services to perform various functions, including balancing network traffic, troubleshooting application issues, monitoring performance, managing disaster recovery, etc.

In most cases, a cloud computing model will require the participation of a cloud provider. The cloud provider may, but need not be, a third-party service that specializes in providing (e.g., offering, renting, selling) IaaS. An entity might also opt to deploy a private cloud, becoming its own provider of infrastructure services.

In some examples, IaaS deployment is the process of putting a new application, or a new version of an application, onto a prepared application server or the like. It may also include the process of preparing the server (e.g., installing libraries, daemons, etc.). This is often managed by the cloud provider, below the hypervisor layer (e.g., the servers, storage, network hardware, and virtualization). Thus, the customer may be responsible for handling (OS), middleware, and/or application deployment (e.g., on self-service virtual machines (e.g., that can be spun up on demand) or the like.

In some examples, IaaS provisioning may refer to acquiring computers or virtual hosts for use, and even installing needed libraries or services on them. In most cases, deployment does not include provisioning, and the provisioning may need to be performed first.

In some cases, there are two different challenges for IaaS provisioning. First, there is the initial challenge of provisioning the initial set of infrastructure before anything is running. Second, there is the challenge of evolving the existing infrastructure (e.g., adding new services, changing services, removing services, etc.) once everything has been provisioned. In some cases, these two challenges may be addressed by enabling the configuration of the infrastructure to be defined declaratively. In other words, the infrastructure (e.g., what components are needed and how they interact) can be defined by one or more configuration files. Thus, the overall topology of the infrastructure (e.g., what resources depend on which, and how they each work together) can be described declaratively. In some instances, once the topology is defined, a workflow can be generated that creates and/or manages the different components described in the configuration files.

In some examples, an infrastructure may have many interconnected elements. For example, there may be one or more virtual private clouds (VPCs) (e.g., a potentially on-demand pool of configurable and/or shared computing resources), also known as a core network. In some examples, there may also be one or more inbound/outbound traffic group rules provisioned to define how the inbound and/or outbound traffic of the network will be set up and one or

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more virtual machines (VMs). Other infrastructure elements may also be provisioned, such as a load balancer, a database, or the like. As more and more infrastructure elements are desired and/or added, the infrastructure may incrementally evolve.

In some instances, continuous deployment techniques may be employed to enable deployment of infrastructure code across various virtual computing environments. Additionally, the described techniques can enable infrastructure management within these environments. In some examples, service teams can write code that is desired to be deployed to one or more, but often many, different production environments (e.g., across various different geographic locations, sometimes spanning the entire world). However, in some examples, the infrastructure on which the code will be deployed must first be set up. In some instances, the provisioning can be done manually, a provisioning tool may be utilized to provision the resources, and/or deployment tools may be utilized to deploy the code once the infrastructure is provisioned.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram 400 illustrating an example pattern of an IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Service operators 402 can be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 404 that can include a virtual cloud network (VCN) 406 and a secure host subnet 408. In some examples, the service operators 402 may be using one or more client computing devices, which may be portable handheld devices (e.g., an iPhone®, cellular telephone, an iPad®, computing tablet, a personal digital assistant (PDA)) or wearable devices (e.g., a Google Glass® head mounted display), running software such as Microsoft Windows Mobile®, and/or a variety of mobile operating systems such as iOS, Windows Phone, Android, BlackBerry 8, Palm OS, and the like, and being Internet, e-mail, short message service (SMS), Blackberry®, or other communication protocol enabled. Alternatively, the client computing devices can be general purpose personal computers including, by way of example, personal computers and/or laptop computers running various versions of Microsoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/or Linux operating systems. The client computing devices can be workstation computers running any of a variety of commercially-available UNIX® or UNIX-like operating systems, including without limitation the variety of GNU/Linux operating systems, such as for example, Google Chrome OS. Alternatively, or in addition, client computing devices may be any other electronic device, such as a thin-client computer, an Internet-enabled gaming system (e.g., a Microsoft Xbox gaming console with or without a Kinect® gesture input device), and/or a personal messaging device, capable of communicating over a network that can access the VCN 406 and/or the Internet.

The VCN 406 can include a local peering gateway (LPG) 410 that can be communicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN 412 via an LPG 410 contained in the SSH VCN 412. The SSH VCN 412 can include an SSH subnet 414, and the SSH VCN 412 can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN 416 via the LPG 410 contained in the control plane VCN 416. Also, the SSH VCN 412 can be communicatively coupled to a data plane VCN 418 via an LPG 410. The control plane VCN 416 and the data plane VCN 418 can be contained in a service tenancy 419 that can be owned and/or operated by the IaaS provider.

The control plane VCN 416 can include a control plane demilitarized zone (DMZ) tier 420 that acts as a perimeter network (e.g., portions of a corporate network between the corporate intranet and external networks). The DMZ-based

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servers may have restricted responsibilities and help keep breaches contained. Additionally, the DMZ tier **420** can include one or more load balancer (LB) subnet(s) **422**, a control plane app tier **424** that can include app subnet(s) **426**, a control plane data tier **428** that can include database (DB) subnet(s) **430** (e.g., frontend DB subnet(s) and/or backend DB subnet(s)). The LB subnet(s) **422** contained in the control plane DMZ tier **420** can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) **426** contained in the control plane app tier **424** and an Internet gateway **434** that can be contained in the control plane VCN **416**, and the app subnet(s) **426** can be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) **430** contained in the control plane data tier **428** and a service gateway **436** and a network address translation (NAT) gateway **438**. The control plane VCN **416** can include the service gateway **436** and the NAT gateway **438**.

The control plane VCN **416** can include a data plane mirror app tier **440** that can include app subnet(s) **426**. The app subnet(s) **426** contained in the data plane mirror app tier **440** can include a virtual network interface controller (VNIC) **442** that can execute a compute instance **444**. The compute instance **444** can communicatively couple the app subnet(s) **426** of the data plane mirror app tier **440** to app subnet(s) **426** that can be contained in a data plane app tier **446**.

The data plane VCN **418** can include the data plane app tier **446**, a data plane DMZ tier **448**, and a data plane data tier **450**. The data plane DMZ tier **448** can include LB subnet(s) **422** that can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) **426** of the data plane app tier **446** and the Internet gateway **434** of the data plane VCN **418**. The app subnet(s) **426** can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway **436** of the data plane VCN **418** and the NAT gateway **438** of the data plane VCN **418**. The data plane data tier **450** can also include the DB subnet(s) **430** that can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) **426** of the data plane app tier **446**.

The Internet gateway **434** of the control plane VCN **416** and of the data plane VCN **418** can be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service **452** that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet **454**. Public Internet **454** can be communicatively coupled to the NAT gateway **438** of the control plane VCN **416** and of the data plane VCN **418**. The service gateway **436** of the control plane VCN **416** and of the data plane VCN **418** can be communicatively couple to cloud services **456**.

In some examples, the service gateway **436** of the control plane VCN **416** or of the data plane VCN **418** can make application programming interface (API) calls to cloud services **456** without going through public Internet **454**. The API calls to cloud services **456** from the service gateway **436** can be one-way: the service gateway **436** can make API calls to cloud services **456**, and cloud services **456** can send requested data to the service gateway **436**. But, cloud services **456** may not initiate API calls to the service gateway **436**.

In some examples, the secure host tenancy **404** can be directly connected to the service tenancy **419**, which may be otherwise isolated. The secure host subnet **408** can communicate with the SSH subnet **414** through an LPG **410** that may enable two-way communication over an otherwise isolated system. Connecting the secure host subnet **408** to the SSH subnet **414** may give the secure host subnet **408** access to other entities within the service tenancy **419**.

The control plane VCN **416** may allow users of the service tenancy **419** to set up or otherwise provision desired resources. Desired resources provisioned in the control

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plane VCN **416** may be deployed or otherwise used in the data plane VCN **418**. In some examples, the control plane VCN **416** can be isolated from the data plane VCN **418**, and the data plane mirror app tier **440** of the control plane VCN **416** can communicate with the data plane app tier **446** of the data plane VCN **418** via VNICs **442** that can be contained in the data plane mirror app tier **440** and the data plane app tier **446**.

In some examples, users of the system, or customers, can make requests, for example create, read, update, or delete (CRUD) operations, through public Internet **454** that can communicate the requests to the metadata management service **452**. The metadata management service **452** can communicate the request to the control plane VCN **416** through the Internet gateway **434**. The request can be received by the LB subnet(s) **422** contained in the control plane DMZ tier **420**. The LB subnet(s) **422** may determine that the request is valid, and in response to this determination, the LB subnet(s) **422** can transmit the request to app subnet(s) **426** contained in the control plane app tier **424**. If the request is validated and requires a call to public Internet **454**, the call to public Internet **454** may be transmitted to the NAT gateway **438** that can make the call to public Internet **454**. Memory that may be desired to be stored by the request can be stored in the DB subnet(s) **430**.

In some examples, the data plane mirror app tier **440** can facilitate direct communication between the control plane VCN **416** and the data plane VCN **418**. For example, changes, updates, or other suitable modifications to configuration may be desired to be applied to the resources contained in the data plane VCN **418**. Via a VNIC **442**, the control plane VCN **416** can directly communicate with, and can thereby execute the changes, updates, or other suitable modifications to configuration to, resources contained in the data plane VCN **418**.

In some embodiments, the control plane VCN **416** and the data plane VCN **418** can be contained in the service tenancy **419**. In this case, the user, or the customer, of the system may not own or operate either the control plane VCN **416** or the data plane VCN **418**. Instead, the IaaS provider may own or operate the control plane VCN **416** and the data plane VCN **418**, both of which may be contained in the service tenancy **419**. This embodiment can enable isolation of networks that may prevent users or customers from interacting with other users', or other customers', resources. Also, this embodiment may allow users or customers of the system to store databases privately without needing to rely on public Internet **454**, which may not have a desired level of threat prevention, for storage.

In other embodiments, the LB subnet(s) **422** contained in the control plane VCN **416** can be configured to receive a signal from the service gateway **436**. In this embodiment, the control plane VCN **416** and the data plane VCN **418** may be configured to be called by a customer of the IaaS provider without calling public Internet **454**. Customers of the IaaS provider may desire this embodiment since database(s) that the customers use may be controlled by the IaaS provider and may be stored on the service tenancy **419**, which may be isolated from public Internet **454**.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram **500** illustrating another example pattern of an IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Service operators **502** (e.g. service operators **402** of FIG. 4) can be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy **504** (e.g. the secure host tenancy **404** of FIG. 4) that can include a virtual cloud network (VCN) **506** (e.g. the VCN **406** of FIG. 4) and a secure host subnet **508** (e.g. the secure host subnet **408** of FIG. 4). The VCN **506** can

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include a local peering gateway (LPG) **510** (e.g. the LPG **410** of FIG. 4) that can be communicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN **512** (e.g. the SSH VCN **412** of FIG. 4) via an LPG **410** contained in the SSH VCN **512**. The SSH VCN **512** can include an SSH subnet **514** (e.g. the SSH subnet **414** of FIG. 4), and the SSH VCN **512** can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN **516** (e.g. the control plane VCN **416** of FIG. 4) via an LPG **510** contained in the control plane VCN **516**. The control plane VCN **516** can be contained in a service tenancy **519** (e.g. the service tenancy **419** of FIG. 4), and the data plane VCN **518** (e.g. the data plane VCN **418** of FIG. 4) can be contained in a customer tenancy **521** that may be owned or operated by users, or customers, of the system.

The control plane VCN **516** can include a control plane DMZ tier **520** (e.g. the control plane DMZ tier **420** of FIG. 4) that can include LB subnet(s) **522** (e.g. LB subnet(s) **422** of FIG. 4), a control plane app tier **524** (e.g. the control plane app tier **424** of FIG. 4) that can include app subnet(s) **526** (e.g. app subnet(s) **426** of FIG. 4), a control plane data tier **528** (e.g. the control plane data tier **428** of FIG. 4) that can include database (DB) subnet(s) **530** (e.g. similar to DB subnet(s) **430** of FIG. 4). The LB subnet(s) **522** contained in the control plane DMZ tier **520** can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) **526** contained in the control plane app tier **524** and an Internet gateway **534** (e.g. the Internet gateway **434** of FIG. 4) that can be contained in the control plane VCN **516**, and the app subnet(s) **526** can be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) **530** contained in the control plane data tier **528** and a service gateway **536** (e.g. the service gateway of FIG. 4) and a network address translation (NAT) gateway **538** (e.g. the NAT gateway **438** of FIG. 4). The control plane VCN **516** can include the service gateway **536** and the NAT gateway **538**.

The control plane VCN **516** can include a data plane mirror app tier **540** (e.g. the data plane mirror app tier **440** of FIG. 4) that can include app subnet(s) **526**. The app subnet(s) **526** contained in the data plane mirror app tier **540** can include a virtual network interface controller (VNIC) **542** (e.g. the VNIC of **442**) that can execute a compute instance **544** (e.g. similar to the compute instance **444** of FIG. 4). The compute instance **544** can facilitate communication between the app subnet(s) **526** of the data plane mirror app tier **540** and the app subnet(s) **526** that can be contained in a data plane app tier **546** (e.g. the data plane app tier **446** of FIG. 4) via the VNIC **542** contained in the data plane mirror app tier **540** and the VNIC **542** contained in the data plane app tier **546**.

The Internet gateway **534** contained in the control plane VCN **516** can be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service **552** (e.g. the metadata management service **452** of FIG. 4) that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet **554** (e.g. public Internet **454** of FIG. 4). Public Internet **554** can be communicatively coupled to the NAT gateway **538** contained in the control plane VCN **516**. The service gateway **536** contained in the control plane VCN **516** can be communicatively couple to cloud services **556** (e.g. cloud services **456** of FIG. 4).

In some examples, the data plane VCN **518** can be contained in the customer tenancy **521**. In this case, the IaaS provider may provide the control plane VCN **516** for each customer, and the IaaS provider may, for each customer, set up a unique compute instance **544** that is contained in the service tenancy **519**. Each compute instance **544** may allow communication between the control plane VCN **516**, contained in the service tenancy **519**, and the data plane VCN **518** that is contained in the customer tenancy **521**. The

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compute instance **544** may allow resources, that are provisioned in the control plane VCN **516** that is contained in the service tenancy **519**, to be deployed or otherwise used in the data plane VCN **518** that is contained in the customer tenancy **521**.

In other examples, the customer of the IaaS provider may have databases that live in the customer tenancy **521**. In this example, the control plane VCN **516** can include the data plane mirror app tier **540** that can include app subnet(s) **526**. The data plane mirror app tier **540** can reside in the data plane VCN **518**, but the data plane mirror app tier **540** may not live in the data plane VCN **518**. That is, the data plane mirror app tier **540** may have access to the customer tenancy **521**, but the data plane mirror app tier **540** may not exist in the data plane VCN **518** or be owned or operated by the customer of the IaaS provider. The data plane mirror app tier **540** may be configured to make calls to the data plane VCN **518** but may not be configured to make calls to any entity contained in the control plane VCN **516**. The customer may desire to deploy or otherwise use resources in the data plane VCN **518** that are provisioned in the control plane VCN **516**, and the data plane mirror app tier **540** can facilitate the desired deployment, or other usage of resources, of the customer.

In some embodiments, the customer of the IaaS provider can apply filters to the data plane VCN **518**. In this embodiment, the customer can determine what the data plane VCN **518** can access, and the customer may restrict access to public Internet **554** from the data plane VCN **518**. The IaaS provider may not be able to apply filters or otherwise control access of the data plane VCN **518** to any outside networks or databases. Applying filters and controls by the customer onto the data plane VCN **518**, contained in the customer tenancy **521**, can help isolate the data plane VCN **518** from other customers and from public Internet **554**.

In some embodiments, cloud services **556** can be called by the service gateway **536** to access services that may not exist on public Internet **554**, on the control plane VCN **516**, or on the data plane VCN **518**. The connection between cloud services **556** and the control plane VCN **516** or the data plane VCN **518** may not be live or continuous. Cloud services **556** may exist on a different network owned or operated by the IaaS provider. Cloud services **556** may be configured to receive calls from the service gateway **536** and may be configured to not receive calls from public Internet **554**. Some cloud services **556** may be isolated from other cloud services **556**, and the control plane VCN **516** may be isolated from cloud services **556** that may not be in the same region as the control plane VCN **516**. For example, the control plane VCN **516** may be located in "Region 1," and cloud service "Deployment 4," may be located in Region 1 and in "Region 2." If a call to Deployment 4 is made by the service gateway **536** contained in the control plane VCN **516** located in Region 1, the call may be transmitted to Deployment 4 in Region 1. In this example, the control plane VCN **516**, or Deployment 4 in Region 1, may not be communicatively coupled to, or otherwise in communication with, Deployment 4 in Region 2.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram **600** illustrating another example pattern of an IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Service operators **602** (e.g. service operators **402** of FIG. 4) can be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy **604** (e.g. the secure host tenancy **404** of FIG. 4) that can include a virtual cloud network (VCN) **606** (e.g. the VCN **406** of FIG. 4) and a secure host subnet **608** (e.g. the secure host subnet **408** of FIG. 4). The VCN **606** can include an LPG **610** (e.g. the LPG **410** of FIG. 4) that can

be communicatively coupled to an SSH VCN **612** (e.g. the SSH VCN **412** of FIG. **4**) via an LPG **610** contained in the SSH VCN **612**. The SSH VCN **612** can include an SSH subnet **614** (e.g. the SSH subnet **414** of FIG. **4**), and the SSH VCN **612** can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN **616** (e.g. the control plane VCN **416** of FIG. **4**) via an LPG **610** contained in the control plane VCN **616** and to a data plane VCN **618** (e.g. the data plane **418** of FIG. **4**) via an LPG **610** contained in the data plane VCN **618**. The control plane VCN **616** and the data plane VCN **618** can be contained in a service tenancy **619** (e.g. the service tenancy **419** of FIG. **4**).

The control plane VCN **616** can include a control plane DMZ tier **620** (e.g. the control plane DMZ tier **420** of FIG. **4**) that can include load balancer (LB) subnet(s) **622** (e.g. LB subnet(s) **422** of FIG. **4**), a control plane app tier **624** (e.g. the control plane app tier **424** of FIG. **4**) that can include app subnet(s) **626** (e.g. similar to app subnet(s) **426** of FIG. **4**), a control plane data tier **628** (e.g. the control plane data tier **428** of FIG. **4**) that can include DB subnet(s) **630**. The LB subnet(s) **622** contained in the control plane DMZ tier **620** can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) **626** contained in the control plane app tier **624** and to an Internet gateway **634** (e.g. the Internet gateway **434** of FIG. **4**) that can be contained in the control plane VCN **616**, and the app subnet(s) **626** can be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) **630** contained in the control plane data tier **628** and to a service gateway **636** (e.g. the service gateway of FIG. **4**) and a network address translation (NAT) gateway **638** (e.g. the NAT gateway **438** of FIG. **4**). The control plane VCN **616** can include the service gateway **636** and the NAT gateway **638**.

The data plane VCN **618** can include a data plane app tier **646** (e.g. the data plane app tier **446** of FIG. **4**), a data plane DMZ tier **648** (e.g. the data plane DMZ tier **448** of FIG. **4**), and a data plane data tier **650** (e.g. the data plane data tier **450** of FIG. **4**). The data plane DMZ tier **648** can include LB subnet(s) **622** that can be communicatively coupled to trusted app subnet(s) **660** and untrusted app subnet(s) **662** of the data plane app tier **646** and the Internet gateway **634** contained in the data plane VCN **618**. The trusted app subnet(s) **660** can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway **636** contained in the data plane VCN **618**, the NAT gateway **638** contained in the data plane VCN **618**, and DB subnet(s) **630** contained in the data plane data tier **650**. The untrusted app subnet(s) **662** can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway **636** contained in the data plane VCN **618** and DB subnet(s) **630** contained in the data plane data tier **650**. The data plane data tier **650** can include DB subnet(s) **630** that can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway **636** contained in the data plane VCN **618**.

The untrusted app subnet(s) **662** can include one or more primary VNICS **664(1)-(N)** that can be communicatively coupled to tenant virtual machines (VMs) **666(1)-(N)**. Each tenant VM **666(1)-(N)** can be communicatively coupled to a respective app subnet **667(1)-(N)** that can be contained in respective container egress VCNs **668(1)-(N)** that can be contained in respective customer tenancies **670(1)-(N)**. Respective secondary VNICS **672(1)-(N)** can facilitate communication between the untrusted app subnet(s) **662** contained in the data plane VCN **618** and the app subnet contained in the container egress VCNs **668(1)-(N)**. Each container egress VCNs **668(1)-(N)** can include a NAT gateway **638** that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet **654** (e.g. public Internet **454** of FIG. **4**).

The Internet gateway **634** contained in the control plane VCN **616** and contained in the data plane VCN **618** can be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service **652** (e.g. the metadata management system **452** of FIG. **4**) that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet **654**. Public Internet **654** can be communicatively coupled to the NAT gateway **638** contained in the control plane VCN **616** and contained in the data plane VCN **618**. The service gateway **636** contained in the control plane VCN **616** and contained in the data plane VCN **618** can be communicatively couple to cloud services **656**.

In some embodiments, the data plane VCN **618** can be integrated with customer tenancies **670**. This integration can be useful or desirable for customers of the IaaS provider in some cases such as a case that may desire support when executing code. The customer may provide code to run that may be destructive, may communicate with other customer resources, or may otherwise cause undesirable effects. In response to this, the IaaS provider may determine whether to run code given to the IaaS provider by the customer.

In some examples, the customer of the IaaS provider may grant temporary network access to the IaaS provider and request a function to be attached to the data plane tier app **646**. Code to run the function may be executed in the VMs **666(1)-(N)**, and the code may not be configured to run anywhere else on the data plane VCN **618**. Each VM **666(1)-(N)** may be connected to one customer tenancy **670**. Respective containers **671(1)-(N)** contained in the VMs **666(1)-(N)** may be configured to run the code. In this case, there can be a dual isolation (e.g., the containers **671(1)-(N)** running code, where the containers **671(1)-(N)** may be contained in at least the VM **666(1)-(N)** that are contained in the untrusted app subnet(s) **662**), which may help prevent incorrect or otherwise undesirable code from damaging the network of the IaaS provider or from damaging a network of a different customer. The containers **671(1)-(N)** may be communicatively coupled to the customer tenancy **670** and may be configured to transmit or receive data from the customer tenancy **670**. The containers **671(1)-(N)** may not be configured to transmit or receive data from any other entity in the data plane VCN **618**. Upon completion of running the code, the IaaS provider may kill or otherwise dispose of the containers **671(1)-(N)**.

In some embodiments, the trusted app subnet(s) **660** may run code that may be owned or operated by the IaaS provider. In this embodiment, the trusted app subnet(s) **660** may be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) **630** and be configured to execute CRUD operations in the DB subnet(s) **630**. The untrusted app subnet(s) **662** may be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) **630**, but in this embodiment, the untrusted app subnet(s) may be configured to execute read operations in the DB subnet(s) **630**. The containers **671(1)-(N)** that can be contained in the VM **666(1)-(N)** of each customer and that may run code from the customer may not be communicatively coupled with the DB subnet(s) **630**.

In other embodiments, the control plane VCN **616** and the data plane VCN **618** may not be directly communicatively coupled. In this embodiment, there may be no direct communication between the control plane VCN **616** and the data plane VCN **618**. However, communication can occur indirectly through at least one method. An LPG **610** may be established by the IaaS provider that can facilitate communication between the control plane VCN **616** and the data plane VCN **618**. In another example, the control plane VCN **616** or the data plane VCN **618** can make a call to cloud services **656** via the service gateway **636**. For example, a call

to cloud services **656** from the control plane VCN **616** can include a request for a service that can communicate with the data plane VCN **618**.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram **700** illustrating another example pattern of an IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Service operators **702** (e.g. service operators **402** of FIG. 4) can be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy **704** (e.g. the secure host tenancy **404** of FIG. 4) that can include a virtual cloud network (VCN) **706** (e.g. the VCN **406** of FIG. 4) and a secure host subnet **708** (e.g. the secure host subnet **408** of FIG. 4). The VCN **706** can include an LPG **710** (e.g. the LPG **410** of FIG. 4) that can be communicatively coupled to an SSH VCN **712** (e.g. the SSH VCN **412** of FIG. 4) via an LPG **710** contained in the SSH VCN **712**. The SSH VCN **712** can include an SSH subnet **714** (e.g. the SSH subnet **414** of FIG. 4), and the SSH VCN **712** can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN **716** (e.g. the control plane VCN **416** of FIG. 4) via an LPG **710** contained in the control plane VCN **716** and to a data plane VCN **718** (e.g. the data plane **418** of FIG. 4) via an LPG **710** contained in the data plane VCN **718**. The control plane VCN **716** and the data plane VCN **718** can be contained in a service tenancy **719** (e.g. the service tenancy **419** of FIG. 4).

The control plane VCN **716** can include a control plane DMZ tier **720** (e.g. the control plane DMZ tier **420** of FIG. 4) that can include LB subnet(s) **722** (e.g. LB subnet(s) **422** of FIG. 4), a control plane app tier **724** (e.g. the control plane app tier **424** of FIG. 4) that can include app subnet(s) **726** (e.g. app subnet(s) **426** of FIG. 4), a control plane data tier **728** (e.g. the control plane data tier **428** of FIG. 4) that can include DB subnet(s) **730** (e.g. DB subnet(s) **630** of FIG. 6). The LB subnet(s) **722** contained in the control plane DMZ tier **720** can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) **726** contained in the control plane app tier **724** and to an Internet gateway **734** (e.g. the Internet gateway **434** of FIG. 4) that can be contained in the control plane VCN **716**, and the app subnet(s) **726** can be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) **730** contained in the control plane data tier **728** and to a service gateway **736** (e.g. the service gateway of FIG. 4) and a network address translation (NAT) gateway **738** (e.g. the NAT gateway **438** of FIG. 4). The control plane VCN **716** can include the service gateway **736** and the NAT gateway **738**.

The data plane VCN **718** can include a data plane app tier **746** (e.g. the data plane app tier **446** of FIG. 4), a data plane DMZ tier **748** (e.g. the data plane DMZ tier **448** of FIG. 4), and a data plane data tier **750** (e.g. the data plane data tier **450** of FIG. 4). The data plane DMZ tier **748** can include LB subnet(s) **722** that can be communicatively coupled to trusted app subnet(s) **760** (e.g. trusted app subnet(s) **660** of FIG. 6) and untrusted app subnet(s) **762** (e.g. untrusted app subnet(s) **662** of FIG. 6) of the data plane app tier **746** and the Internet gateway **734** contained in the data plane VCN **718**. The trusted app subnet(s) **760** can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway **736** contained in the data plane VCN **718**, the NAT gateway **738** contained in the data plane VCN **718**, and DB subnet(s) **730** contained in the data plane data tier **750**. The untrusted app subnet(s) **762** can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway **736** contained in the data plane VCN **718** and DB subnet(s) **730** contained in the data plane data tier **750**. The data plane data tier **750** can include DB subnet(s) **730** that can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway **736** contained in the data plane VCN **718**.

The untrusted app subnet(s) **762** can include primary VNICS **764(1)-(N)** that can be communicatively coupled to

tenant virtual machines (VMs) **766(1)-(N)** residing within the untrusted app subnet(s) **762**. Each tenant VM **766(1)-(N)** can run code in a respective container **767(1)-(N)**, and be communicatively coupled to an app subnet **726** that can be contained in a data plane app tier **746** that can be contained in a container egress VCN **768**. Respective secondary VNICS **772(1)-(N)** can facilitate communication between the untrusted app subnet(s) **762** contained in the data plane VCN **718** and the app subnet contained in the container egress VCN **768**. The container egress VCN can include a NAT gateway **738** that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet **754** (e.g. public Internet **454** of FIG. 4).

The Internet gateway **734** contained in the control plane VCN **716** and contained in the data plane VCN **718** can be communicatively coupled to a metadata management service **752** (e.g. the metadata management system **452** of FIG. 4) that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet **754**. Public Internet **754** can be communicatively coupled to the NAT gateway **738** contained in the control plane VCN **716** and contained in the data plane VCN **718**. The service gateway **736** contained in the control plane VCN **716** and contained in the data plane VCN **718** can be communicatively couple to cloud services **756**.

In some examples, the pattern illustrated by the architecture of block diagram **700** of FIG. 7 may be considered an exception to the pattern illustrated by the architecture of block diagram **600** of FIG. 6 and may be desirable for a customer of the IaaS provider if the IaaS provider cannot directly communicate with the customer (e.g., a disconnected region). The respective containers **767(1)-(N)** that are contained in the VMs **766(1)-(N)** for each customer can be accessed in real-time by the customer. The containers **767(1)-(N)** may be configured to make calls to respective secondary VNICS **772(1)-(N)** contained in app subnet(s) **726** of the data plane app tier **746** that can be contained in the container egress VCN **768**. The secondary VNICS **772(1)-(N)** can transmit the calls to the NAT gateway **738** that may transmit the calls to public Internet **754**. In this example, the containers **767(1)-(N)** that can be accessed in real-time by the customer can be isolated from the control plane VCN **716** and can be isolated from other entities contained in the data plane VCN **718**. The containers **767(1)-(N)** may also be isolated from resources from other customers.

In other examples, the customer can use the containers **767(1)-(N)** to call cloud services **756**. In this example, the customer may run code in the containers **767(1)-(N)** that requests a service from cloud services **756**. The containers **767(1)-(N)** can transmit this request to the secondary VNICS **772(1)-(N)** that can transmit the request to the NAT gateway that can transmit the request to public Internet **754**. Public Internet **754** can transmit the request to LB subnet(s) **722** contained in the control plane VCN **716** via the Internet gateway **734**. In response to determining the request is valid, the LB subnet(s) can transmit the request to app subnet(s) **726** that can transmit the request to cloud services **756** via the service gateway **736**.

It should be appreciated that IaaS architectures **400**, **500**, **600**, **700** depicted in the figures may have other components than those depicted. Further, the embodiments shown in the figures are only some examples of a cloud infrastructure system that may incorporate an embodiment of the disclosure. In some other embodiments, the IaaS systems may have more or fewer components than shown in the figures, may combine two or more components, or may have a different configuration or arrangement of components.

In certain embodiments, the IaaS systems described herein may include a suite of applications, middleware, and

database service offerings that are delivered to a customer in a self-service, subscription-based, elastically scalable, reliable, highly available, and secure manner. An example of such an IaaS system is the Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) provided by the present assignee.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example computer system **800**, in which various embodiments may be implemented. The system **800** may be used to implement any of the computer systems described above. As shown in the figure, computer system **800** includes a processing unit **804** that communi-
cates with a number of peripheral subsystems via a bus subsystem **802**. These peripheral subsystems may include a processing acceleration unit **806**, an I/O subsystem **808**, a storage subsystem **818** and a communications subsystem **824**. Storage subsystem **818** includes tangible computer-readable storage media **822** and a system memory **810**.

Bus subsystem **802** provides a mechanism for letting the various components and subsystems of computer system **800** communicate with each other as intended. Although bus subsystem **802** is shown schematically as a single bus, alternative embodiments of the bus subsystem may utilize multiple buses. Bus subsystem **802** may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. For example, such architectures may include an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, which can be implemented as a Mezzanine bus manufactured to the IEEE P1386.1 standard.

Processing unit **804**, which can be implemented as one or more integrated circuits (e.g., a conventional microprocessor or microcontroller), controls the operation of computer system **800**. One or more processors may be included in processing unit **804**. These processors may include single core or multicore processors. In certain embodiments, processing unit **804** may be implemented as one or more independent processing units **832** and/or **834** with single or multicore processors included in each processing unit. In other embodiments, processing unit **804** may also be implemented as a quad-core processing unit formed by integrating two dual-core processors into a single chip.

In various embodiments, processing unit **804** can execute a variety of programs in response to program code and can maintain multiple concurrently executing programs or processes. At any given time, some or all of the program code to be executed can be resident in processor(s) **804** and/or in storage subsystem **818**. Through suitable programming, processor(s) **804** can provide various functionalities described above. Computer system **800** may additionally include a processing acceleration unit **806**, which can include a digital signal processor (DSP), a special-purpose processor, and/or the like.

I/O subsystem **808** may include user interface input devices and user interface output devices. User interface input devices may include a keyboard, pointing devices such as a mouse or trackball, a touchpad or touch screen incorporated into a display, a scroll wheel, a click wheel, a dial, a button, a switch, a keypad, audio input devices with voice command recognition systems, microphones, and other types of input devices. User interface input devices may include, for example, motion sensing and/or gesture recognition devices such as the Microsoft Kinect® motion sensor that enables users to control and interact with an input device, such as the Microsoft Xbox® 360 game controller, through a natural user interface using gestures and spoken

commands. User interface input devices may also include eye gesture recognition devices such as the Google Glass® blink detector that detects eye activity (e.g., ‘blinking’ while taking pictures and/or making a menu selection) from users and transforms the eye gestures as input into an input device (e.g., Google Glass®). Additionally, user interface input devices may include voice recognition sensing devices that enable users to interact with voice recognition systems (e.g., Siri® navigator), through voice commands.

User interface input devices may also include, without limitation, three dimensional (3D) mice, joysticks or pointing sticks, gamepads and graphic tablets, and audio/visual devices such as speakers, digital cameras, digital camcorders, portable media players, webcams, image scanners, fingerprint scanners, barcode reader 3D scanners, 3D printers, laser rangefinders, and eye gaze tracking devices. Additionally, user interface input devices may include, for example, medical imaging input devices such as computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, position emission tomography, medical ultrasonography devices. User interface input devices may also include, for example, audio input devices such as MIDI keyboards, digital musical instruments and the like.

User interface output devices may include a display subsystem, indicator lights, or non-visual displays such as audio output devices, etc. The display subsystem may be a cathode ray tube (CRT), a flat-panel device, such as that using a liquid crystal display (LCD) or plasma display, a projection device, a touch screen, and the like. In general, use of the term “output device” is intended to include all possible types of devices and mechanisms for outputting information from computer system **800** to a user or other computer. For example, user interface output devices may include, without limitation, a variety of display devices that visually convey text, graphics and audio/video information such as monitors, printers, speakers, headphones, automotive navigation systems, plotters, voice output devices, and modems.

Computer system **800** may comprise a storage subsystem **818** that comprises software elements, shown as being currently located within a system memory **810**. System memory **810** may store program instructions that are loadable and executable on processing unit **804**, as well as data generated during the execution of these programs.

Depending on the configuration and type of computer system **800**, system memory **810** may be volatile (such as random access memory (RAM)) and/or non-volatile (such as read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, etc.). The RAM typically contains data and/or program modules that are immediately accessible to and/or presently being operated and executed by processing unit **804**. In some implementations, system memory **810** may include multiple different types of memory, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM). In some implementations, a basic input/output system (BIOS), containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within computer system **800**, such as during start-up, may typically be stored in the ROM. By way of example, and not limitation, system memory **810** also illustrates application programs **812**, which may include client applications, Web browsers, mid-tier applications, relational database management systems (RDBMS), etc., program data **814**, and an operating system **816**. By way of example, operating system **816** may include various versions of Microsoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/or Linux operating systems, a variety of commercially-available UNIX® or UNIX-like operating systems (including

without limitation the variety of GNU/Linux operating systems, the Google Chrome® OS, and the like) and/or mobile operating systems such as iOS, Windows® Phone, Android® OS, BlackBerry® 8 OS, and Palm® OS operating systems.

Storage subsystem **818** may also provide a tangible computer-readable storage medium for storing the basic programming and data constructs that provide the functionality of some embodiments. Software (programs, code modules, instructions) that when executed by a processor provide the functionality described above may be stored in storage subsystem **818**. These software modules or instructions may be executed by processing unit **804**. Storage subsystem **818** may also provide a repository for storing data used in accordance with the present disclosure.

Storage subsystem **800** may also include a computer-readable storage media reader **820** that can further be connected to computer-readable storage media **822**. Together and, optionally, in combination with system memory **810**, computer-readable storage media **822** may comprehensively represent remote, local, fixed, and/or removable storage devices plus storage media for temporarily and/or more permanently containing, storing, transmitting, and retrieving computer-readable information.

Computer-readable storage media **822** containing code, or portions of code, can also include any appropriate media known or used in the art, including storage media and communication media, such as but not limited to, volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage and/or transmission of information. This can include tangible computer-readable storage media such as RAM, ROM, electronically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disk (DVD), or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or other tangible computer readable media. This can also include nontangible computer-readable media, such as data signals, data transmissions, or any other medium which can be used to transmit the desired information and which can be accessed by computing system **800**.

By way of example, computer-readable storage media **822** may include a hard disk drive that reads from or writes to non-removable, nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive that reads from or writes to a removable, non-volatile magnetic disk, and an optical disk drive that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile optical disk such as a CD ROM, DVD, and Blu-Ray® disk, or other optical media. Computer-readable storage media **822** may include, but is not limited to, Zip® drives, flash memory cards, universal serial bus (USB) flash drives, secure digital (SD) cards, DVD disks, digital video tape, and the like. Computer-readable storage media **822** may also include, solid-state drives (SSD) based on non-volatile memory such as flash-memory based SSDs, enterprise flash drives, solid state ROM, and the like, SSDs based on volatile memory such as solid state RAM, dynamic RAM, static RAM, DRAM-based SSDs, magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM) SSDs, and hybrid SSDs that use a combination of DRAM and flash memory based SSDs. The disk drives and their associated computer-readable media may provide non-volatile storage of computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, and other data for computer system **800**.

Communications subsystem **824** provides an interface to other computer systems and networks. Communications subsystem **824** serves as an interface for receiving data from

and transmitting data to other systems from computer system **800**. For example, communications subsystem **824** may enable computer system **800** to connect to one or more devices via the Internet. In some embodiments communications subsystem **824** can include radio frequency (RF) transceiver components for accessing wireless voice and/or data networks (e.g., using cellular telephone technology, advanced data network technology, such as 3G, 4G or EDGE (enhanced data rates for global evolution), WiFi (IEEE 802.11 family standards, or other mobile communication technologies, or any combination thereof), global positioning system (GPS) receiver components, and/or other components. In some embodiments communications subsystem **824** can provide wired network connectivity (e.g., Ethernet) in addition to or instead of a wireless interface.

In some embodiments, communications subsystem **824** may also receive input communication in the form of structured and/or unstructured data feeds **826**, event streams **828**, event updates **830**, and the like on behalf of one or more users who may use computer system **800**.

By way of example, communications subsystem **824** may be configured to receive data feeds **826** in real-time from users of social networks and/or other communication services such as Twitter® feeds, Facebook® updates, web feeds such as Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds, and/or real-time updates from one or more third party information sources.

Additionally, communications subsystem **824** may also be configured to receive data in the form of continuous data streams, which may include event streams **828** of real-time events and/or event updates **830**, that may be continuous or unbounded in nature with no explicit end. Examples of applications that generate continuous data may include, for example, sensor data applications, financial tickers, network performance measuring tools (e.g. network monitoring and traffic management applications), clickstream analysis tools, automobile traffic monitoring, and the like.

Communications subsystem **824** may also be configured to output the structured and/or unstructured data feeds **826**, event streams **828**, event updates **830**, and the like to one or more databases that may be in communication with one or more streaming data source computers coupled to computer system **800**.

Computer system **800** can be one of various types, including a handheld portable device (e.g., an iPhone® cellular phone, an iPad® computing tablet, a PDA), a wearable device (e.g., a Google Glass® head mounted display), a PC, a workstation, a mainframe, a kiosk, a server rack, or any other data processing system.

Due to the ever-changing nature of computers and networks, the description of computer system **800** depicted in the figure is intended only as a specific example. Many other configurations having more or fewer components than the system depicted in the figure are possible. For example, customized hardware might also be used and/or particular elements might be implemented in hardware, firmware, software (including applets), or a combination. Further, connection to other computing devices, such as network input/output devices, may be employed. Based on the disclosure and teachings provided herein, a person of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate other ways and/or methods to implement the various embodiments.

Although specific embodiments have been described, various modifications, alterations, alternative constructions, and equivalents are also encompassed within the scope of the disclosure. Embodiments are not restricted to operation within certain specific data processing environments, but are

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free to operate within a plurality of data processing environments. Additionally, although embodiments have been described using a particular series of transactions and steps, it should be apparent to those skilled in the art that the scope of the present disclosure is not limited to the described series of transactions and steps. Various features and aspects of the above-described embodiments may be used individually or jointly.

Further, while embodiments have been described using a particular combination of hardware and software, it should be recognized that other combinations of hardware and software are also within the scope of the present disclosure. Embodiments may be implemented only in hardware, or only in software, or using combinations thereof. The various processes described herein can be implemented on the same processor or different processors in any combination. Accordingly, where components or modules are described as being configured to perform certain operations, such configuration can be accomplished, e.g., by designing electronic circuits to perform the operation, by programming programmable electronic circuits (such as microprocessors) to perform the operation, or any combination thereof. Processes can communicate using a variety of techniques including but not limited to conventional techniques for inter process communication, and different pairs of processes may use different techniques, or the same pair of processes may use different techniques at different times.

The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense. It will, however, be evident that additions, subtractions, deletions, and other modifications and changes may be made thereunto without departing from the broader spirit and scope as set forth in the claims. Thus, although specific disclosure embodiments have been described, these are not intended to be limiting. Various modifications and equivalents are within the scope of the following claims.

The use of the terms “a” and “an” and “the” and similar referents in the context of describing the disclosed embodiments (especially in the context of the following claims) are to be construed to cover both the singular and the plural, unless otherwise indicated herein or clearly contradicted by context. The terms “comprising,” “having,” “including,” and “containing” are to be construed as open-ended terms (i.e., meaning “including, but not limited to,”) unless otherwise noted. The term “connected” is to be construed as partly or wholly contained within, attached to, or joined together, even if there is something intervening. Recitation of ranges of values herein are merely intended to serve as a shorthand method of referring individually to each separate value falling within the range, unless otherwise indicated herein and each separate value is incorporated into the specification as if it were individually recited herein. All methods described herein can be performed in any suitable order unless otherwise indicated herein or otherwise clearly contradicted by context. The use of any and all examples, or exemplary language (e.g., “such as”) provided herein, is intended merely to better illuminate embodiments and does not pose a limitation on the scope of the disclosure unless otherwise claimed. No language in the specification should be construed as indicating any non-claimed element as essential to the practice of the disclosure.

Disjunctive language such as the phrase “at least one of X, Y, or Z,” unless specifically stated otherwise, is intended to be understood within the context as used in general to present that an item, term, etc., may be either X, Y, or Z, or any combination thereof (e.g., X, Y, and/or Z). Thus, such disjunctive language is not generally intended to, and should

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not, imply that certain embodiments require at least one of X, at least one of Y, or at least one of Z to each be present.

Preferred embodiments of this disclosure are described herein, including the best mode known for carrying out the disclosure. Variations of those preferred embodiments may become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art upon reading the foregoing description. Those of ordinary skill should be able to employ such variations as appropriate and the disclosure may be practiced otherwise than as specifically described herein. Accordingly, this disclosure includes all modifications and equivalents of the subject matter recited in the claims appended hereto as permitted by applicable law. Moreover, any combination of the above-described elements in all possible variations thereof is encompassed by the disclosure unless otherwise indicated herein.

All references, including publications, patent applications, and patents, cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference to the same extent as if each reference were individually and specifically indicated to be incorporated by reference and were set forth in its entirety herein.

In the foregoing specification, aspects of the disclosure are described with reference to specific embodiments thereof, but those skilled in the art will recognize that the disclosure is not limited thereto. Various features and aspects of the above-described disclosure may be used individually or jointly. Further, embodiments can be utilized in any number of environments and applications beyond those described herein without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the specification. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded as illustrative rather than restrictive.

The invention claimed is:

1. A method for secure one-way transmission of data from a public network to a private network, the method comprising:

obtaining, at a first computing device in the public network, from a first application, a stream of data packets, information identifying a recipient user, and information identifying a recipient application;

authenticating a sending user and the first application by verifying a token obtained by a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device responsive to the sending user providing user information to the first application;

forwarding the stream of data packets and the user information associated with the sending user to the first instance of the trust module executing on the first computing device;

adding metadata to the stream of data packets, the metadata including (a) a digital signature derived from a private key specific to the first instance of the trust module and (b) information relating to the user information; and

forwarding the stream of data packets to a second computing device in the private network via a cross-domain system (CDS), the second computing device being configured to process the metadata of the stream of data packets to verify the digital signature relating to the first instance of the trust module based on a public key that corresponds to the private key, where the stream of data packets are forwarded to the recipient application and the recipient user in the private network to consume the metadata.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first instance of the trust module is configured to authorize the first application by determining that the stream of data packets is signed with

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a trusted application key unique to the first application, and wherein a second instance of the trust module in the private network executing on the second computing device is configured to authorize the recipient application by determining that the stream of data packets are signed with a trusted application key unique to the recipient application. 5

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first application authenticates the sending user by verifying login credentials provided to the first application that correspond with the sending user. 10

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the user information comprises login credentials specific to the sending user for logging into the first application.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the stream of data packets are forwarded along a priority communication channel in the CDS, wherein existing traffic in the CDS is diverted to a second communication channel responsive to forwarding the stream of data packets to the CDS to increase throughput of transmission of the stream of data packets on the priority communication channel. 20

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: converting the stream of data packets into a first file type, wherein the stream of data packets fall below a threshold data size and are within a set of encoding criteria. 25

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the CDS is configured to:
store the stream of data packets in a dynamic buffer;
validate the digital signature derived from the private key specific to the first instance of the trust module;
log the stream of data packets in an auditing computer for subsequent auditing of content being transmitted to the private network; and
provide the stream of data packets to a receive buffer of the second computing device responsive to the second computing device verifying an identity of the sending user and verifying the digital signature. 35

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the stream of data packets are provided to a one-way clipboard allowing content to be written or copied to the one-way clipboard. 40

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the CDS is configured to assign a ticket to the stream of data packets via a ticketing module, the ticket identifying a session between the sending user and the recipient user. 45

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the stream of data packets are sent to the second computing device via the CDS using a one-way chat application.

11. A system comprising:

a first computing device in a public network, the first computing device including:
a first processor; and

a first computer-readable medium including instructions that, when executed by the first processor, cause the first processor to: 55

obtain, from a first application executing on the first computing device, a stream of data packets, information identifying a recipient user, and information identifying a recipient application;

authenticate a sending user and the first application by verifying a token obtained by a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device responsive to the sending user providing user information to the first application; 60

pass the stream of data packets to the first instance of the trust module executing on the first computing device; 65

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add, by the first instance of the trust module, metadata to the stream of data packets, the metadata including a digital signature derived from a private key specific to the first instance of the trust module and information relating to the user information provided to the first instance of the trust module, the first application, the sending user, and the recipient user; and

forward the stream of data packets to a second computing device in a private network via a cross-domain system (CDS) providing one-way communication of data from the public network to the private network.

12. The system of claim 11, wherein the second computing device in the private network is configured to:
process, by a second instance of the trust module executing on the second computing device, the metadata of the stream of data packets to verify an identity of the sending user and verify the digital signature relating to the first instance of the trust module; and
receive the stream of data packets at a receiving buffer responsive to verifying the identity of the sending user and verifying the digital signature. 15

13. The system of claim 11, wherein the first computer-readable medium further causes the first processor to:
split the stream of data packets into a number of portions responsive to the stream of data packets exceeding a threshold data volume, wherein the stream of data packets are forwarded to the CDS in the number of portions. 25

14. The system of claim 11, wherein the CDS is configured to:
establish a session between the first computing device and the second computing device for secure one-way transmission of data; and
log the stream of data packets and the metadata in an auditing computer for subsequent auditing of content being transmitted to the private network, wherein the auditing computer stores the stream of data packets in a partition of an object storage for the session. 35

15. The system of claim 11, wherein the stream of data packets are converted into an ASCII file type, wherein the stream of data packets fall below a threshold data size and are within a set of encoding criteria. 40

16. A non-transitory computer-readable medium including stored thereon a sequence of instructions which, when executed by a processor causes the processor to execute a process, the process comprising: 45

obtaining, by a first computing device in a public network, from a first application executing on the first computing device, a stream of data packets, information identifying a recipient user, and information a recipient application;

authenticating, by a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device, a sending user and the first application by verifying a token obtained by the first instance responsive to the sending user providing user information to the first application;

passing, by the first computing device, the stream of data packets to the first instance of the trust module executing on the first computing device;

adding, by the first instance of the trust module executing on the first computing device, metadata to the stream of data packets;

forwarding, by the first computing device, the stream of data packets to a second computing device in a private network via a cross-domain system (CDS) providing 55

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secure one-way communication of the stream of data packets from the public network to the private network, wherein a second computing device is configured to:

process the metadata of the stream of data packets to
 verify an identity of the sending user and verify a
 digital signature relating to the first instance of the
 trust module in the metadata in the stream of data
 packets; and
 responsive to verifying the identity of the sending user
 and verifying the digital signature, receive the stream
 of data packets in a receive buffer maintained by the
 second computing device.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16, where the metadata includes a digital signature derived from a private key specific to the first instance of the trust module and information relating to the user information is provided to the first instance of the trust module, the first application, a sending user, and the recipient user.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17, wherein the user information comprises login credentials specific to the sending user for logging into the first application.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16, wherein the stream of data packets are forwarded along a priority communication channel in the CDS, wherein existing traffic in the CDS is diverted to a second communication channel responsive to forwarding the stream of data packets to the CDS to increase throughput of transmission of the stream of data packets on the priority communication channel.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16, wherein the process further comprises:

splitting the stream of data packets into a number of portions responsive to the stream of data packets exceeding a threshold data volume, wherein the stream of data packets are forwarded to the CDS in the number of portions.

21. A method for secure one-way transmission of data from a public network to a private network, the method comprising:

obtaining, at a first computing device in the public network, from a first application, a stream of data packets, a recipient user, and a recipient application;
 forwarding the stream of data packets and user information associated with a sending user to a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device;
 adding metadata to the stream of data packets, the metadata including a digital signature derived from a private

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key specific to the first instance of the trust module and information relating to the user information; and
 forwarding the stream of data packets to a second computing device in the private network via a cross-domain system (CDS), the second computing device being configured to process the metadata of the stream of data packets to verify the digital signature relating to the first instance of the trust module based on a public key that corresponds to the private key, where the stream of data packets are forwarded to the recipient application and the recipient user in the private network to consume the metadata, wherein the first instance of the trust module is configured to authorize the first application by determining that the stream of data packets is signed with a trusted application key unique to the first application, and wherein a second instance of the trust module in the private network executing on the second computing device is configured to authorize the recipient application by determining that the stream of data packets are signed with a trusted application key unique to the recipient application.

22. A method for secure one-way transmission of data from a public network to a private network, the method comprising:

obtaining, at a first computing device in the public network, from a first application, a stream of data packets, a receipt user, and a recipient application;
 forwarding the stream of data packets and user information associated with a sending user to a first instance of a trust module executing on the first computing device;
 adding metadata to the stream of data packets, the metadata including a digital signature derived from a private key specific to the first instance of the trust module and information relating to the user information; and
 forwarding the stream of data packets to a second computing device in the private network via a cross-domain system (CDS), the second computing device being configured to process the metadata of the stream of data packets to verify the digital signature relating to the first instance of the trust module based on a public key that corresponds to the private key, where the stream of data packets are forwarded to the recipient application and the recipient user in the private network to consume the data, and wherein the CDS is configured to assign a ticket to the stream of data packets via a ticketing module, the ticket identifying a session between the sending user and the recipient user.

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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION

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APPLICATION NO. : 17/195466
DATED : June 20, 2023
INVENTOR(S) : Kuehnel et al.

Page 1 of 1

It is certified that error appears in the above-identified patent and that said Letters Patent is hereby corrected as shown below:

In the Specification

In Column 8, Line 25, Delete “that that” and insert -- that --.


In the Claims

In Column 26, Lines 37-38, In Claim 1, delete “network,” and insert -- network --.

In Column 26, Line 39, In Claim 1, delete “recepient” and insert -- recipient --.

In Column 30, Line 27, In Claim 22, delete “receipt” and insert -- recipient --.

Signed and Sealed this
Second Day of April, 2024



Katherine Kelly Vidal
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office