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(54) **SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR
CYBER-PHYSICAL THREAT MODELING**

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(57) **ABSTRACT**

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H04L 9/40 (2022.01)

Systems, methods, and products comprise an analytic server,
which improves security of a unified system of distributed
network infrastructure comprising a plurality of cyber-
physical systems. The analytic server may instantiate a sub
attack tree for each cyber-physical system within the unified
system. The analytic server may determine how the inter-
connection of the plurality of cyber-physical systems may
affect the unified system security. The analytic server may
monitor systems and receive electronic notifications of alerts
in real-time from devices in the plurality of cyber-physical
systems. The analytic server may follow the logic of the
attack tree model by traversing the attack tree from bottom
up and determine how the alerts from the cyber-physical
systems may affect the distributed network infrastructure as
a whole. The analytic server may generate reports compris-
ing a list of the prioritized attacks and recommendation
actions to mitigate the attacks.

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See application file for complete search history.


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20 Claims, 6 Drawing Sheets

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


FIG. 1

200 ↗





FIG. 2






FIG. 4




FIG. 5




FIG. 6

SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL THREAT MODELING

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application relates to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 16/012,651, filed Jun. 19, 2018, titled “Systems and Methods for Improving the Ranking and Prioritization of Attack-Related Events,” and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 16/267,304, filed Feb. 4, 2019, titled “Systems and Methods for Unified Hierarchical Cybersecurity,” each of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This application relates generally to methods and systems for threat modeling in cyber-physical systems.

BACKGROUND

With ever-increasing reliance on technology, the threat of cyber-attacks has migrated to the physical plane. Furthermore, due to increased automation, physical systems are now facing a host of virtual adversaries. This adds a whole new dimension of attack surfaces. For example, automation can leave physical systems extremely vulnerable to radio-based attacks. The physical systems may further be vulnerable to both replay and spoofing attacks.

For example, integrated circuit lifecycle attacks, while difficult to execute, are of devastating consequences. Examples of such attacks have affected military grade equipment in the past. While evidence of malicious access can be discovered through intrusion detection systems, the true culprit is difficult to find.

The conventional threat modeling tools, although effective in the virtual plane, are not do not work for physical systems. Much of the emphasis is made on attacks over a network, disregarding the physical attack surface. This deficiency leaves physical systems vulnerable to a plethora of physical attacks, such as USB drive-by attacks, lifecycle attacks, and the like. For example, if a physical system has unused physical interfaces readily available (USB, as well as other serial ports), a conventional threat modeling tools fail to warn an administrative analyst about the possibility of both external and internal adversaries using the physical attack against the interface. For instance, one of such undetected physical attacks may be that a USB drive, acting as a keyboard, injects keystrokes to gain and maintain access to a system.

SUMMARY

What is therefore desired is to have a system that builds threat modeling tools in cyber-physical systems that analyze and prioritize the impact of physical attacks. Embodiments disclosed herein describe a threat modeling tool or a security application that characterizes and mitigates threats via attack surface testing and indexing threat models using attack tree structures. The threat modeling tool is configured for analysis of cyber-physical systems. An analytic server running the security application may discover and report vulnerabilities in both a high-level report and a low-level overview of all possible ways an attack can be executed by displaying a detailed report of sub-tasks.

To address the security of cyber-physical critical infrastructure and fill the need for secure operation maintenance

and prevention of data leaks, embodiments disclosed herein build a threat modeling tool or a security application for cyber-physical systems. The threat modeling tool is based upon a technology that analyzes the security of applications by modeling high-level risks (e.g., to service availability) in terms of testable, low-level items in a generalization of an attack tree approach. Metadata, such as remediation cost and impact, are attached to individual graph nodes in the attack tree. Furthermore, automated testing descriptions are attached to individual graph nodes when necessary. A graph model (e.g., attack tree model) may compute the value of node functions (such as total remediation cost or lowest cost yet sufficient sub-item) in a hierarchical structure to give the analyst overall statistics and a prioritized set of action items.

In one embodiment, a computer-implemented method comprises instantiating, by a computer, a first sub attack tree for a first cyber-physical system within a distributed network infrastructure, the first sub attack tree being based upon a first physical configuration of the first cyber-physical system; instantiating, by the computer, a second sub attack tree for a second cyber-physical system within the distributed network infrastructure, the second sub attack tree being based upon a second physical configuration of the second cyber-physical system; generating, by the computer, a machine-readable markup file of an attack tree of the distributed network infrastructure, the attack tree containing the first sub attack tree and the second sub attack tree, and the machine-readable markup file containing a first identifier of the first sub attack tree and a second identifier of the second sub attack tree; receiving, by the computer in real-time, electronic notifications of alerts from a plurality of devices in the first and second cyber-physical systems; and detecting, by the computer, one or more attacks on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts by executing a logic of the attack tree, wherein executing the logic of the attack tree comprises traversing the first sub attack tree based on the first identifier, the second sub attack tree based on the second identifier, and a parent node hierarchically above the first and second sub attack trees to determine an impact on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts.

In another embodiment, a system comprises a non-transitory storage medium storing a plurality of computer program instructions; and a processor electrically coupled to the non-transitory storage medium and configured to execute the plurality of computer program instructions to: instantiate a first sub attack tree for a first cyber-physical system within a distributed network infrastructure, the first sub attack tree being based upon a first physical configuration of the first cyber-physical system; instantiate a second sub attack tree for a second cyber-physical system within the distributed network infrastructure, the second sub attack tree being based upon a second physical configuration of the second cyber-physical system; generate a machine-readable markup file of an attack tree of the distributed network infrastructure, the attack tree containing the first sub attack tree and the second sub attack tree, and the machine-readable markup file containing a first identifier of the first sub attack tree and a second identifier of the second sub attack tree; receive electronic notifications of alerts from a plurality of devices in the first and second cyber-physical systems; and detect one or more attacks on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts by executing a logic of the attack tree, wherein executing the logic of the attack tree comprises traversing the first sub attack tree based on the first identifier, the second sub attack tree based on the second identifier, and a parent node hierarchically above the first and second sub

attack trees to determine an impact on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts.

It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory and are intended to provide further explanation of the disclosed embodiment and subject matter as claimed.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings constitute a part of this specification and illustrate embodiments of the subject matter disclosed herein.

FIG. 1 illustrates a computer system for cyber-physical threat modeling, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 2 illustrates a flowchart for improving the security of cyber-physical systems, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of an attack tree, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of cyber-physical threat modeling in air traffic control, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a graphical user interface for an attack tree referring to sub attack trees, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example of a graphical user interface for attack reports of the cyber-physical systems, according to an embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Reference will now be made to the illustrative embodiments illustrated in the drawings, and specific language will be used here to describe the same. It will nevertheless be understood that no limitation of the scope of the claims or this disclosure is thereby intended. Alterations and further modifications of the inventive features illustrated herein, and additional applications of the principles of the subject matter illustrated herein, which would occur to one ordinarily skilled in the relevant art and having possession of this disclosure, are to be considered within the scope of the subject matter disclosed herein. The present disclosure is here described in detail with reference to embodiments illustrated in the drawings, which form a part here. Other embodiments may be used and/or other changes may be made without departing from the spirit or scope of the present disclosure. The illustrative embodiments described in the detailed description are not meant to be limiting of the subject matter presented here.

Embodiments disclosed herein describe an analytic server running a security application. The security application may comprise a threat modeling tool that analyzes and prioritizes the impact of security alerts and security-relevant events in cyber-physical systems. The analytic server running the security application may model threats using attack tree concepts and constructive hierarchical models, with structural enhancements to better describe risks to complex distributed systems.

Specifically, the analytic server running the security application may customize the attack tree structures to the cyber-physical systems. The analytic server may integrate physical models and circuit datasheet analysis into the attack tree model. The analytic server may analyze all relevant integrated circuit datasheets, produce a report, and display attack threats over radio and wired communication links.

For example, the analytic server may detect vulnerabilities due to misconfiguration, hardware lifecycle attack threats based on the data provided by the circuit datasheets,

physical access attacks such as BadUSB, radio based spoofing attacks; as well as a whole host of threats through more conventional communication links (e.g., Ethernet). Aside from the actual vulnerabilities, the report may include threat likelihood, impact, and remediation costs. The report may also include possible mitigation and further testing suggestions (e.g., in cases of hardware lifecycle attacks).

The methods and systems disclosed herein may be general and can be applied to a wide variety of cyber-physical security problems (e.g., via plug-ins), both in the system design phase and for ongoing monitoring. Alternatively, the methods and systems disclosed herein may be customized for a specific area. For example, the models and user interface may be customized for transportation and aviation use. Specifically, the analytic server may add physical models and aviation-specific knowledge to the tree models in order to analyze risks to the overall cyber-physical aviation network. Physics-based models, for instance, can be used to determine whether data reported by ADS-B (automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast) transponders or weather stations are consistent with other reports, or whether it is aberrant enough to warrant investigation. The possibility of lifecycle attacks may be reported through the study of circuit datasheets. The analytic server may determine parts of the physical system that allow an adversary to embed malicious integrated circuits, which later can grant access to the system. Using circuit datasheet analysis, the analytic server may search for integrated circuit vulnerabilities (e.g., dead space) and recommend ways to test for hardware Trojans, such as logic and side-channel testing.

The embodiments disclosed herein may go beyond the tree-based modeling by incorporating physics-based models, extensive metadata, computed attributes (such as cost or impact), and automated testing of leaf nodes in the attack tree. The conventional solutions provide a static attack tree structure. The embodiments disclosed herein may build dynamic tree models, which can be used for automated analysis.

FIG. 1 illustrates components of a system 100 for cyber-physical threat modeling, according to an embodiment. The system 100 may include an analytic server 102 with a local knowledge database 104, enterprise/distributed systems and network infrastructure 106, a third party intrusion detection system (IDS) or security information and event management (SIEM) system 108, a second analytic server 110 connected with a second network of distributed systems 112. FIG. 1 shows how a system fits within a multi-site real-time monitoring system. The analytic server and other system devices may be connected via hardware and software components of one or more networks. Examples of the network include, but are not limited to, Local Area Network (LAN), Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), Wide Area Network (WAN), and the Internet. The communication over the network may be performed in accordance with various communication protocols, such as Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and IEEE communication protocols.

The analytic server 102 may be any computing device comprising a processor and other computing hardware and software components, configured to build a security system containing one or more security applications. The analytic server 102 may be logically and physically organized within the same or different devices or structures, and may be distributed across any number of physical structures and locations (e.g., cabinets, rooms, buildings, cities). The analytic server 102 may execute automated configuration and

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run-time status queries. At the same time, the analytic server **102** may receive logging and alert information from the servers, endpoints, and network devices under management. For example, the analytic server **102** may receive logging and alert information from the devices in the enterprise/ distributed systems and network infrastructure **106**, the second analytic server **110** connected with the second network of distributed systems **112**. The analytic server **102** may also query existing IDS and SIEM systems for alert data, and receive such data asynchronously from the third party IDS or SIEM **108**. The logging and alert information collected on each device may be collected via standard protocols such as syslog, Windows Event Logs, secure shell (SSH), or the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). The OASIS® Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) is a natural way of describing the logging and alert data and is supported in the security system via the OASIS Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII) transport. In this way, the security system may leverage future/third-party advances in detection algorithms.

The analytic server **102** may build a security application **116** by using an attack tree model based on a set of aggregation rules, which dictate how various metrics are computed in terms of lower-level data. In the security application **116**, the analytic server **102** may support a large set of aggregation functions, and the user can define custom functions if needed. The analytic server **102** may refine the interface for aggregation functions and provide a set of aggregators specific to assessing real-time threat indicator data. The results of the aggregation rules can be in standard form such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) vectors or costs, or in mission domain-specific terms. As data arrives, the metrics will be recomputed in real-time, “bubbling up” the tree as appropriate.

After the analytic server **102** prioritizes and analyzes the aggregate impact of multiple alters, IDS notifications, and other attack indicators, the analytic server **102** may display the results on a user interface of the analytic server or on a computing device (not shown) associated with the analyst **114**. The analyst **114** may easily see which alerts have the most significant “big picture” impact and which can be triaged for later assessment by low-level personnel. When cost or other metrics are available within the model, the analyst **114** may see which proposed remediation strategies have the most significant impact for the least cost or least mission disruption.

The analytic server **102** may operate the security application **116** in a federal manner, where portions of the tree model located at various sites or administrative domains are maintained by local experts. At alternate sites, headless copies of security applications aggregate site-local data and alerts; the results may provide aggregated inputs to one or more “master” instances for analyst use. Such an architecture may allow for voluminous, potentially sensitive alert and IDS data to stay local (e.g., for forensic purposes) while enabling the entire system to scale up for very large enterprises.

Overall, the analytic server **102** may use the security application **116** to help the analyst **114** sort out false alarms from true attacks that have minimal impact on mission success, and highlight the attacks that may have to be addressed immediately and possibly automatically. Therefore, the analytic server **102** may save time and reduce cognitive burden on overloaded security analysts.

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The security application **116** built by the analytic server **102** may include several components or modules, such as an import/export module, an attack tree analysis module, an agent tests module, a graphical user interface module. The import/export module may receive data from or transmit data to local knowledge database **104**. The import/export module may also receive logging and alert information from devices under management, such as the servers, endpoints, and network devices in the distributed systems and network infrastructure **106** through a third-party IDS or SIEM **108**. The agent tests module may receive events and alerts from the operating system of the infrastructure platform within the enterprise/distributed systems and network infrastructure **106** or applications and servers within the operating system. In addition, the agent tests module may perform configuration tests and remote agent tests on the operating system of the infrastructure platform within the enterprise/distributed systems and network infrastructure **106**. The agent tests module may interact with the attack tree analysis module to determine and analyze the security attacks. The attack tree module may comprise a set of aggregation rules for computing various metrics on threats and possible attacks on different devices. The graphical user interface module may comprise graphical interactive elements configured to display analysis results and threat indicator data, receive user configuration, and any other interactive elements that allow the user to interact with the analytic server **102**.

The local knowledge database **104** may be any non-transitory machine-readable media associated with the analytic server **102**. The local knowledge database **104** may be configured to store data, including logging and alert information from different devices and systems, the attack tree model comprising aggregation rules and configurations for analyzing security threats and attacks, the metrics computed based on the aggregation rules in the attack tree model, the ranking and prioritization of attack-related events. The local knowledge database **104** may also include any other data that is helpful for analyzing security alerts and server/ endpoint/network events.

The enterprise/distributed systems and network infrastructure **106** may be any number of devices and systems connected with each other within a distributed network. Such devices and systems may be under management of the analytic server **102**. The enterprise/distributed systems and network infrastructure **106** may comprise infrastructure platform with operating system for servers and applications. The operating system may receive remote agent tests from the analytic server **102**. The infrastructure platform of one system may be connected to another system (e.g., a second system). The infrastructure platform of each system may transmit logging and alert information to the analytic server **102** via a third-party IDS or SIEM **108**.

The enterprise/distributed systems and network infrastructure **106** may be a unified system comprising a plurality of physical-cyber systems. The analytic server **102** may manage the security of the unified system **106** based on an attack tree. The analytic server **102** may build a high-level attack tree of the unified system by aggregating the sub attack trees of the systems. Specifically, the analytic server may instantiate a sub attack tree for each cyber-physical system within the distributed network infrastructure **106**. The analytic server **102** may determine how the interconnection of the plurality of cyber-physical systems may affect the unified system security. The analytic server **102** may build the attack tree based on a set of aggregation rules. Each cyber-physical system may integrate sensing, computation,

control and networking into physical objects/devices and infrastructures that are connected with each other.

The attack tree of the unified system may make reference to sub attack trees of the plurality of cyber-physical systems. The analytic server **102** may refer to the sub attack trees as files or via URL (Uniform Resource Locator) or URI (Uniform Resource Identifier). For example, when the analytic server **102** traverses the attack tree of the unified system, the analytic server **102** may reach a portion of the attack tree that is a reference to a sub attack tree of a cyber-physical system. The reference may be a URL or URI. The analytic server **102** may access or refer to the sub attack tree based on the identifier (e.g., URL or URI) in runtime. The analytic server **102** may generate a machine-readable markup file of an attack tree to store the identifiers of the plurality of sub attack trees of the cyber-physical systems.

Furthermore, the analytic server **102** may generate a set of parameters (e.g. parameterized references) based on security analysis from the traversing of the attack tree, while refer to the sub attack trees. When the analytic server **102** refers to the sub attack trees, the analytic server **102** may transmit the set of parameters to the sub attack trees. Sequentially, each sub attack tree may execute the logic for detecting attacks based on the set of parameters.

The third-party IDS or SIEM **108** may be any device or software application that monitors a network or systems for malicious activity or policy violations. The SIEM system may report any malicious activity or violation to an administrator or analyst. The SIEM may combine outputs from multiple sources. The third-party IDS or SIEM **108** may plug in the existing systems, aggregate the alerts and events from various systems and devices and import the alerts and events into the security application **116** running on the analytic server **102**.

The second analytic server **110** connected with the second network of distributed systems **112** may be a similar system architecture as the analytic server **102** connected with the enterprise/distributed systems and network infrastructure **106**. The different analytic servers may be in communication with each other and feed alerts and events information into each other. The system **100** may comprise any number of such analytic servers and connected networks of distributed systems.

FIG. 2 illustrates a flowchart **200** for improving the security of cyber-physical systems, according to an embodiment. Other embodiments may comprise additional or alternative steps, or may omit some steps altogether.

At step **202**, the analytic server may instantiate a first sub attack tree with a first physical configuration associated with a first cyber-physical system. A unified system may be a distributed network infrastructure comprising a plurality of cyber-physical systems. The plurality of cyber-physical systems may be owned by different entities. For example, a first entity may own the first cyber-physical system. A second entity may own a second cyber-physical system. The analytic server may instantiate a sub attack tree for each cyber-physical system within the distributed network infrastructure.

To use the attack tree model in cyber-physical systems, the analytic server may integrate physical models and circuit datasheet analysis into the attack tree model. Specifically, for a first cyber-physical system, the analytic server may instantiate the first sub attack tree based on a first physical configuration of the first cyber-physical system. The first physical configuration may comprise attack detection rules, metadata, various attributes of the first cyber-physical system. The attack detection rules, metadata, various attributes

may be from user configuration and/or local knowledge in a local database associated with the first cyber-physical system.

The first sub attack tree may be an executable logic for detecting attacks within the first cyber-physical system. Based on the attack detection rules of the first physical configuration, the analytic server may generate the first sub attack tree that shows how the first cyber-physical system can be attacked, and describes threats on the first cyber-physical system and possible attacks to realize those threats. The analyst server may be able to associate different metadata, various attributes from the physical configuration (e.g., user configuration and/or local knowledge) on the first cyber-physical system with items of the first sub attack tree and test the systems in various ways.

The analytic server may instantiate the first sub attack tree with a first set of parameterized references. The first set of parameterized references may be a set of parameters available for the first sub attack tree to execute the logic to detect attacks. The analytic server may generate the first sub attack tree based on a template. The template may take the attack detection rules, metadata, various attributes from user configuration and/or local knowledge as input and output an attack tree. In some embodiments, the first cyber-physical system may generate its own sub attack tree. The sub attack tree may be stored in the first cyber-physical system.

At step **204**, the analytic server may instantiate a second sub attack tree with a second physical configuration associated with a second cyber-physical system. As discussed above, a distributed network infrastructure (e.g., unified system) may comprise a plurality of cyber-physical systems. Each cyber-physical system may have its own sub attack tree to monitor the system and analyze security threats and attacks. For a second cyber-physical system, the analytic server may instantiate a second sub attack tree based on a second physical configuration of the second cyber-physical system. The second physical configuration may comprise attack detection rules, metadata, various attributes of the second cyber-physical system. The attack detection rules, metadata, various attributes may be from user configuration and/or local knowledge in a local database associated with the second cyber-physical system.

The second sub attack tree may be an executable logic for detecting attacks within the second cyber-physical system. Based on the attack detection rules of the second physical configuration, the analytic server may generate the second sub attack tree that shows how the second cyber-physical system can be attacked, and describes threats on the second cyber-physical system and possible attacks to realize those threats. The analyst server may be able to associate different metadata, various attributes from the physical configuration (e.g., user configuration and/or local knowledge) on the second cyber-physical system with items of the second sub attack tree and test the systems in various ways.

The analytic server may instantiate the second sub attack tree with a second set of parameterized references. The second set of parameterized references may be a set of parameters available for the second sub attack tree to execute the logic to detect attacks. The analytic server may generate the second sub attack tree based on a template. The template may take the attack detection rules, metadata, various attributes from user configuration and/or local knowledge as input and output an attack tree. In some embodiments, the second cyber-physical system may generate its own sub attack tree. The sub attack tree may be stored in the second cyber-physical system. The analytic server may perform the process discussed above to instan-

tiate a sub attack tree for each cyber-physical system within the distributed network infrastructure (e.g., unified system).

At step **206**, the analytic server may generate a machine-readable markup file of an attack tree for the distributed network infrastructure (e.g., unified system) containing the first and second cyber-physical systems. The attack tree for the distributed network infrastructure may comprise the sub attack tree of each cyber-physical system (including the first and second cyber-physical systems) within the distributed network infrastructure. The analytic server may build a dynamic attack tree, which can be used for automated analysis. The attack tree is in a hierarchical structure comprising a root node and one or more child nodes, the root node representing a higher-level operating condition of an attack, and each of the one or more child nodes representing a lower-level operating condition of the attack.

The machine-readable markup file may be an Extensible Markup Language file. The markup file may contain identifiers of the plurality of sub attack trees of the plurality of cyber-physical systems, including a first identifier of the first sub attack tree and a second identifier of the second sub attack tree. The analytic server may manage the security of the distributed network infrastructure. The analytic server may generate the machine-readable markup file to record the identifier of each sub attack tree. The identifier of each sub attack tree may be URL or URI.

The attack tree model may be an executable logic for detecting attacks within the distributed network infrastructure. The attack tree of the distributed network infrastructure may be able to determine various security-relevant metrics for the unified system as a whole. In operation, the analytic server may aggregate the plurality of sub attack trees of the cyber-physical systems to build the attack tree for the distributed network infrastructure (e.g., unified system). The analytic server may determine how the aggregation of the plurality of cyber-physical systems may affect the unified system security. Emergent vulnerabilities may appear due to aggregation of specific pairs of systems. A particular system may impart crosscutting concerns on all other systems. Another pairwise combination may result in a “cross product” of model sub-trees.

The analytic server may build the attack tree based on a set of aggregation rules and other attack detection rules, which dictate how various metrics are computed in terms of lower-level data. The analytic server may support a large set of aggregation functions and attack detection rules. The analytic server may determine the impacts of the interconnection of the plurality of cyber-physical systems on the distributed network infrastructure based on the set of aggregation rules. For instance, the analytic server may determine how the interconnection of the plurality of cyber-physical systems may affect the unified system security. For example, while the first and second cyber-physical systems are each secure locally, the analytic server may determine the security threats produced by the interconnection of the first and second cyber-physical systems. The analytic server may also determine any changes in one or more security attributes of the first and second cyber-physical systems and the unified system. The analytic server may automatically update one or more nodes in the attack tree to reflect the changes.

At step **208**, the analytic server may monitor systems and receive electronic notifications of alerts in real-time from a plurality of devices in the first and second cyber-physical systems. The analytic server may monitor various devices of the plurality of cyber-physical systems connected with each other within the distributed network infrastructure. For example, the analytic server may use physics-based models

to determine threats and attacks on the physical devices within the plurality of cyber-physical systems. The analytic server may monitor and collect the testable results of the physical devices, which correspond to the leaf nodes of the attack tree.

For example, in transportation and aviation use, the analytic server may use physics-based models to determine whether data reported by ADS-B (automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast) transponders or weather stations are consistent with other reports, or whether it is aberrant enough to warrant investigation. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a surveillance technology in which an aircraft determines its position via satellite navigation and periodically broadcasts it, enabling it to be tracked.

In addition, the analytic server may study circuit datasheets to detect lifecycle attacks. The analytic server may determine parts of the physical system that allow an adversary to embed malicious integrated circuits, which later can grant access to the system. Using circuit datasheet analysis, the analytic server may search for integrated circuit vulnerabilities (e.g., dead space) and recommend ways to test for hardware Trojans, such as logic and side-channel testing.

The analytic server may detect vulnerabilities due to misconfiguration, hardware lifecycle attack threats based on the data provided by the circuit datasheets, physical access attacks such as BadUSB, radio based spoofing attacks (ADS-B spoofing), as well as a whole host of threats through more conventional communication links (e.g., Ethernet). BadUSB is a dangerous USB security flaw that allows attackers to turn a simple USB device into a keyboard, which can then be used to type malicious commands into the victim’s computer.

The analytic server may monitor a network with multiple heterogeneous systems by receiving alerts from external sensors and intrusion detection systems. Such devices and systems may be under management of the analytic server. The analytic server may receive logging and alert information from the infrastructure platform of the distributed systems and network infrastructure via a third-party IDS or SIEM. The third-party IDS or SIEM may plug in the existing systems, aggregate the alerts and events from various systems and devices and import the alerts and events into the analytic server.

At step **210**, the analytic server may detect one or more attacks on the distributed network infrastructure based on the alerts using the attack tree. Specifically, the analytic server may execute the logic of the attack tree. The analytic server may traverse the first sub attack tree based on the first identifier, the second sub attack tree based on the second identifier, and a parent node hierarchically above the first and second sub attack trees to determine an impact on the distributed network infrastructure based on the alerts.

The analytic server may follow the logic of the attack tree model by traversing the attack tree (including the first and second sub attack trees) from bottom up and determine if the alerts and events data satisfy the operating conditions of the nodes. In operation, the analytic server may collect the test results of low-level testable results of the physical devices that correspond to the leaf nodes in the attack tree. From the bottom up, the analytic server may perform computation based on the test results using the attack tree logic.

From the bottom up, child nodes are lower-level operating conditions of an attack, at least one of the child nodes may have to be satisfied to make the direct parent node true, the parent node may represent higher-level operating condition;

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when the root is satisfied (e.g., the highest level operating condition is satisfied), the attack is complete. By traversing the attack tree from bottom up, the analytic server may traverse the first and second sub attack trees and a parent node hierarchically above the first and second sub attack trees. Based on the traversing, the analytic server may determine how the alerts from the first and second cyber-physical systems may affect the distributed network infrastructure as a whole.

The analytic server may determine an impact score for each of the one or more attacks by correlating physical configuration data of the plurality of cyber-physical systems (including the first and second cyber-physical systems). For example, the analytic server may correlate context and configuration data from disparate cyber-physical systems and determine overall system risk and impact. The analytic server may not only determine if the combination of correlated data indicates an attack, but also how much of an impact the attack might have on the distributed network infrastructure. In addition to using the attack tree to determine the security attacks (e.g., threat likelihood) on various nodes of the attack tree, the analytic server may also determine the impacts of the attacks on the various nodes, and the costs to remedy the impacts on the various nodes.

The analytic server may perform automated evaluations and computations over the attack tree model, testing on-line to see whether particulate vulnerabilities are present or known-weak configurations or libraries are in use. In addition, by correlating information from multiple sources, the analytic server may be able to learn context for alerts and distinguish likely false alarms, as well as true, but unimportant, alerts. Thus, the analytic server may reduce false positives.

When the analytic server traverses the attack tree, the analytic server may need to access the sub attack tree of each cyber-physical system. The analytic server may access the markup file to retrieve the identifiers of the sub attack trees of the cyber-physical systems (including the first and second cyber-physical systems) within the distributed network infrastructure. For example, the analytic server may traverse the first sub attack tree based on the first identifier, the second sub attack trees based on the second identifier. The identifiers may be the URL or URI.

In operation, when the analytic server traverses the attack tree of the distributed network infrastructure at runtime, the analytic server may reach a portion of the attack tree that is a reference to a sub attack tree of a cyber-physical system. The reference may be a URL or URI. The analytic server may access or refer to the sub attack tree based on the identifier (e.g., URL or URI) at runtime. Furthermore, the analytic server may generate a set of parameters (e.g., parameterized references) based on security analysis from traversing the attack tree, while refer to the sub attack tree. When the analytic server refers to the sub attack tree, the analytic server may transmit the set of parameters to the sub attack tree. Sequentially, the sub attack tree may execute the logic for detecting attacks based on the set of parameters.

After the analytic server detects the one or more attacks in the distributed network infrastructure of the cyber-physical systems, the analytic server may rank and prioritize the one or more attacks based on the impact scores. The analytic server may generate in real-time reports in standard formats. The analytic server may display the reports in a dashboard of a user interface based on the ranking. The reports in the dashboard may comprise the list of the prioritized attacks. The reports may comprise security overview results and recommendation actions for the distributed network infra-

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structure and each cyber-physical system to mitigate the one or more attacks. For example, the report may include possible mitigation and further testing suggestions. The analytic server may automatically respond to one or more higher priority attacks.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of an attack tree 300, according to an embodiment. The attack tree may show how a target can be attacked or describe threats to a system. The attack tree may show how an adversary's aims can be achieved in terms of sub-goals and system configuration choices. The attack tree may be a multi-level diagram consisting of one root, leaves, and children. From the bottom up, child nodes are conditions, which may have to be satisfied to make the direct parent node true; when the root is satisfied, the attack is complete. Each node may be satisfied only by its direct child nodes. A node may be the child of another node; in such a case, it becomes logical that multiple steps may have to be taken to carry out an attack.

The figure shows an excerpt of an attack tree that describes an attack on altering course of UAS (unmanned aircraft systems) 302. The altering course of UAS may comprise attacks of spoofing ADS-B messages 304 and altering instructions from operator 306. The altering instructions from operator 306 may comprise breaking encrypted communication link 308, sending plausible control inputs 310, and sending invalid control inputs 312. To determine whether there are invalid control inputs 312, the analytic server may need to monitor and collect test results 314a, 314b of bottom leaf nodes, such as various physical devices of the cyber-physical systems.

The analytic server may determine the logic of attack tree based on the parameters 316 (e.g., physical configurations) of the cyber-physical system. Based on such a logic of attack tree, the analytic server may detect attacks and determine overall goals and risks 322 on the system by traversing the attack tree from bottom up. In operation, the analytic server may collect the test results of low-level testable items 320. From the bottom up, the analytic server may perform computation based on the test results 318 using the attack tree logic.

Specifically, from the bottom up, the child nodes are lower-level operating conditions of an attack, at least one of the child nodes may have to be satisfied to make the direct parent node true, the parent node may represent higher-level operating condition; when the root is satisfied (e.g., the highest level operating condition is satisfied), the attack is complete.

In the process of traversing the attack tree from the bottom up, the analytic server may determine the threat likelihood, impact, remediation cost on each node of the attack tree. The analytic server may use the attack tree based threat modeling to produce multi-layer reports. In addition to the threats and their impacts, the report may reveal lower level sub-threats, giving an administrative analyst a detailed security overview of the cyber-physical system. After the traversing of attack tree reaches the root node, the analytic server may generate a report 324 comprising security overview results and recommendation actions for the whole system. As shown in the figure, the report 324 may comprise a list of action items for improving the system security. For example, the report 324 may include possible mitigation and further testing suggestions. The list of action items may be ordered by the impact and/or cost.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of cyber-physical threat modeling 400 in air traffic control, according to an embodiment. In this example, the attack tree 402 may comprise the executing logic of attacks on the air traffic control. More

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specifically, the attacks on air traffic control may comprise attacks on datalink and attacks on wired links. The attacks on datalink may comprise wireless Internet and ADS-B. The attacks on wired links may comprise USB, Ethernet, and data bus.

To determine the threats on the air traffic control, the analytic server may execute the logic of the attack tree from the bottom up. Specifically, the analytic server may perform attack tree analysis **404**, agent tests **406**, wireless and wired access points test **408**. The analytic server may also generate a graphical user interface (GUI) **410** to display the results. In the wireless and wired access point test **408**, the analytic server may check the status of the access points of the leaf nodes. For example, the analytic server may monitor and collect the test results of the wireless Internet, ADB-S, USB, Ethernet, and data bus. Based on such test results, the analytic server may perform the attack tree analysis **404** by following the logic of the attack tree from the bottom up. In addition, the analytic server may perform agent test **406** when traversing the attack tree. In the agent test **406**, the analytic server may determine the status of the node based on the physical configuration. The physical configuration may comprise attack detection rules, metadata, various attributes of the cyber-physical systems.

The analytic server may perform various computation modules while traversing the attack tree from the bottom up, including function hooking and active monitor module **412**, external probe module **414**, platform configuration test module **416**, system state test and monitoring module **418**, and static analysis tools **420**. The function hooking and active monitor module **412** may monitor the inputs and outputs of functions to determine whether the inputs and outputs are consistent with the cyber-physical system configuration. The external probe module may **414** monitor the logical signals of the cyber-physical system and collect status of the physical devices using external testing. The system state test and monitoring module **418** may test and monitor the status of the physical devices from the inside. The system state test and monitoring module **418** and platform configuration test module **416** may perform tests about the configuration and disposition of the cyber-physical systems. The static analysis tools **420** may perform analysis about the structure of source code and the properties of the source code in the physical devices of the cyber-physical systems.

FIG. **5** illustrates an example of a graphical user interface **500** for an attack tree referring to sub attack trees, according to an embodiment. The GUI **500** may help administrative analysts discover vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in cyber-physical systems. The analytic server may support distributed models, where a high-level model may make reference to multiple sub-system models maintained by others. For example, the attack tree of the unified system may make reference to sub attack trees of the plurality of sub-systems. The analytic server may refer to the sub attack trees as files or via URL. References may add annotation, extra document, or override attributes of referred-to components. References may also make structural modification to the referred-to attack tree models when appropriate via a set of parameters (e.g., to add new attack vectors that are only relevant in a specific context).

As shown in the figure, the attack tree **502** may comprise breach confidentiality, compromise integrity, reduce availability, misuse services, force non-compliance or increase liability, etc. Although the attack trees are in a directory structure, the system may also show a traditional boxes-and-arrows tree diagram, similar to FIG. **3**. In the example of

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breach confidentiality **504**, breach confidentiality **504** may comprise read private information in transit **506**, read private data at rest on a specific computer or device **508**, convince a human to directly reveal private information **510**, and deduce private data by reading public data **512**.

FIG. **6** illustrates an example of a graphical user interface **600** for attack reports of the cyber-physical systems, according to an embodiment. The GUI **600** may comprise hierarchical model structure of the attack tree model **602** with testing annotations. For example, the analytic server may display various attacks in the hierarchical model structure, including resource leak, memory leak, and the like. Upon receiving a selection of a specific attack, the analytic server may display more test details for the selected attack. For example, when attack “resource leak: fp” **604** is selected, the analytic server may display the details **606** for “resource leak: fp,” including overall result and justification/notes. Furthermore, the details of the specific attack may also include attributes and computed values **608** associated with the attack. The GUI **600** may also include an interactive component (e.g., a menu) **610** to display additional information about the attacks, such as a dashboard, a diagram model, and raw XML. The GUI **600** is a convenient and intuitive front-end. The analytic server may generate highly customizable attack reports for technical and administrative users based on GUI **600**.

The foregoing method descriptions and the process flow diagrams are provided merely as illustrative examples and are not intended to require or imply that the steps of the various embodiments must be performed in the order presented. The steps in the foregoing embodiments may be performed in any order. Words such as “then,” “next,” etc. are not intended to limit the order of the steps; these words are simply used to guide the reader through the description of the methods. Although process flow diagrams may describe the operations as a sequential process, many of the operations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition, the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process may correspond to a method, a function, a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, and the like. When a process corresponds to a function, the process termination may correspond to a return of the function to a calling function or a main function.

The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of this disclosure or the claims.

Embodiments implemented in computer software may be implemented in software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description languages, or any combination thereof. A code segment or machine-executable instructions may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment may be coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passing

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and/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc. may be passed, forwarded, or transmitted via any suitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing, network transmission, etc.

The actual software code or specialized control hardware used to implement these systems and methods is not limiting of the claimed features or this disclosure. Thus, the operation and behavior of the systems and methods were described without reference to the specific software code being understood that software and control hardware can be designed to implement the systems and methods based on the description herein.

When implemented in software, the functions may be stored as one or more instructions or code on a non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage medium. The steps of a method or algorithm disclosed herein may be embodied in a processor-executable software module, which may reside on a computer-readable or processor-readable storage medium. A non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable media includes both computer storage media and tangible storage media that facilitate transfer of a computer program from one place to another. A non-transitory processor-readable storage media may be any available media that may be accessed by a computer. By way of example, and not limitation, such non-transitory processor-readable media may comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other tangible storage medium that may be used to store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that may be accessed by a computer or processor. Disk and disc, as used herein, include compact disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc (DVD), floppy disk, and Blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media. Additionally, the operations of a method or algorithm may reside as one or any combination or set of codes and/or instructions on a non-transitory processor-readable medium and/or computer-readable medium, which may be incorporated into a computer program product.

The preceding description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the embodiments described herein and variations thereof. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the subject matter disclosed herein. Thus, the present disclosure is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the following claims and the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

While various aspects and embodiments have been disclosed, other aspects and embodiments are contemplated. The various aspects and embodiments disclosed are for purposes of illustration and are not intended to be limiting, with the true scope and spirit being indicated by the following claims.

What is claimed is:

1. A computer-implemented method comprising:

instantiating, by a computer, a first sub attack tree generated at a first cyber-physical system within a distributed network infrastructure, the first sub attack tree

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being based upon a first physical configuration of the first cyber-physical system;

instantiating, by the computer, a second sub attack tree generated at a second cyber-physical system within the distributed network infrastructure, the second sub attack tree being based upon a second physical configuration of the second cyber-physical system wherein the second physical configuration is distinct from the first physical configuration;

generating, by the computer, a machine-readable markup file of an attack tree of the distributed network infrastructure, the attack tree containing the first sub attack tree and the second sub attack tree, and the machine-readable markup file containing a first identifier of the first sub attack tree and a second identifier of the second sub attack tree;

receiving, by the computer in real-time, electronic notifications of alerts from a plurality of devices in the first and second cyber-physical systems; and

detecting, by the computer, one or more attacks on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts by executing a logic of the attack tree, wherein executing the logic of the attack tree comprises traversing the first sub attack tree based on the first identifier, the second sub attack tree based on the second identifier, and a parent node hierarchically above the first and second sub attack trees to determine an impact on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts.

2. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, wherein the machine readable markup file is an Extensible Markup Language file.

3. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, wherein the identifiers are Uniform Resource Locators.

4. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, wherein the identifiers are Uniform Resource Identifiers.

5. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, further comprising:

calculating, by the computer, an impact score for each of the one or more attacks by correlating the physical configurations of the first and second cyber-physical systems.

6. The computer-implemented method according to claim 5, further comprising:

ranking and prioritizing, by the computer, the one or more attacks based on the corresponding impact scores.

7. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, further comprising:

generating, by the computer in real-time, a report in a dashboard comprising a prioritized list of the one or more attacks.

8. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, further comprising:

generating, by the computer, a report comprising recommendation actions for mitigating the one or more attacks.

9. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, further comprising:

determining, by the computer, impacts of an interconnection of the first and second cyber-physical systems on the distributed network infrastructure based on a set of aggregation rules.

10. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1, wherein the attack tree is in a hierarchical structure comprising a root node and one or more child nodes, the root node representing a higher-level operating condition of an

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attack, and each of the one or more child nodes representing a lower-level operating condition of the attack.

11. A system comprising:

a non-transitory storage medium storing a plurality of computer program instructions; and

a processor electrically coupled to the non-transitory storage medium and configured to execute the plurality of computer program instructions to:

instantiate a first sub attack tree generated at a first cyber-physical system within a distributed network infrastructure, the first sub attack tree being based upon a first physical configuration of the first cyber-physical system;

instantiate a second sub attack tree generated at a second cyber-physical system within the distributed network infrastructure, the second sub attack tree being based upon a second physical configuration of the second cyber-physical system wherein the second physical configuration is distinct from the first physical configuration;

generate a machine-readable markup file of an attack tree of the distributed network infrastructure, the attack tree containing the first sub attack tree and the second sub attack tree, and the machine-readable markup file containing a first identifier of the first sub attack tree and a second identifier of the second sub attack tree;

receive electronic notifications of alerts from a plurality of devices in the first and second cyber-physical systems; and

detect one or more attacks on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts by executing a logic of the attack tree, wherein executing the logic of the attack tree comprises traversing the first sub attack tree based on the first identifier, the second sub attack tree based on the second identifier, and a parent node hierarchically above the first and second sub attack trees to determine an impact on the distributed network infrastructure based upon the alerts.

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12. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the machine readable markup file is an Extensible Markup Language file.

13. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the identifiers are Uniform Resource Locators.

14. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the identifiers are Uniform Resource Identifiers.

15. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to:

calculate an impact score for each of the one or more attacks by correlating the physical configurations of the first and second cyber-physical systems.

16. The system according to claim **15**, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to:

rank and prioritize the one or more attacks based on the corresponding impact scores.

17. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to:

generate, in real-time, a report in a dashboard comprising a prioritized list of the one or more attacks.

18. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to:

generate a report comprising recommendation actions for mitigating the one or more attacks.

19. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the processor is configured to further execute the computer program instructions to:

determine impacts of an interconnection of the first and second cyber-physical systems on the distributed network infrastructure based on a set of aggregation rules.

20. The system according to claim **11**, wherein the attack tree is in a hierarchical structure comprising a root node and one or more child nodes, the root node representing a higher-level operating condition of an attack, and each of the one or more child nodes representing a lower-level operating condition of the attack.

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