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(54) **COMMUNICATING WITH A MACHINE TO MACHINE DEVICE**

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
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(57) **ABSTRACT**

Method and system for routing communications traffic between a machine to machine, M2M, device connected to a telecommunications network and having an International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI, and a server, the method comprising assigning an access point name, APN, from a plurality of APNs based on the IMSI of the M2M device. Routing, via the assigned APN, communications traffic between the M2M device and the server, wherein the server is determined based on one or more of: the IMSI, the APN and a characteristic of a communication traffic between the M2M device and the server.

**18 Claims, 8 Drawing Sheets**



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


FIG. 1




FIG. 2






FIG. 3




FIG. 4



Fig. 5




Fig. 6






Fig. 7





Fig. 8

600 ←





## COMMUNICATING WITH A MACHINE TO MACHINE DEVICE

### CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a U.S. Nationalization of PCT Application Number PCT/GB2014/052767, filed on Sep. 12, 2014, which claims priority to GB Patent Application No. 1409652.3, filed on May 30, 2014, which claims priority to GB Patent Application No. 1318339.7, filed on Oct. 16, 2013, which claims priority to GB Patent Application No. 1316370.4, filed on Sep. 13, 2013, the entireties of which are incorporated herein by reference.

### FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to a method and system for communicating with a machine to machine device and in particular for routing communications traffic between the machine to machine device and a server.

### BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Machine to Machine (M2M) devices are often numerous, hard-to-reach, and have constrained capabilities (owing to low cost, small size, low processing power or limited battery life). All of this makes their management, often remote, very complicated. Moreover, M2M devices often need to be managed in a secure manner. For example, they may contain information that is commercially sensitive and/or confidential for the one or more entities that manage and/or own said devices. There is a need to remotely manage them in a secure way, while respecting these constraints.

The M2M device needs to be able to contact a device management (DM) server in a secure manner. Whilst at the time of manufacture the device may be pre-provisioned with the necessary addresses and URLs to locate this DM server, this requires device suppliers to have knowledge about the device's end users. Furthermore, should the addresses or locations of the DM server change then the M2M devices will require updating to prevent communications from becoming lost or misdirected.

Therefore, there is required a system and method that allows the M2M devices to communicate more reliably and more securely.

Details of 3GPP Standards and Technologies Used to Implement Aspects of the Method And System

One of these architectures of 3GPP is a Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA), which is a complex of standards which is described, for example, in 3GPP TS 33.919 (entitled "3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description", currently it may be retrieved at <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33919.htm>).

Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) is a 3GPP standard defined in 3GPP TS 33.220 (entitled "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)", it could be currently retrieved at <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/specs/html-info/33220.htm>). GBA is part of the complex of standards called GAA (see above).

GBA is a standard which enables a shared secret to be derived (bootstrapped) from the existing security association between a mobile network and a SIM card. This involves a network element called a Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF). In other words, GBA leverages the security of a SIM card (UICC) to authenticate mobile equipment, and then derive key material for general-purpose applications.

GBA may be advantageously used to provide high-security to the communication between a client and the server, thus allowing remotely managing, controlling and, in general, communicating with a device in a high security manner.

In particular, GBA (or a GBA-like architecture) is used for enabling a secure communication with the device (which, according to an aspect of the present disclosure, may be an M2M device), said communication being between a server and a client, the client being associated with the device, and wherein this communication is done for managing the device and/or services provided by (or via) the device, thus enabling a secure management of that device and/or the services provided by (or via) the device. In this way, the device and/or the services provided by (or via) the device can be safely, securely and efficiently managed in a remote manner via a remote server.

GBA has been developed mainly for securing mobile broadcast (e.g. pay TV and equivalents). Indeed, standards for Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS) rely on GBA. Similarly, Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) Mobile Broadcast Services Enabler Suite (BOAST) smartcard profile relies on GBA. To date, most of the limited number of deployments of GBA in the world has been for mobile broadcast. GBA has also been standardised as an optional feature in conjunction with presence services, and within miscellaneous "federated identity" services (e.g. Liberty Alliance, OpenID). In general, it is understood that GBA has been designed for use with mobile devices, such as mobile phones, laptop, computers, and many of the designed features have been provisioned with this in mind.

A variant of GBA, called "GBA Push", has been proposed for securing a message between a client and a DM server in the context of OMA Device Management Security. The OMA Device Management is specifically designed for management of mobile devices such as mobile phones, tablet, computers, etc.

A different recent standard document (TS 102 690) merely mentions, in the context of M2M communications, the use of a standard GBA to secure communications between a device/gateway service layer and a network service layer.

There are some alternatives for identifying/authenticating a mobile user/device to a service. All of these alternatives are simpler than using GBA. For example, mobile operators and service providers can use WAP header enrichment.

Alternatively, the service provider can request the user to enter their phone number, send an SMS one-time password to that phone number, and ask the user to read the SMS and enter the password. These alternatives all work well with mobile devices and operators already, so service providers use them, although they are not as secure as GBA.

Additionally, many service providers prefer to offer services to a huge range of mobile devices, many of which do not contain a SIM card (e.g. PCs, laptops, Wi-fi-only tablets etc.). Since GBA relies on a SIM card/UICC in order to work, there has been no interest in using it.

Strong security is not possible with current alternatives such as a user-entered PIN or a bootstrapping message delivered by an SMS. These alternatives would either not be feasible or they would not provide the required level of security. First, there might not be a user around to enter a PIN (as most M2M devices operate independently from human intervention). Second, the service provider may be likely to want strong security (e.g. because M2M devices may include critical infrastructure), whereas PIN-based bootstrapping has weaker security. Third, if a PIN or SMS-based bootstrapping goes wrong (server connects to wrong



client, client connects to wrong server, or there is a Man-In-The-Middle), then the user is likely to notice, complain and get it fixed, whereas an M2M device is unlikely to notice and complain, so may be permanently compromised. Neither is particularly practical by way of existing methods. For example, the OMA Device Management uses GBA Push for securing a message between a client and a DM server, and there is no explanation of how a similar architecture could be used or even modified for managing the device. Moreover, as mentioned above, the OMA Device Management is not compatible for use with an M2M device, as discussed above. This is particularly true for low cost, simple M2M devices, such as simple sensors, switches, low cost trackers etc. Further, the standard document mentioned above uses a standard GBA to secure communications between a device/gateway service layer and a network service layer. Thus, the communication is not used for device/service management-related communications, and it is not clear, based on the observations made above, how a similar architecture could be used or even modified for managing the device from the server. Moreover, for the reasons mentioned above, the OMA Device Management and the standard document are incompatible, and a combination of the GBA Push for OMA Device Management with the standard document is not feasible, as it would result in the wrong device management protocol (i.e. one that is not suitable for M2M devices, particularly simple M2M devices), and some very laborious effort to make the two compatible and delete the elements which are redundant.

The OMA has defined a lightweight protocol for managing (as well as interacting with) M2M devices and managing services provided by M2M devices (e.g. remote control of attached sensors or machines). This protocol is called LWM2M, which is described in detail at [http://technical.openmobilealliance.org/Technical/release\\_program/lightweightM2M\\_v1\\_0.aspx](http://technical.openmobilealliance.org/Technical/release_program/lightweightM2M_v1_0.aspx)

This protocol runs over the CoAP protocol (analogous to http)—more specifically CoAP over DTLS (coaps) which is analogous to http over TLS (https). However, coaps requires a secure association to be provisioned between a device and a network server (DM Server) while providing no strong means to provision such an association from scratch.

A security aspect of OMA LWM2M is defined in Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification

Candidate Version 1.0-10 Dec. 2013 (OMA-TS-LightweightM2M-V1\_0-20131210-C).

In addition, there exists two protocols, the first one called DTLS defined in RFC 6347 (entitled “Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2”; it could be currently retrieved at <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>); the second one called CoAP defined in draft-ietf-core-coap-18 (entitled “Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)”; it could be currently retrieved at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-core-coap/>). Both protocols are currently used in LWM2M. CoAP is still only an IETF draft (not a full RFC), and DTLS version 1.2 is also comparatively new (January 2012): versions of TLS have often existed as RFCs for several years before receiving widespread adoption.

The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) channel security for [COAP] is defined by the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347], which is the equivalent of TLS v1.2 [RFC5246] for HTTP and utilizes a subset of the Cipher Suites defined in TLS. (Refers to TLS Cipher Suite registry <http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameterst/tls-parameters.xml>) The DTLS binding for CoAP is defined in Section 9 of [CoAP]. DTLS is a long-lived session based

security solution for UDP. It provides a secure handshake with session key generation, mutual authentication, data integrity and confidentiality.

The keying material used to secure the exchange of information within a DTLS session may be obtained using one of the bootstrap modes defined in Section 5.1.2 Bootstrap Modes of OMA LWM2M. The formats of the keying material carried in the LWM2M Security Object Instances are defined in Appendix E.1.1.

There also exists an authentication protocol HTTP Digest authentication, which is defined in RFC 3310 (entitled “Hypertext Transfer protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)”, it can currently be retrieved at <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3310.txt>).

The GAA cluster of specifications TS 33.222 (entitled “Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS)”) defines a general approach for pre-shared key TLS (TLS-PSK, RFC 4279). This can currently be retrieved at <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33222.htm>. For example, see especially Section 5.4.

In particular, with reference to GBA, 3GPP Specification TS 33.220 defines the components and interfaces that are shown in FIG. 1. These are further described as:

NAF **122**, the “Network Application Function” is a server-side component of an application that will be secured using GBA.

BSF, “Bootstrapping Server Function”, **130** is a server-side component, which obtains authentication vectors from the HLR/HSS **140**, and sends a challenge to the mobile device, “UE”, **110** during the GBA protocol. On successful authentication, it derives the shared secret.

HLR/HSS **140**, the “Home Location Register” or “Home Subscriber System”, is the existing 3GPP system which stores subscription details and credentials (the K and IMSI) for each SIM card (UICC) issued by a mobile operator. It may be “GBA-aware” (so that it stores details for a GBA user subscription) or may be a legacy component.

UE, the “User Equipment”, **110** is a mobile device containing a SIM card (UICC). The UE **110** supports a client application which communicates with the NAF **122**, as well as a service which interfaces to the UICC, communicates with the BSF **130**, and derives the shared secret before passing it to the client application. This service is (somewhat confusingly) called a “GAA Server” in TR 33.905 (entitled “Recommendations for Trusted Open Platforms”, it can currently be retrieved at <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/specs/htmlinfo/33905.htm>).

Ua **150** is the interface between the Mobile Device (UE) **110** and the Network Application Function (NAF) **120**.

Ub **160** is the interface between the Mobile Device (UE) **110** and the Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) **130**. This is specified in detail in TS 24.109 (entitled “Bootstrapping interface (Ub) **160** and network application function interface (Ua) **150**; Protocol details”, it can currently be retrieved at <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/24109.htm>).

Zh/Zh' **180** is the interface between the BSF **130** and the HSS or HLR **140**. The Zh **180** interface is used with an HSS **140** that is “GBA Aware”. The Zh' **180** interface is used with a legacy HLR or HSS **140**. The Zh and Zh' **180** interfaces are specified in detail in TS 29.109 (entitled “Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Zh and Zn Interfaces based on Diameter protocol; Stage 3”, it can currently be retrieved at <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/29109.htm>) and TS 29.229 (entitled “Cx and Dx interfaces based on the



Diameter protocol; protocol details”, it can currently be retrieved at <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/29229.htm>).

Zn 170 is the interface between the NAF 122 and the BSF 130: this can use either a Web Services protocol (SOAP over http) or the Diameter protocol (RFC 3588). This is specified in detail in TS 29.109 (see above).

There are a few other components and interfaces defined within the GAA standards, but these are not described in detail here.

There are several different versions of GBA defined in the standards. The flavours of GBA may include GBA-ME, GBA-U, GBA-SIM etc. The version called “GBA-ME” may require no special customizations of the UICC, except that the UICC does contain a 3G SIM (a USIM). However, other versions may be used. There may be a need to use the 2G variant of GBA (using a SIM rather than a USIM).

#### SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

According to a first aspect there is provided a method for routing communications traffic between a machine to machine, M2M, device connected to a telecommunications network and having an International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI, and a server, the method comprising the steps of:

- assigning an access point name, APN, from a plurality of APNs based on the IMSI of the M2M device; and
- routing, via the assigned APN, communications traffic between the M2M device and the server, wherein the server is determined based on one or more of: the IMSI, the APN and a characteristic of a communication traffic between the M2M device and the server.

Therefore, communications traffic from devices and in particular M2M devices, may be routed more flexibly and changes may be made after the M2M devices have been deployed.

Optionally, the server may be selected from a plurality of servers based on the transport protocol of the communications traffic received from the device or M2M device. Therefore, routing may be achieved automatically leading to improved communications reliability.

Preferably, the protocol of the communications traffic may be determined from the port number. Ports may be dedicated to particular protocols and so the port number may determine the routing.

Optionally, the communications traffic may be selected from the group consisting of Constrained Application Protocol, CoAP, HTTP, CoAPs, HTTPs, UDP and TCP. Other traffic types may be used.

Optionally, the characteristic of the communication traffic between the M2M device and the server may be that it is an acknowledged or an unacknowledged protocol.

Optionally, the characteristic of the communication traffic may be selected from the group consisting of user datagram protocol, UDP, transmission control protocol, TCP and SMS.

Advantageously, the characteristic of the communication traffic may be a URL protocol identifier. For example, the routing rules may be based on detecting `http://`, `coap://`, `https://`, or `coaps://` in the URL.

Preferably, the server may be any one or more or a combination of servers selected from: a device management, DM, server; a bootstrapping server function, BSF, server; a DM bootstrapping server, a lightweight M2M, LWM2M, server; a LWM2M bootstrapping server; a network application function, NAF; a DM server; and BSF server. The BSF

may be used to authenticate a shared secret and in particular, may use the GBA protocol to do so. The server may be any other type. Where the server is a combined DM server and a BSF server there are particular advantages in terms of simplifying communications but other server combinations may be used (e.g., a combined DM bootstrapping server and BSF server).

Preferably, CoAP traffic may be routed to a DM server and HTTP traffic may be routed to a BSF; or

CoAPs or HTTPs traffic may be routed to a DM server and CoAP or HTTP traffic may be routed to a BSF; or CoAP and CoAPs traffic may be routed to a DM server and HTTP or HTTPs traffic may be routed to a BSF; or

secure traffic may be routed to a DM server and unsecure traffic may be routed to a BSF. Therefore, the routing for separate functions may be routed automatically depending to the required functionality. Other combinations of these routing rules may be made.

Optionally, UDP communications traffic may be routed to the DM server and TCP communications traffic is routed to the BSF server.

Optionally, the server may indicate an address or addresses (e.g. URL) for alternative server or servers with which to route the communications traffic. Therefore, the communications traffic may be automatically routed to a default server, which may then be able to select or nominate alternative servers. This may be used for load balancing purposes or to route specific groups of M2M devices (perhaps managed by particular operators, or types of M2M devices) to dedicated servers.

Optionally, the address or addresses of the alternative server or servers may be contained within a pre-shared key (psk) hint indicated by the server or may be contained within a bootstrap message. The psk hint or bootstrap message may otherwise be disregarded by the M2M device but the information regarding the address of the alternative server may be extracted.

Optionally, the bootstrap message may be a write logical operation.

Optionally, the write logical operation may be on custom resources. For example, the custom resources may be “NAF” Id or “BSF” Id.

Preferably, the bootstrap message may be absent any security prompting a rejection of the write operation. This may be used to prevent the bootstrap message from being implemented but still allow the M2M device to derive the server address or addresses.

Optionally, the bootstrap message may be secured with a public key.

Preferably, the bootstrap message may be delivered from a lightweight machine to machine, LWM2M, server. The LWM2M device may implement suitable standards and protocols enabling a more efficient communication environment.

Optionally, the LWM2M server may further comprise a bootstrapping server function, BSF. This may simplify the bootstrapping server function.

Preferably, the write logical operation may be a write to a LWM2M Security Object or other object within the M2M device.

Optionally, the bootstrap message may deliver credentials for communicating with a Device Management, DM, server.

Preferably, the method may further comprise the step of delivering from the combined LWM2M and BSF, a GBA push info, GPI, message providing credentials for the M2M



device to communicate with the DM server. Relevant production credentials may then be derived from the GPI further simplifying the BSF.

Optionally, the routing may be limited to expire after one or a predetermined number of connections or is limited to a period of time.

Optionally, after expiration of the routing the M2M device may be routed to a different server.

Optionally, on expiration of the routing a different APN is assigned.

According to a second aspect, there is provided a system for routing communications traffic between a machine to machine, M2M, device connected to a telecommunications network and having an International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI, and a server, the system comprising:

an interface configured to receive communications from the M2M device; and logic configured to:

receive at the interface the IMSI of the M2M device, assign an access point name, APN, from a plurality of APNs based on the

IMSI of the M2M device, and route, via the assigned APN, communications traffic between the M2M device and the server, wherein the server is determined based on one or more of: the IMSI, the APN and a characteristic of a communication traffic between the M2M device and the server.

Preferably, the system may further comprise a plurality of M2M devices configured to communicate with the interface and communicate with the server. There may be thousands or millions of such M2M devices, which further increases the need for more automated routing.

Preferably, the system may further comprise a plurality of APNs selectable by the logic. These may be used to different groups of M2M devices, for example.

Preferably, the server may be any one or more selected from: a device management, DM, server; a bootstrapping server function, BSF, server; a lightweight M2M, LWM2M, server; a LWM2M bootstrapping server; a network application function, NAF; and a combined DM server and BSF server.

Preferably, the system may further comprise a DM server and/or a BSF server.

Optionally, the server may be configured to indicate an address or addresses of an alternative server or servers with which to route the communications traffic.

Optionally, the address or addresses of the alternative server or servers may be contained within a pre-shared key, PSK, hint indicated by the server or is contained within a bootstrap message.

Optionally, the bootstrap message may be a write logical operation or a write logical operation on custom resources.

Optionally, the bootstrap message may be absent any security prompting a rejection of the write operation. In other words, the write operation is intended to fail but is used as a carrier of the address details.

Advantageously, the system may further comprise a lightweight machine to machine, LWM2M, server configured to deliver the bootstrap message.

Optionally, the system may further comprise one or more Device Management, DM, server, and wherein the bootstrap message delivers credentials for communicating with the one or more DM servers.

Advantageously, the LWM2M server may further comprise a bootstrapping server function, BSF.

Optionally, the combined LWM2M and BSF may be configured to deliver a GBA push info, GPI, message providing credentials for the M2M device to communicate with the DM server.

The methods described above may be implemented as a computer program comprising program instructions to operate a computer. The computer program may be stored on a computer-readable medium.

The computer system may include a processor such as a central processing unit (CPU). The processor may execute logic in the form of a software program. The computer system may include a memory including volatile and non-volatile storage medium. A computer-readable medium may be included to store the logic or program instructions. The different parts of the system may be connected using a network (e.g. wireless networks and wired networks). The computer system may include one or more interfaces. The computer system may contain a suitable operation system such as UNIX, Windows® or Linux, for example.

It should be noted that any feature described above may be used with any particular aspect or embodiment of the invention.

#### BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The present invention may be put into practice in a number of ways and embodiments will now be described by way of example only and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of components and interfaces with which GBA may be used;

FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of an example of an architecture that can be used in accordance with the present invention, in particular when GBA is used;

FIG. 3 shows an exemplary flow diagram of communications exchanged within the exemplary architecture of FIG. 2;

FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of an example of an alternative architecture that can be used in accordance with the present invention, in particular when generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) is used;

FIG. 5 shows a schematic diagram of a device management (DM) server in communication with a Machine to Machine (M2M) device;

FIG. 6 shows a schematic diagram of a system and method for initiating communications between the DM server and M2M device of FIG. 5;

FIG. 7 shows a schematic diagram of a further system and method for initiating communications between the DM server and M2M device of FIG. 5; and

FIG. 8 shows a flowchart of the method of FIG. 7.

It should be noted that the figures are illustrated for simplicity and are not necessarily drawn to scale. Like features are provided with the same reference numerals.

#### DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

A device may communicate securely with a server. The device may be a Machine to Machine (M2M) device, or an equivalent device (e.g. a device, a generic or specific communication device, including one or more modules capable of providing M2M capabilities).

Aspects of the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) and Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) are identified in "Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system" above.



In particular, the specific architecture on which the method and system may be based is GBA.

Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) uses existing security associations between a network (e.g. a mobile network) and a card (e.g. a SIM card or UICC) to derive a key that can be used for the secure communication between the client and the server. Accordingly, if the device is associated with such a card, as well as with the client, the method can advantageously use the GBA to derive the security elements (e.g. a shared secret) to enable the client associated with the device to securely communicate with the server. Accordingly, the device could be advantageously adapted so that it is associated with the card and the client and uses GBA to derive the security elements for secure communication with the server. Moreover, as GBA is standards-based, the impact of the required modifications may be relatively limited and the overall solution would be very attractive (in particular, to M2M users/owners as well as to network operators and/or service providers).

M2M devices are different from the mobile devices that OMA Device Management was originally designed for (such as mobile phones, laptops, computers, as explained in “Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system” above), and use of GBA (in any of its versions) with M2M is not a straightforward implementation.

A variant of GBA, called “GBA Push” has been proposed for securing a message between a client and a DM server in the context of OMA Device Management Security, and is identified in “Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system” above. It is noted that, although GBA Push and GBA are related, it is not trivial to use GBA in place of GBA Push (and vice versa). This is because these two architectures have some important differences. First, in GBA the device has to contact the BSF in order to request a RAND and AUTN (and use this to derive a Ks\_local). To the contrary, in GBA Push, the client does not have to talk to the BSF—it just receives a message prepared by the BSF. Furthermore, in GBA, there is no need to modify the Ua interface. In GBA Push, either the Ua interface has to be modified in some way to carry the push message or a new interface must be added. Accordingly, GBA Push cannot be used with an arbitrary application protocol. For GBA Push, the application protocol has to be “GBA aware” in some sense (e.g. so it can carry the GBA Push Info (GPI) messages). In GBA, the Ks\_local can be used to derive several different Ks\_NAFs (e.g. for different application servers). In GBA Push, only one NAF can use/rely on the Ks\_local. Accordingly, GBA Push is slightly less efficient than GBA.

The GBA Push Info is described in 3GPP TS 33.223, Section 5.2.1. The encoding is defined in Section 5.3.5. See in particular table 5.2.1.1 and FIG. 5.3.5.1 in 3GPP TS 33.223 V12.0.0 (2013-12) that may be found: [http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33\\_series/33.223/33223-c00.zip](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.223/33223-c00.zip)

Moreover, as discussed above, M2M devices are very constrained in their capabilities (e.g. computation, communication, life, etc.) and these constraints make their management more complex and harder to implement in a simple manner. GBA requires a number of interfaces and components which are hard to implement with M2M (for examples and description of these interfaces and components, please refer to the sections below).

In order to more efficiently and securely manage the device and/or services provided by (or via) the device, these

interfaces and components need to be modified or otherwise adapted so they can properly and effectively work with M2M devices.

For example, carrying the Ub interface (and associated protocol) over constrained M2M devices is very difficult. For example, the standard Ub interface uses HTTP and HTTP digest. The likely rationale for this is that, as mentioned above, GBA was designed having mobile devices, such as mobile phones, in mind. So, since all phones use HTTP, and therefore all have an HTTP stack, then HTTP was the easiest protocol to be used for the Ub interface. However, this is not true for M2M devices. For example, according to the Lightweight M2M (LWM2M) protocol (see below for more details), a protocol called CoAP is used in M2M devices, precisely because it is a simpler/more efficient alternative to HTTP. Alternatively, this Ub interface could be tunnelled, for example via another interface (e.g. the Ua), so that the system may be simplified.

Additionally, building all the necessary components (e.g. GAA server, interfaces) into a capacity-constrained M2M device appears to be very difficult. For example, physical and virtual space constraints, as well as computational constraints, create considerable problems for building the necessary components. Moreover, having one or more interfaces between M2M application(s) and a card on the device, such as a UICC, is very difficult. This is due, for example, to the fact that most M2M modems do not support the required low level interface(s). In general, the overall integration of the GBA required interfaces and components with an M2M device appear very difficult. A possible, but not optimal solution, could be to pre-provision the M2M devices (e.g. having the M2M devices already designed and/or manufactured with the required components and interfaces) and the associated elements required for use of GBA (e.g. the card being capable of interfacing with the M2M device) so that the GBA could be used. To date, no M2M device is pre-provisioned with these characteristics.

In addition, as noted above, GBA is not widely used. There are other reasons why GBA is not widely used. For example, use of GBA requires support in the device, in the network (e.g. BSF—see below) and by individual services (which may be deployed, for example, by a mobile operator or by other parties). In the preferred use-case (mobile broadcast) support is also required in the SIM card (as it uses GBA-U). Accordingly, a lack of coordination and willingness to act/cooperate between the various parties involved in this deployment (e.g. device manufacturers, mobile operators, service providers) has so far blocked implementation of GBA.

For all the above reasons, GBA (or a GBA-like architecture, for example a variant and/or a suitably modified version) may be used for enabling a secure communication with a device (in particular, an M2M device). The communication may be between a server and a client, the client being associated with the device, and wherein this communication may be done for managing the device and/or services provided by (or via) the device. This enables a secure management of that device and/or the services provided by (or via) the device and creates a new and innovative combination which produces a synergistic effect and provides many technical advantages.

For instance, as already mentioned above, the GBA will provide a higher and very strong level of security to the device/service management-related communications with M2M devices, which is a very critical and important point.

Another advantage, in addition or combined with the strong security described above, is in terms of full automa-



tion. Moreover, an M2M service provider does not have the cost/complexity of setting up their own security solutions, as the solution can be provided directly by the mobile operator implementing the solution described in this application. In particular, a service provider does not have to set up a PKI, issue certificates, pre-load keys to devices and so on.

Accordingly, the method may further comprise that the provision of the secure communication is based on a security association between a network and a card, the card being associated with the device. For example, the card may be embedded within the device (e.g. soldered in the device) or provided to the device by way of a suitable connection. In general, the card may be associated in any suitable manner so that there is an association between the card and the device. The network can be a mobile network, or any equivalent network, while the card can be a SIM card, a UICC, or any card associated with the network. The method may further comprise deriving a shared secret based on the security association. The method may further comprise providing the client and the server with the shared secret so as to enable the secure communication. The server may be a server adapted to manage the device (e.g. remotely manage the device, send updates, transfer information to and from the device, control device parameters, etc.) and to manage services provided by the device (e.g. device is used to switch on/off and/or dim streetlights). The shared secret may be a key and/or a similar security arrangement.

The method may further comprise authentication between the client and the server. The authentication may be based on the shared secret. The authentication may be performed via an authentication component. The authentication may be performed by means of a first authentication between the client and an authentication component and of a second authentication between the server and the authentication component. The client and the server may be independently authenticated by an authentication component. As a result of the client and the server being authenticated by the authentication component, both the client and the server may share the shared secret. The authentication may be performed by means of the shared secret. The shared secret may be shared between the client and the server. Alternatively, the shared secret may be shared between the client, the server and the authentication component. The authentication may implicitly result from the client, the server and the authentication component sharing the shared secret. The method may further comprise deriving a second shared secret based on the shared secret, the second shared secret being shared between the client and the server. This second shared secret may then be used for the authentication as discussed above.

The obtainment of the shared secret at the client may be based on an identifier associated with a server authentication component. The shared secret may be obtained at the server from the authentication component. The obtainment of the shared secret at the server is obtained based on an identifier associated with the shared secret. The identifier is generated by the authentication component. The identifier may be provided to the server by the client.

The OMA LWM2M protocol for managing (as well as interacting with) M2M devices and managing services provided by M2M devices (as described in “Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system”) may be used. However, other device management protocols may be used or the method and system may be extended to other M2M services (for example, securing the delivery of binary SMS).

GBA could be advantageously used in conjunction with LWM2M in order, for example, to establish keys for

LWM2M, whilst at the same time LWM2M and the procedures specified therein could be used to transport and/or carry any message and/or communication which relates to GBA. For example, this can be done by using specific tunnels (e.g. Ub) or GBA Push Info (GPI) messages. The use of GBA together with LWM2M creates a new and innovative combination which produces a synergistic effect and provides many technical advantages. For example, it allows addressing many more low-end devices, such as M2M devices. This is due, for example, to the use of a device management protocol which is properly optimized for M2M, rather than one repurposed from the consumer space (e.g. OMA DM v1, TR-069). This optimised protocol can be used to transport GBA messages—avoiding the need for a separate HTTP stack—and to manage GBA parameters (identifiers for device and application, lifetimes, key derivation methods, etc.). Further, when accompanied by appropriate network systems to provide automated routing and discovery (e.g. of LWM2M server and BSF), GBA and LWM2M advantageously combine to eliminate the cost of pre-loading settings and credentials, so facilitating low cost devices. GBA with LWM2M securely supports low-cost devices which are unattended or have no UI, where there is no option for user interaction (such as entry of PIN), and where there is no user who is able to notice and recover from authentication failures (spoofer server, spoofer client or Man In The Middle). Moreover, GBA works without requiring any public key or certificate processing on the device. This is particularly advantageous on simpler devices, as these devices may have minimal public key support or implementation errors when handling certificates.

Accordingly, the shared secret may be used as a key in the LWM2M standard. Also, the LWM2M standard procedures may be used for transmission and/or reception of any communication used within the GBA.

The shared secret may be used as a key or shared secret within the DTLS protocol (identified in “Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system” above), either when the LWM2M is used in conjunction with a DTLS protocol or when the DTLS is used alone or in conjunction with one or more other protocols.

The secure communication may further be a data communication. The data communication may be an SMS-based communication. An SMS binding may be used. The data communication may be a UDP-based communication.

The method may further comprise encrypting a communication over the secure data communication. The encryption may be performed using an Advanced Encryption Standard. The SMS-based communication may be further secured by use of an Over-The-Air (OTA) protocol, e.g. a Secured Packet Structure for UICC Applications. This protocol is defined in ETSI standard 102.225. The OTA protocol may be arranged to secure the communication with the identification card associated with the device.

It has also been noted that the OTA protocol can be used advantageously in conjunction with the LWM2M standard, in which the LWM2M can be used to manage parameters, keys and similar elements for the OTA protocol.

The use of OTA with LWM2M is not a straightforward implementation. OTA is a solution designed for SIM card security, as it has some real technical challenges if used for LWM2M. In particular, while there is software written for SIM cards and SIM OTA servers to support ETSI standard 102.225, a similar software does not exist in the device management space for devices (and, in particular, not for OMA DM clients and servers).



Thus, M2M device manufacturers do not have a code-base that they can easily adapt for use with these devices.

Further, the ETSI standard 102.225 does not explain how to set up the keys and parameters for use with the standard. It simply assumes the keys and parameters are all pre-loaded and known to both SIM card and OTA server. Although this assumption is acceptable in the SIM space—because SIM cards can be securely provisioned with the necessary keys at the manufacturing stage, and SIM manufacturers have interfaces with operators for communicating the necessary keys and parameters—the same cannot be said about LWM2M, where that infrastructure does not exist.

Thus, the use of OTA together with LWM2M creates a new and innovative combination which produces a synergistic effect and provides many technical advantages. For example, the SMS bearer needs to be secured, and so far no solution has been found. Use of OTA enables the SMS bearer to be used in LWM2M. Without it, it would not be possible to use SMS-based communications in LWM2M, and that would limit the applicability of the overall LWM2M standard.

Accordingly, the LWM2M standard procedures may be used to manage parameters and/or keys used in the OTA protocol. The method may further be used in conjunction with LWM2M, as described above.

It has also been noted that the method described above, implemented using the GBA (or a similar architecture), can be used in conjunction with SMS so that the GBA can be employed to establish keys for secure SMS-based communications (e.g. SMS), while at the same time SMS-based communications can be used to transport or carry messages associated with GBA—for example, carry GBA Push Info (GPI) messages. The use of SMS-based communications together with GBA creates a new and innovative combination which produces a synergistic effect and provides many technical advantages. For example, GBA can be used to establish the shared keys that are needed to protect SMS, while using SMS as a transport to deliver the necessary GBA messages. Further the SMS used to deliver the GBA messages can themselves be integrity protected (and partly encrypted) using the keys that will be established by GBA, so at no point is there a reliance on not secure SMS. This synergistic combination allow use of SMS as the sole bearer for M2M traffic, something which would not otherwise be possible, except by preloading the keys needed to secure SMS traffic, or switching to a different protocol to negotiate these keys: both of these alternatives would add complexity and cost. Thus, it would provide a very high security solution for obtaining shared keys so that the security of the keys is not compromised, and at the same time an-SMS-based communication is enabled by virtue of the provisioning of the keys.

Accordingly, when the method is implemented using GBA, the GBA may be used to establish keys for secure transmission and/or delivery of SMS. SMS-based communications may be used for transmission and/or reception of any communication used within the GBA, noting that these communications may themselves be protected using the keys that will be derived in GBA.

In addition to the above, the server may further comprise a server authentication component. Also, the client may further comprise a client authentication component. The server authentication component may perform authentication of the server with the authentication component. The client authentication component may perform authentication of the client with the authentication component.

Further, the authentication component may be a Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF), the server authentication component may be a Network Application Function (NAF) and the client authentication component may be a GAA Server.

The method may further comprise communicating between the server and the client for determining security parameters to be used for the secure communication, wherein the communicating is performed by using a device management protocol (for example, the GBA). The secure communication may be for use in the device management protocol.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a method of enabling secure communication for use in a device and/or service/application management protocol, the secure communication being between a server and a client, the client being associated with a device, the secure communication requiring security parameters to be agreed between the client and server, the method comprising communicating between the server and client to agree the security parameters, wherein the communicating is performed by using the device management protocol. The device can be an M2M device.

In a further embodiment, there is provided an apparatus, system, module or network for enabling secure communication with a device, said communication being between a server and a client, the client being associated with the device. In addition, the apparatus, system, module or network may further include means for performing any one of the steps or features of the methods described above. The device can be an M2M device.

In a further embodiment, there is provided an apparatus, system, module or network for enabling secure communication for use in a device and/or service/application management protocol, the secure communication being between a server and a client, the client being associated with a device, the secure communication requiring security parameters to be agreed between the client and server, the method comprising communicating between the server and client to agree the security parameters, wherein the communicating is performed by using the device management protocol. In addition, the apparatus, system, module or network may further include means for performing any one of the steps or features of the methods described above. The device can be an M2M device.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a client including any means, features or functionalities corresponding to the means, features or functionalities relative to the client as recited by any one of the methods described above.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a server including any means, features or functionalities corresponding to the means, features or functionalities relative to the server as recited by any one of the methods described above.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a device comprising a card and a client, wherein the device is arranged for enablement of secure communication, the secure communication being between a server and the client, wherein the provision of the secure communication is based on a security association between a network and the card. The client may comprise any means, features or functionalities corresponding to the means, features or functionalities relative to the client as recited by any one of the methods described above. The device can be an M2M device.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a server arranged for enablement of secure communication with a device, the secure communication being between the server



and a client associated with the device, wherein the provision of the secure communication is based on a security association between a network and a card, the card being associated with the device. The server may comprise any means, features or functionalities corresponding to the means, features or functionalities relative to the server as recited by any one of the methods described above. The device can be an M2M device.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a system for enabling secure communication with a device, said communication being between a server and a client, the client being associated with the device, wherein the provision of the secure communication is based on a security association between a network and a card, the card being associated with the device. The device can be an M2M device.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a method of enabling secure data communication with a device, the communication being between a server and a client associated with the device, wherein the security of the communication is enabled by a bootstrapped secret. The device can be an M2M device. The security protocol may be used to secure the data communication. The bootstrapped secret may be used to obtain the security elements used for the secure protocol. The bootstrapped secret may be a pre-shared secret, said secret being directly provided to the server and the client. The pre-shared secret may be permanently provided to the server and the client (e.g. by pre-provisioning the client and/or the server with said pre-shared secret, e.g. at manufacturing stage or before the client and/or server are used in a system). The pre-shared secret may be a strong, high entropy or a temporary, low-entropy pre-shared secret. The bootstrapped secret may be based on a public key or a certificate-based method. The bootstrapped secret may be provided via a bootstrap server. The security elements can be keys and/or similar arrangements well known in the art.

The communication may be an SMS-based communication. The security protocol is defined by ETSI TS 102.225. The method may use SMS binding. The device may be further associated with a card, and the security of the data communication may be controlled by means of the card. Any incoming SMS-based communication may be decrypted and/or checked by means of the card, and/or any outgoing SMS-based communication may be encrypted and/or checked by means of the card.

The communication may be a UDP-based communication. The security protocol may be a DTLS protocol.

The secure data communication may be provided over a communication interface. The communication interface may be used for managing the device or for managing the bootstrapping operations.

The data communication may be performed according to the LWM2M protocol.

In a further embodiment, there is provided an apparatus, system, module or network for enabling secure data communication with a device, the communication being between a server and a client associated with the device, wherein the security of the communication is enabled by a bootstrapped secret. The device can be an M2M device.

In a further embodiment, there is provided a method of retrieving security elements required for enabling secure data communication with a device, the communication being between a server and a client associated with the device, wherein the security elements are retrieved using a bootstrapping protocol. The device can be an M2M device. The bootstrapping protocol may retrieve the security elements in a secure session. The session may be secured based on a security protocol. The security protocol may be a DTLS

protocol. The bootstrapping protocol may be based on GBA. The data communication may be an SMS-based communication. The bootstrapping protocol may be a LWM2M bootstrap protocol. The security elements can be keys and/or similar arrangements well known in the art.

In a further embodiment, there is provided an apparatus, system, module or network for enabling secure data communication with a device, the communication being between a server and a client associated with the device, wherein the security elements are retrieved using a bootstrapping protocol. The device can be an M2M device.

The secure communication may be for the purpose of managing the device and/or the client and/or services (e.g. provided by the device) by the server. Both the device and the server may be machines (i.e. not requiring any human intervention to work). When the device is a machine, the server may be used to manage it. Again, the management may be done without any human intervention (e.g. automatically).

As discussed above, the solution could be used in conjunction with the LWM2M protocol, but the solution could be extended to other Device Management protocols, or to other M2M services (e.g. securing delivery of binary SMS). In particular, and as discussed above, the use of the solution in conjunction with an M2M-specific protocol, such as LWM2M, allows the solution to be very efficient when used with M2M devices, and in particular, when used to manage the device and/or services provided by (or via) the device. In other words, all the advantages mentioned above are further enhanced and optimised when the solution is used in conjunction with an M2M-specific protocol.

In addition, there is also provided any aspects or combination of aspects according to any one of the claims.

Any combination of the features described in connection with any of the aspects is also provided, even if not explicitly disclosed.

With reference to FIG. 2, an exemplary architecture (100) is shown that may be implemented, in particular when GBA is used. A device 110 (in the example, an M2M Device and/or a User Equipment) is associated with a card 112 (in the example, a UICC) and a Client 116 (in the example, a Device Management (DM) client. Note that this client could also be an LWM2M Client, namely a client that can manage the device itself and service/applications provided by the device e.g. asset control). The device 110 is also associated with a device authentication component 114 (in the example, a GAA server). Further, a server 120 is provided (in the example, a DM server), the server associated with a server authentication component 122 (in the example, a Network Application Function (NAF)). Further, an authentication component 130 is provided (in the example, a Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF)) and a register 140 (in the example, an HLR or HSS). Also, four different interfaces are provided for communication between the various components, in particular interface Ua 150 between device 110 and server 120, interface Ub 160 between device 110 and authentication component 130, interface Zn 170 between authentication component 130 and server 120, and interface Zh/Zh' between authentication component 130 and register 140.

In particular, with reference to GBA, document TS 33.220 defines the following components and interfaces, which are shown on FIG. 2. NAF, the "Network Application Function", is a server-side component of an application that may be secured using GBA. In a preferred embodiment, the NAF may be a software component within a Device Management (DM) Server.



Some aspects of a BSF, HLR/HSS, UE, Ua, Ub, Zh/Zh' and Zn are provided in "Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system" above.

On successful authentication of the device **110**, the BSF **130** derives the shared secret Ks\_NAF, which is retrieved by the NAF. In a preferred embodiment, the BSF **130** would most likely be on a separate server from the HLR/HSS **140**, but within an M2M platform cluster.

The HLR/HSS may be "GBA-aware" (so that it stores details for a GBA user subscription) or may be a legacy component. In a preferred embodiment, the HLR/HSS would be the HLR or HSS of an M2M mobile operator (i.e. one dedicated specifically to serving M2M connections).

The UE **110** is, in the proposed solution, an M2M device.

In a preferred embodiment, the Ua is the interface between a Device Management client **116** and Device Management server **120**.

In a preferred embodiment, the Ub would be the interface between the "GAA Server" component **114** of the device and the BSF **130**.

In a preferred embodiment, the Zn interface is used.

In the proposed solution, this interface is between the Device Management Server **120** and the BSF **130**. The WS version of the interface would allow placement of a DM Server in multiple locations (not just in the M2M operator/platform cluster), and allow future NAFs in multiple locations.

With reference to FIG. 3, the procedure for setting up the secure communication in accordance with the present invention is now described, in particular when GBA is used.

At **205**, the UE **110** contacts over interface Ua the NAF **122** (in the described embodiment, the Device Management client **116** contacts the Device Management server **122**) and discovers that the NAF requires it to acquire a shared secret using GBA. This could be because there is no existing secret, or the existing secret has expired, or is otherwise considered invalid by the NAF.

The exact interface and communication method may be specific to the application concerned. One possible interface and communication method for OMA Lightweight M2M is discussed below.

Over the internal UE interface from DM client to GAA server: at **210**, the DM client **116** requests the GAA server **114** to obtain a shared secret. It presents an identifier for the corresponding NAF (NAF\_Id).

Over the Ub Interface: at **215**, The UE **110** contacts the BSF (GAA Server **114** contacts the BSF **130**). This may be a basic http GET request. The UE presents an "IMPI" (equivalent of an IMSI) or a "TMPI" (equivalent of a TMSI) for anonymity reasons, if one is available.

Over the Zh or Zh' Interface: at **220**, the BSF **130** requests an authentication vector from the HLR/HSS **140**. At **225**, the HLR/HSS **140** returns a fresh vector, consisting of a RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, and IK, for example.

The BSF **130** generates a transaction identifier (B-TID) and passes (**230**) the B-TID together with the RAND and AUTN back to the UE **110**. It may also indicate the lifetime of the B-TID, and the associated key.

Over the internal UE interface from the GAA Server to the UICC: at **235**, the GAA Server **114** forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UICC **112** which validates the AUTN. If the AUTN is valid, then the BSF **130** is authenticated. At **240**, the UICC **112** returns a RES, CK and IK to the GAA Server **114**.

At **245**, the UE **110** (GAA Server **114**) contacts the BSF **130** again, using the resulting RES for HTTP Digest authentication

(which is identified in "Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system" above).

The BSF **130** verifies the HTTP Digest using the XRES. If it matches, then the UE **110** has been successfully authenticated. The BSF **130** stores the tuple <IMPI, B-TID, RAND, CK, IK> and tells at **250** the UE **110** that the authentication was successful. The UE **110** stores <B-TID, RAND, CK, IK>.

Over the internal UE **110** interface from DM client **116** to GAA server **114**: the UE **110** (GAA Server **114**) derives a secret Ks\_NAF using the CK, IK, RAND, IMPI and NAF\_Id. At **255**, it passes Ks\_NAF and the B-TID back to the DM client **116**.

Over the Ua interface again: at **260**, the UE **110** (DM Client **116**) contacts the NAF (DM Server **122**) and presents the B-TID as retrieved above.

Over the Zn Interface: at **265**, the NAF **122** contacts the BSF **130**, and presents the BTID. The BSF **130** authenticates the NAF, derives the corresponding Ks\_NAF, and at **270** returns it to the NAF, together with an indicator of key lifetime.

The UE **110** (DM Client **116**) and NAF (DM Server **122**) now both share Ks\_NAF. They can use it directly, or to derive their own session keys for further communication.

Again, the exact interface and communication method may be specific to the application concerned. One possible interface and communication method for OMA Lightweight M2M is discussed below.

As discussed above, the solution could be used in conjunction with the LWM2M standard. This standard can be viewed as a successor to existing OMA Device management standards (OMA DM 1.0 to 1.3), but heavily optimized for low end machine-type devices, and with an extended management scope beyond the device itself including the management of services provided by the M2M device such as asset control. This contrasts for instance with OMA DM 2.0 which is the successor for consumer devices like smartphones, tablets etc. Other widely-used Device Management standards include TR-069, which was developed by the Broadband Forum for managing Customer Premises Equipment (in particular DSL modems).

The exemplary flow described with reference to FIG. 3 is very generic, and can be used with many different sorts of device management protocols (or other application protocols). As can be seen, many details of the Ua interface are outside the scope of 3GPP and are left to other standards to complete (or left to proprietary implementations). However, integration with the LWM2M standard is possible, as described in these examples.

Under the specification (see above), the security for OMA LWM2M is based on DTLS v1.2 (see above) and CoAP (see above). Both the client and server must support pre-shared key DTLS (e.g. see section 7.1.1, page 41), whereas support for certificate-based authentication is only optional. This means that a key derived by GBA (Ks\_NAF) could be used as a DTLS pre-shared key and it would work with any DM client/DM server pair.

The general approach for pre-shared key TLS is referenced in "Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system" above. The GBA and TLS-PSK protocols work well together. In **205** described above, the "Server Hello" message contains a field where the server can indicate that it supports GBA-bootstrapping, and in response, the client can then provide an identifier (B-TID) for an already bootstrapped key (**260**). Or if the client doesn't already have a bootstrapped key, it asks



the GAA server to get one, before resuming the “Client Hello” and “Server Hello” at 260. The use of the Ks\_NAF to derive session keys is then specified entirely within the TLS-PSK protocol. The 3GPP spec assumes HTTP/TLS, but the basic approach looks the same for CoAP/DTLS.

To improve consistency with the OMA profile of GBA, the LWM2M spec may need to define a “protocol identifier” for DTLS pre-shared key and have it registered by OMNA (see section 5.2.1 of OMA GBA Profile, Approved Version 1.1-31 Jul. 2012 found at: [http://technical.openmobilealliance.org/Technical/release\\_program/sec\\_cf\\_archive.aspx](http://technical.openmobilealliance.org/Technical/release_program/sec_cf_archive.aspx)).

Aside from GBA aspects, the M2M device may be configured to support the security of OMA LWM2M, which is referenced in “Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system” above.

#### Additional Aspects

##### 1. Device Development for GBA

As can be seen from FIG. 2 and FIG. 3, the M2M device may contain several internal components. It should support a DM client which is “GBA aware”, as well as a “GAA Server” component.

The GAA Server component should support internal interfaces to the DM client and to the SIM card (UICC) as well as the external Ub interface to the BSF. The interface to the UICC may be particularly challenging, as the M2M device may not expose an existing API to allow device software to send commands to the UICC. One possibility (that may be used) is for the modem to expose AT commands. However, this may not be at a sufficiently low level (AT+CSIM allows raw APDUs to be communicated to the UICC) in every case. Further, there may be security issues: while the GAA Server must be able to interface to the UICC, general applications installed on the device should not be able to use this interface, as that could allow external parties to impersonate the device (and engender fraud on the cellular network). So the API to the SIM Card should be privileged, as well as being sufficiently low level to be usable.

##### 2. Ub Tunnelling, or GBA Push

The interface to the BSF is based on http and HTTP Digest authentication. One alternative may be “tunnelling” the Ub interface within the Ua interface, so that the device only needs to support the CoAP protocol (not HTTP as well).

A related alternative is using the GBA “Push” variant, and carrying push messages (Upa interface) within the Ua interface. Both of these would require identifying suitable commands and parameters in the Ua interface (i.e. the relevant Device Management protocol) to carry the tunnel or push messages. The interfaces and message flow for GBA push are outlined below (see also 3GPP TS 33.223, entitled “3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push function”, it can currently be retrieved by <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33223.htm>).

With reference to FIG. 4, an example Processing and message flow for GBA Push follows:

1. A NAF establishes a shared NAF SA with a UE which is registered for Push services. It knows the identity of the subscriber.
2. The Push-NAF generates the GPI (GBA Push info) Request and sends the GPI Request to the BSF.
3. Upon receiving the request from the NAF, the BSF checks that the NAF is authorized, and resolves the requested subscriber identifier to a private identifier (e.g. IMSI).

4. The BSF fetches a new AV (authentication vector) and subscriber’s GUSS (GBA User Security Settings) from the HSS.

5. The HSS sends the AV and the GUSS to the BSF.

6. When the BSF receives the AV Response from the HSS, it generates the NAF keys based on the requested NAF\_Id and creates the relevant GPI Response.

7. The BSF sends the GPI Response to the NAF.

8. The NAF stores the received information together with other user information in a NAF SA.

9. The NAF then forwards the GPI to the UE over Upa using the selected transport mechanism and the given transport address.

10. When the UE receives the message containing the GPI, it processes the GPI as for regular GBA, and stores the corresponding NAF SA(s)

The UE and NAF are now ready to use the established NAF SA.

TR 33.223 specifies that Upa is a new interface that is separate from Ua—“a new reference point Upa is introduced between the NAF and the UE” (Section 4.2.1). As such, the Ua interface should be unaware of whether GBA or GBA-push is being used.

##### 3. Provisioning the Address of the BSF and the NAF

The address of the BSF (http URL) may be pre-loaded when the device is manufactured. It could be device managed itself, which would seem to create a “chicken-and-egg” problem, but the DM Server could, for instance, provide an address for an acceptable BSF in the ServerHello. Or http traffic might be routed by the M2M mobile operator to a default BSF address. Similarly, the location of the preferred DM Server might need to be pre-loaded, or the M2M mobile operator could route CoAP traffic to a default DM Server address.

##### 4. Flavour of GBA (GBA-ME, GBA-U, GBA-SIM etc.)

Several different versions of GBA are referenced in “Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system”. GBA-U has security advantages, but also logistic advantages: it permits a longer lifetime for the B-TID as the derived key is stored more securely. It allows safe retention of Ks during power-off cycles for instance. GBA-U requires specific support from the UICC, so would have a (modest) increment to the cost. Since M2M devices are typically provided with a new UICC anyway at manufacture, it is a software/development cost rather than a hardware cost. Also, in a model with a customised UICC, this may allow for a solution using restricted AT commands to the modem, rather than full AT+CSIM.

##### 5. Location of the NAF (DM Server) and type of Zn interface

The architecture example allows for there to be several DM Servers in different locations: it could be part of an M2M platform (e.g. M2M mobile operator) cluster, or hosted elsewhere by a network operator/service provider, or perhaps by a customer of said operator/provider. The BSF may need to be located within a firewalled Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), or perhaps connected via an http proxy in the DMZ (so allowing external http Web Service access from NAFs), and then would execute the Diameter interface to the HLR/HSS. It may be undesirable to expose an http interface directly onto the server supporting the HLR, or to tunnel Diameter through firewalls. However, if the DM Server is itself part of the M2M platform cluster then this may be over-engineering. Possibly, a Diameter solution for the Zn interface then becomes acceptable.



## 6. Use of Zh or Zh' Interface

Ideally, the HLR may be upgraded to a full HSS with support for the Zh reference point. However, if the HLR/HSS only supports Zh' then the BSF will need to be more complicated, and take on some of the subscription management functions (profiling, lifetime, security policies) typically associated with the HSS.

## 7. Development of NAF Component

While the NAF functionality looks fairly straightforward, it will need to be developed for each DM Server used, and for each additional application which uses GBA.

GBA keys could be used to protect SMS (e.g. encrypt/integrity protect SMS using a secure packet interface e.g. like ETSI TS 102.225 which is used for SIM OTA). This SMS channel is likely to be more efficient than DTLS.

In addition, regardless of GBA, a secure SMS protocol could be linked to a Device and/or Service management protocol, namely: using a secure SMS protocol (e.g. originally designed for SIM OTA (102 225)), but now adapted for LWM2M communications, combined with using the LWM2M protocol to define (and manage) the necessary parameters for the secure SMS protocol (i.e. the relevant Kic, KID, SPI, TAR, and keys).

GBA could be used to securely derive the keys.

Further aspects and advantageous or preferable features are described in the following paragraphs.

LWM2M needs a security solution for the SMS bearer. Without a solution, SMS will not be usable as a bearer, severely limiting scope of LWM2M. A solution to this problem is to use SIM OTA security (e.g. see TS 102 225).

TS 102.225 relies on the keys and parameters being already agreed between client and server. However, it is difficult to pre-load these into LWM2M client devices, and ensure that they are sent to servers, because there is no present infrastructure for doing so. It would be pointless to deliver the keys and parameters over unsecured SMS.

There are various proposed solutions for delivering these keys and parameters in a secure way.

In a first solution, there is provided switching bearer to UDP/Coap and running DTLS. The DTLS session can be used to secure the LWM2M Bootstrap protocol. The LWM2M Bootstrap can be used to set the TS 102.225 keys and parameters securely. Note that managed resources/objects need to be defined to allow the Bootstrap server to update them; the format of these resources is specified in the numbered paragraphs below.

In a second solution, there is provided relying on a SIM card (UICC) which has already having been provisioned with keys and parameters, and using this card to terminate TS 102 225 security. Please note that, because this solution provides a secure channel, the same channel can be used to deliver other keys and parameters.

In a third solution, there is provided use of GBA to set up the keys and parameters. This works because the GPI (GBA Push Info) can be delivered over unsecured SMS. So, there is no requirement to have an initial key to protect the SMS. (Note that the delivery of the parameters like Kic, KID, SPI and TAR is not obvious, but these are only 6 bytes, and there are fields in the GPI e.g. App\_Lbl, NAF\_Id, P-TID which could be used to carry this info.)

Further details are provided in the numbered paragraphs below.

UDP channel security for [COAP] is referenced in "Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system" above.

Since the LWM2M protocol utilizes DTLS for authentication, data integrity and confidentiality purposes, the

LWM2M Client and LWM2M Server SHOULD keep a DTLS session in use for as long a period as can be safely achieved without risking compromise to the session keys and counters. If a session persists across sleep cycles, encrypted and integrity-protected storage SHOULD be used for the session keys and counters.

Note that the Client-Server relationship of DTLS (i.e. who initiated the handshake) is separate from the Client-Server relationship of LWM2M.

Considering that any device with a LWM2M Client can be managed by any LWM2M Server and LWM2M Bootstrap Server the choice of Cipher Suites is not limited to the list defined in Section 9 of [CoAP]. Due to the sensitive nature of Bootstrap Information, particular care has to be taken to ensure protection of that data including constraints and dependencies within a LWM2M Client/Bootstrap Server relationship according to the adopted security mode.

Concerning Bootstrap from a Smartcard, the same care has to be taken and a secure channel between the Smartcard and the LWM2M Device SHOULD be established as described in Appendix H of OMA LWM2M in reference to GlobalPlatform Secure Channel Protocol 03 (SCP 03) Amendment D v1.1 September 2009.

The keying material used to secure the exchange of information using a DTLS session may be obtained using one of the bootstrap modes referenced in "Details of 3GPP standards and technologies used to implement aspects of the method and system" above.

The Resources (i.e. "Security Mode", "Public Key or Identity", "Server Public Key or Identity" and "Secret Key") in the LWM2M Security Object that are associated with the keying material are used either

- 1) for providing UDP channel security in "Device Registration", "Device Management & Service Enablement", and "Information Reporting" Interfaces if the LWM2M Security Object Instance relates to a LWM2M Server, or,
- 2) for providing channel security in the Bootstrap Interface if the LWM2M Security Object instance relates to a LWM2M Bootstrap Server.

LWM2M Clients MUST either be directly provisioned for use with a target LWM2M Server (Manufacturer Pre-configuration bootstrap mode) or else be provisioned for secure bootstrapping with an LWM2M Bootstrap Server. Any LWM2M Client which supports Client or Server initiated bootstrap mode MUST support at least one of the following secure methods:

- 1) Bootstrapping with a strong (high-entropy) pre-shared secret, as described in section 7.1 of OMA LWM2M. The cipher-suites defined in this section MUST NOT be used with only a low-entropy pre-shared secret.
- 2) Bootstrapping with a temporary, low-entropy pre-shared secret (such as a PIN, password and private serial number) using the cipher-suite TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256, as defined in RFC5489.
- 3) Bootstrapping with a public key or certificate-based method (as described in sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 of OMA LWM2M). The LWM2M client MUST use a unique key-pair, one which is unique to each LWM2M client.

For full interoperability, a LWM2M Bootstrap Server SHALL support all of these methods.

NOTE: The above security methods can also be used by the LWM2M Bootstrap Server to provision Kic and KID for SMS channel security (see below for SMS channel security).



## SMS Channel Security

## SMS Secured Packet Structure Mode

The Secured Packet Structure is based on [3GPP TS 31 115]/[ETSI TS 102 225] which is defining secured packets for different transport mechanisms. The solution was originally designed for securing packet structures for UICC based applications, however, for LWM2M it is suitable for securing the SMS payload exchanged between client and server.

The SMS Secured Packet Structure mode specified in this section MUST be supported when the SMS binding is used.

A LWM2M Client which uses the SMS binding MUST either be directly provisioned for use with a target LWM2M Server (Manufacturer Pre-configuration bootstrap mode or Smart Card Provisioning) or else be able to bootstrap via the UDP binding.

The end-point for the SMS channel (delivery of mobile terminated SMS, and sending of mobile originated SMS) SHALL be either on the smartcard or on the device. When the LWM2M Client device doesn't support a smartcard, the end-point is on the LWM2M Client device.

A LWM2M Client, Server or Bootstrap Server supporting SMS binding SHALL discard SMS messages which are not correctly protected using the expected parameters stored in the "SMS Binding Key Parameters" Resource and the expected keys stored in the "SMS Binding Secret Keys" Resource, and SHALL NOT respond with an error message secured using the correct parameters and keys.

## Device End-Point

If the SMS channel end-point is on the device the following settings SHALL be applied: Class 1 SMS as specified in [3GPP TS 23.038]

TP-PID of 111101 (ME Data Download) as specified in [3GPP TS 23.040]

TP-OA: the TP-OA (originating address as defined in [3GPP 23.040] of an incoming command packet (e.g. CoAP request) MUST be re-used as the TP-DA of the outgoing packet (e.g. CoAP response)

## Smartcard End-Point

If the SMS channel end-point is on the smart card the following settings SHALL be applied:

Class 2 SMS as specified in [3GPP TS 23.038]. The [3GPP TS 23.040] SMS header MUST be defined as below:

TP-PID: 111111 (USIM Data Download) as specified in [3GPP TS 23.040]

TP-OA: the TP-OA (originating address as defined in [3GPP 23.040] of an incoming command packet (e.g. CoAP request) MUST be re-used as the TP-DA of the outgoing packet (e.g. CoAP response)

## SMS Secured Packet Mode Mechanisms

## 1. Secure SMS Transfer to UICC

A SMS Secured Packet encapsulating a CoAP request received by the LWM2M device, MUST be—according to [ETSI TS 102 225]/[3GPP TS 31.115]—addressed to the LWM2M UICC Application in the Smartcard where it will be decrypted, aggregated if needed, and checked for integrity.

If decryption and integrity verification succeed, the message contained in the SMS MUST be provided to the LWM2M Client.

If decryption or integrity verification failed, SMS MUST be discarded.

The mechanism for providing the decrypted CoAP Request to the LWM2M Client relies on basic GET\_DATA commands of [GP SCP03]. This data MUST follow the format as below

```
data_rcv::=<address><coap_msg>
address::=TP_OA; originated address
coap_msg::
=COAP_TAG<coap_request_length><coap_request>
coap_request_length::=16 BITS_VALUE
coap_request::=CoAP message payload
```

NOTE: In current LWM2M release, the way the LWM2M Client Application is triggered for retrieving the available message from the Smartcard is at the discretion of the device: i.e. a middle class LWM2M Device implementing [ETSI TS 102 223] Toolkit with class "e" and "k" support could be automatically triggered by Toolkit mechanisms, whereas a simpler LWM2M device could rely on a polling mechanisms on Smartcard for fetching data when available.

## 2. Secured SMS Transfer to LWM2M Server

For sending a CoAP message to the LWM2M Server, the LWM2M Client prepares a data containing the right TP-DA to use, concatenated with the CoAP message and MUST provide that data to the LWM2M UICC Application in using the [GP SCP03] STORE-DATA command.

According to [ETSI TS 102 225]/[3GPP TS 31.115] the Smartcard will be in charge to prepare (encryption/concatenation) the CoAP message before sending it as a SMS Secure Packet ([ETSI TS 102 223] SEND\_SMS command). The SMS Secured Packet MUST be formatted as Secured Data specified in section 7.3.1.2.

The Secure Channel as specified in Annex H SHOULD be used to provide the prepared data to the Smartcard.

The SMS channel security is provided by the Secured Packet Structure [ETSI TS 102 225] and [SCP080] which is defining secured packets for different transport mechanisms.

The solution was originally designed for securing packet structures for UICC based applications, however, for LWM2M it is suitable for securing the SMS channel between client and server.

The SMS channel security specified in this section MUST be applied when the SMS binding is used.

When the LWM2M device supports a smartcard, the security SHOULD be terminated on the smartcard. The LWM2M client SHOULD pass SMS messages to the smartcard for encryption and integrity protection before sending, and SHOULD pass encrypted SMS messages received from the LWM2M server to the smartcard for decryption and integrity checking.

A LWM2M Client which supports the SMS binding SHALL support the Secured Packet Structure as defined in [ETSI TS 102 225] and [SCP080]. The LWM2M Client SHALL share the relevant keys—identified by K<sub>IC</sub> and K<sub>ID</sub>—with a LWM2M Bootstrap Server during bootstrapping, or with a LWM2M Server otherwise.

A LWM2M Bootstrap Server which supports the SMS binding SHALL support the Secured Packet Structure as defined in [ETSI TS 102 225] and [SCP080].

A LWM2M Server which supports the SMS binding SHALL support Secured Packet Structure as defined in [ETSI TS 102 225] and [SCP080].

In SMS Secured Packet Structure mode, a CoAP message as defined in [CoAP] MUST be encapsulated in [3GPP 31.115] Secured Packets, in implementing—for SMS Point to Point (SMS\_PP)—the general [ETSI 102 225] specification for UICC based applications.

The following applies to LWM2M Client and LWM2M Bootstrap Server and LWM2M Server:

The "Command Packet" command specified in [3GPP 31.115]/ET& TS 102 225] MUST be used for both CoAP Request and Response message.



The Structure of the Command Packet contained in the Short Message MUST follow [3GPP 31.115] specification.

Single DES SHALL NOT be relied on.

AES or Triple DES with three different keys MUST be used.

Preferably, AES should be used. Where AES is used it should be used with CBC mode for encryption (see coding of K<sub>Ic</sub> in [ETSI TS 102 225] section 5.1.2) and in CMAC mode for integrity (see coding of K<sub>ID</sub> in [ETSI TS 102 225] section 5.1.3).

SPI SHALL be set as follows (see coding of SPI in [ETSI TS 102 225] section 5.1.1).:

cryptographic checksum

ciphering

The ciphering and cryptographic checksum MUST use either AES or Triple DES

Single DES SHALL NOT be used

AES SHOULD be used

When Triple DES is used, then it MUST be used in outer CBC mode and 3 different keys MUST be used

When AES is used it MUST be used with CBC mode for ciphering (see coding of K<sub>Ic</sub> in [ETSI TS 102 225] section 5.1.2) and in CMAC mode for integrity (see coding of K<sub>ID</sub> in [ETSI TS 102 225] section 5.1.3

process if and only if counter value is higher than the value in the RE

Preferably, TAR (see coding of TAR in [ETSI TS 101 220], section 6) SHALL be set to a value in the range BF FF 00-BF FF FF.

NOTE: A TAR for LWM2M SMS security will be requested from ETSI SCP and the range above applies only until the TAR has been assigned.

Secured Data: contains the Secured Application Message which MUST be coded as a BER-TLV, the Tag (TBD: e.g. 0x05) will indicate the type (e.g. CoAP type) of that message.

There will be two different TARs for terminating the security on the smartcard or on the device.

The ciphering and integrity keys and associated counter values SHOULD be held in a smart card or other tamper-resistant secure storage environment (e.g. embedded secure element). The client SHOULD pass MT SMS to the smart card/SE for decryption and integrity checking, and SHOULD pass MO SMS to the smart card/SE for encryption and integrity protection before sending.

If the keys and associated counter values are not stored in the above recommended way, they SHALL be treated as session keys with a lifetime no greater than the duration of the Registration Lifetime. The LWM2M Client SHALL acquire fresh discard the key material on each "Register" or "Update" operation, load fresh key material using one of the mechanisms described below, and reset the counters.

Re-bootstrapping via the GBA Push mechanism, as described in [OMA DM v2.0] section 9.3.1.3. GBA Push uses a UICC to generate a so called K<sub>s</sub>(ext/int)\_NAF shared secret both in the network and in the device. From this master key K<sub>s</sub>(ext/int)\_NAF, two session secrets are then generated: the DMBEK and the DMBIK. The value of the K<sub>Ic</sub> (ciphering key for SMS) SHALL be set by truncating DMBEK to the relevant key length (taking bits 0 to 127 for AES-128, or bits 0 to 167 bits for 3DES), and the value of the K<sub>ID</sub> (integrity key for SMS) SHALL similarly be set by truncating DMBIK to the relevant key length (bits 0 to 127 for AES-128, or bits 0 to 167 for 3DES). The GBA Push Info SHALL be delivered to the LWM2M Client using a Class 1 SMS as specified in [3GPP TS 23.038] with a TP-PID of 111101 (ME Data Download) as specified in [3GPP TS 23.040].

Re-bootstrapping from the Smart Card by one of the following methods:

Using the above-described GBA Push mechanism, specifically with GBA-U, and with the Smart Card generating the DMBIK and DMBEK from K<sub>s</sub>\_int\_NAF.

Using Remote File Management (RFM) or Remote Application Management (RAM) as specified in [ETSI TS 102.226]. The LWM2M Server SHALL generate random new key data of appropriate length for K<sub>Ic</sub> and K<sub>ID</sub> and ensure these are delivered to the Smart Card by a Class 2 SMS as specified in [3GPP TS 23.038] with a TP-PID of 111111 (USIM Data Download) as specified in [3GPP TS 23.040], protected using the relevant OTA security keys for RFM or RAM.

The Smart Card SHALL place the updated session keys in the provisioning file EF\_LWM2M\_Bootstrap.

—Re-bootstrapping via the UDP binding, secured as described in Section 7.1 (UDP Security).

Where the UDP binding is unavailable, the LWM2M Server (or Bootstrapping Server) SHOULD send SMS to the LWM2M Client to refresh the session keys before the next attempted "Register" or "Update" operation. If the LWM2M Client attempts to contact the LWM2M Server using an expired registration, or attempts to "Register" or "Update" using a stale key, the LWM2M Server SHALL respond with an error (4.00 Bad Request) and SHALL send SMS to refresh the session keys. However, the LWM2M Server SHOULD send such SMS prior to the expiry of the current Registration, if the LWM2M Client is awake; or if the LWM2M Client is in a sleep cycle, the LWM2M Server (or Bootstrapping Server) SHOULD send such SMS on the next wake up. These measures will avoid a failed "Register" or "Update" operation.

As for Section 7.1 (UDP Security), where a session persists across sleep cycles, encrypted and integrity-protected storage SHOULD be used for the session keys and counters. Alternatively, new session keys SHALL be established by one of the above mechanisms on wake up from a sleep cycle.

Preferably, K<sub>Ic</sub>, K<sub>ID</sub>, SPI and TAR SHALL be stored in the "SMS Binding Key Parameters" Resource.

Preferably, the corresponding key values should be stored in the "SMS Binding Secret Keys" Resource.

A LWM2M Client which uses the SMS binding may either be directly provisioned for use with a target LWM2M Server (Manufacturer Pre-configuration bootstrap mode) or else be able to bootstrap via the UDP binding.

A LWM2M Client, Server or Bootstrap Server supporting SMS binding SHALL discard SMS messages which are not correctly protected using the expected parameters stored in the “SMS Binding Key Parameters” Resource and the expected keys stored in the “SMS Binding Secret Keys” Resource, and SHALL NOT respond with an error message secured using the correct parameters and keys.

LWM2M Object: LWM2M Security

Description: This LWM2M object provides the keying material of a LWM2M Client appropriate to access a specified LWM2M Server. One Object Instance SHOULD address a LWM2M Bootstrap Server

These LWM2M object resources MUST only be changed by a LWM2M Bootstrap Server or SmartCard provisioning

and MUST NOT be accessible by any other LWM2M Server.

### Example Object Info

Object	Object ID	Object URN	Multiple Instances?	Mandatory?
LWM2M Security	0		Yes	Yes

### Resource Info:

Resource Name	Type	Range or Enumeration	Units	Descriptions
LWM2M Server URI	String	0-255 bytes	—	Uniquely identifies the LWM2M Server or LWM2M Bootstrap Server, and is in the form: “coaps://host:port”, where host is an IP address or FQDN, and port is the UDP port of the Server.
Bootstrap Server	Boolean		—	Determines if the current instance concerns a LWM2M Bootstrap Server (true) or a standard LWM2M Server (false)
Security Mode	Integer	0-3	—	Determines which UDP channel security mode is used 0: Pre-Shared Key mode 1: Raw Public Key mode 2: Certificate mode 3: NoSec mode
Public Key or Identity	Opaque		—	Stores the LWM2M Client’s Certificate (Certificate mode), public key (RPK mode) or PSK Identity (PSK mode). The format is defined in Section E.1.1.
Server Public Key or Identity	Opaque		—	Stores the LWM2M Server’s or LWM2M Bootstrap Server’s Certificate (Certificate mode), public key (RPK mode) or PSK Identity (PSK mode). The format is defined in Section E.1.1.
Secret Key	Opaque		—	Stores the secret key or private key of the security mode. The format of the keying material is defined by the security mode in Section E.1.1. This resource MUST only be changed by a bootstrap server and MUST NOT be readable by any server.
SMS Security Mode	Integer	0-255		Determines which SMS payload security mode is used (see section 7.2) 0: Reserved for future use 1: Secure Packet Structure mode device terminated 2: Secure Packet Structure mode smartcard terminated 3: NoSec mode 255: Proprietary modes
SMS Binding Key Parameters	Opaque	6 bytes	—	Stores the KIC, KID, SPI and TAR. The format is defined in Section D.1.2.
SMS Binding Secret Keys	Opaque	32-48 bytes	—	Stores the values of the keys for the SMS binding.



-continued

Resource Name	Type	Range or Enumeration	Units	Descriptions
LWM2M Server SMS Number	Integer			This resource MUST only be changed by a bootstrap server and MUST NOT be readable by any server. MSISDN used by the LWM2M Client to send messages to the LWM2M Server via the SMS binding. The LWM2M Client SHALL silently ignore any SMS not originated from unknown MSISDN
Short Server ID	Integer	1-65535	—	This identifier uniquely identifies each LWM2M Server configured for the LWM2M Client. This resource MUST be set when the Bootstrap Server resource has false value. Default Short Server ID (i.e. 0) MUST NOT be used for identifying the LWM2M Server.
Client Hold Off Time	Integer		s	Relevant information for a Bootstrap Server only. The number of seconds to wait before initiating a Client Initiated Bootstrap once the LWM2M Client has determined it should initiate this bootstrap mode

#### UDP Channel Security: Security Key Resource Format

This section defines the format of the Secret Key and Public Key and Identity resources of the LWM2M Server and LWM2M Bootstrap Objects when using UDP Channel security. These resources are used to configure the security mode and keying material that a Client uses with a particular Server. The Objects are configured on the Client using one of the Bootstrap mechanisms described in Section 5.1 of OMA LWM2M. The use of this keying material for each security mode is defined in Section 7.1 of OMA LWM2M.

#### Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Mode

The PSK is a binary shared secret key between the Client and Server of the appropriate length for the Cipher Suite used [RFC 4279]. This key is composed of a sequence of binary bytes in the Secret Key resource. The default PSK Cipher Suites defined in this specification use a 128-bit AES key. Thus this key would be represented in 16 bytes in the Secret Key Resource.

The corresponding PSK Identity for this PSK is stored in the Public Key or Identity resource. The PSK Identity is simply stored as a UTF-8 String as per [RFC4279]. Clients and Servers MUST support a PSK Identity of at least 128 bytes in length as required by [RFC4279].

#### Raw-Public Key (RPK) Mode

The raw-public key mode requires a public key and a private key of the appropriate type and length for the Cipher Suite used. These keys are carried as a sequence of binary bytes with the public key stored in the Public Key or Identity Resource, and the private key stored in the Secret Key Resource. The default RPK Cipher Suites defines in this specification use a 256-bit ECC key. Thus the Certificate Resource would contain a 32 byte public key and the Secret Key Resource a 32 byte private key.

#### Certificate Mode

The Certificate mode requires an X.509v3 Certificate along with a matching private key. The private key is stored in the Secret Key Resource as in RPK mode. The Certificate is simply represented as binary X.509v3 in the value of the Public Key or Identity Resource.

#### SMS Payload Security: Security Key Resource Format

This section defines the format of the Secret Key and Public Key and Identity resources of the LWM2M Server and LWM2M Bootstrap Objects when using SMS Payload security. These resources are used to configure keying material that a Client uses with a particular Server. The Objects are configured on the Client using one of the Bootstrap mechanisms described in Section 5.1. The use of this keying material is defined in Section 7.2.

The SMS key parameters are stored in the order KIC, KID, SPI, TAR (KIC is byte 0).

Ordering of bits within bytes SHALL follow ETSI TS 102 221 "Coding Conventions" (b8 MSB, b1 LSB).

#### Unbootstrapping

If a Security Object Instance is to be deleted, some related resources and configurations need to be deleted or modified. Therefore when Delete operation is sent via Bootstrap Interface, the Client MUST proceed following procedure.

1. If there is an Object Instance that can be accessed only by a Server of the Server Object Instance (i.e. the Server is Access Control Owner and the LWM2M Server can access the Object Instance only in an Access Control Object Instance), the Object Instance and the corresponding the Access Control Object Instance MUST be deleted
2. If an Object Instance can be accessed by multiple Servers including the Server, which Security Object Instance is to be deleted, then:
  - An ACL Resource Instance for the Server in Access Control Object Instance for the Object Instance MUST be deleted



If the Server is Access Control Owner of the Access Control Object Instance, then the Access Control Owner MUST be changed to another Server according to the rules below: The Client MUST choose the Server who has highest sum of each number assigned to an access right (Write: 1, Delete: 1) for the Access Control Owner. If two or more Servers have the same sum, the Client MUST choose one of them as the Access Control Owner.

3. Observation from the Server MUST be deleted
4. The Server Object Instance MUST be deleted
5. Client MAY send "De-register" operation to the Server

Note: To monitor the change of Access Control Owner, the Server MAY observe Access Control Owner Resource.

As a further enhancement, the GBA BSF may be merged into the LWM2M bootstrap server. This makes it easier to discover a single server. This is shown in FIG. 5 in which a combined server 420 holds both the BSF 130 and the LWM2M 440.

FIGS. 6 and 7 show schematic diagrams indicating how the combined BSF LWM2M server may be reached by the M2M device 110. Whilst the combined BSF LWM2M 420 are shown in FIGS. 6 and 7, other embodiments may operate where the BSF and LWM2M are embodied as separate entities (e.g. as shown in FIG. 2). However, the same or similar discovery techniques may be used, as described below.

The M2M device 110 requires some mechanism for finding a server and in particular the LWM2M server (DM server) or the BSF server. As described previously, the LWM2M server uses interface Ua and the BSF server uses interface Ub. The M2M device 110 therefore requires the correct IP addresses, URLs and/or ports to contact and communicate with the various servers. As discussed previously, it may not be particularly feasible or convenient to pre-provision the M2M device 110 with all necessary addresses and URLs as this would require such settings to be specified at the date of manufacture and it would not be easy to change or alter these data later on. The OMA device management standards propose the use of a bootstrapping server to load the relevant server details of a DM server. However, this transfers the problem to one of provisioning the details on the bootstrapping server.

The following describes how routing infrastructure may be used to achieve automated discovery of the LWM2M (DM) server and/or BSF. An example of this method 600 is shown as a flowchart in FIG. 8. A gateway GPRS support node (GGSN) 410 supplies a default access point name (APN) 430 to act as a default routing for CoAP traffic 620 when the M2M device 110 first connects 610. Therefore, traffic may be automatically routed 630 to a default DM server 420. The GGSN 410 may vary the default server (e.g. LWM2M/BSF combination server) 420 depending on the IMSI provided by the M2M device 110 (certain groups of IMSI numbers may be routed to one server 420 and other IMSI number groups may be routed to a different server 420').

Furthermore, CoAP traffic will have a dedicated port (5683) and so a short-lived default routing rule may be applied for this port. In other words, all communications on this port may be sent to a default LWM2M/BSF combination server 420 (DM server) or there may be a short-lived default routing for all UDP traffic, for example. There may be similar default routing rules for HTTP traffic (BSF 130) or all TCP traffic, or a default DNS which sends all HTTP traffic to the BSF 130 until device management configuration is completed.

Once the default DM server 420 has been reached (either by the method 400 described with respect to FIG. 6 or 8 or by other means) the default server 420 may indicate an address for an alternative server 640 and/or preferred BSF server (e.g. LWM2M/BSF server 420' combination). This may allow for load balancing or other network configurations to be achieved. FIG. 7 shows how this can be done in schematic form. The default DM server 420 may provide the M2M device 110 with a pre-shared key (psk) hint including the alternative server's 420' address details. For example a psk hint may be included when running TLS or DTLS. The alternative server's 420' address may be supplied using other mechanisms. The APN (and so routing) may be assigned or reassigned based on other detected properties or parameters such as the present APN or a characteristic of the communication traffic between the M2M device and the server 420, for example.

For example, a LWM2M bootstrap message may use a write logical operation (message) on custom resources (such as a "NAF\_ID" and "BSF\_ID"). If the write message contains no security then the M2M device may formally reject the write operation but may use the information that the write operation contains to derive the address of the alternative server 420'. In other words, the write logical operation fails (as intended) but the message that was received contains enough information to allow the M2M device 110 to locate the alternative server 420'.

As described with reference to FIG. 5, the BSF may be merged into the LWM2M bootstrap server 440 to form a combined DM server 420. Therefore, there will be only a single entity to discover. In the write bootstrap message described with reference to FIG. 7, the LWM2M bootstrap server 440 may deliver credentials for interacting with an alternative or production DM server 420'. Therefore the write message instructs the M2M device to write to a Server Access Security Object (but this message is intended to fail authentication). The combined BSF/LWM2M server 420 may deliver a GBA Push Info (GPI) message which allows the relevant production credentials to be derived on the M2M device 110. This optimisation may lead to a particularly simplified BSF 130.

It is to be understood that the above description is given by way of example and only for the benefit of understanding the solution, and it must include also any combination of the above features, as well as any alterations, modifications or otherwise addition which could be done by a skilled person by use of his/her skills and/or general knowledge in the relevant and/or neighbouring art.

Many combinations, modifications, or alterations to the features of the above embodiments will be readily apparent to the skilled person and are intended to form part of the invention. Any of the features described specifically relating to one embodiment or example may be used in any other embodiment by making the appropriate changes.

The invention claimed is:

1. A method for using an intermediary default server to connect a machine to machine (M2M) device comprising an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) to a preferred alternative server, the method comprising:

determining and assigning an access point name (APN) from a plurality of APNs based on the IMSI of the M2M device;

routing, via the assigned APN, communications traffic between the M2M device and the intermediary default server, wherein:

selecting the intermediary default server to initially communicate with the M2M device is determined



based on one or more of: the IMSI, the APN, or a characteristic of traffic associated with the M2M device,

the communications traffic, as a result of using a particular transmission protocol, is routed through a dedicated port of the APN, the dedicated port being dedicated for use by M2M device traffic which includes the communications traffic,

the dedicated port of the APN is configured to implement a short-lived default routing rule that causes all M2M device traffic routed through the dedicated port, including the communications traffic, to initially be sent to the intermediary default server, and the intermediary default server is any one or more or a combination of servers selected from: a device management (DM) server; a bootstrapping server function (BSF) server; a DM bootstrapping server, a lightweight M2M (LWM2M) server; a LWM2M bootstrapping server; a network application function (NAF); a DM server; and a BSF server; and

after the intermediary default server provides the M2M device with address information of the preferred alternative server, causing the M2M device to subsequently communicate with the preferred alternative server instead of continuing to communicate with the intermediary default server.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the intermediary default server is selected from a plurality of servers based on a transport protocol of the communications traffic received from the M2M device.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the transport protocol of the communications traffic is determined from a port number.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the communications traffic is selected from the group consisting of Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), HTTP, CoAPs, HTTPs, UDP and TCP.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein a characteristic of the communication traffic between the M2M device and the intermediary default server is that it is an acknowledged or an unacknowledged protocol.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein a characteristic of the communication traffic is that it is selected from the group consisting of user datagram protocol (UDP) transmission control protocol, TCP and SMS.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the characteristic of the communication traffic is a URL protocol identifier.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein:

CoAP traffic is routed to a DM server and HTTP traffic is routed to a BSF; or

CoAPs or HTTPs traffic is routed to a DM server and CoAP or HTTP traffic is routed to a BSF; or

CoAP and CoAPs traffic is routed to a DM server and HTTP or HTTPs traffic is routed to a BSF; or

secure traffic is routed to a DM server and unsecure traffic is routed to a BSF.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein UDP communications traffic is routed to the DM server and TCP communications traffic is routed to the BSF server.

10. A system for using an intermediary default server to route communications traffic between a machine to machine (M2M) device connected to a telecommunications network and having an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and a preferred alternative server, the system comprising:

a hardware processor;

an interface configured to receive communications from the M2M device; and

logic, which is executed by the hardware processor, configured to:

receive at the interface the IMSI of the M2M device, determine and assign an access point name (APN) from a plurality of APNs based on the IMSI of the M2M device;

route, via the assigned APN, communications traffic between the M2M device and the intermediary default server, wherein:

selecting the intermediary default server to initially communicate with the M2M device is determined based on one or more of: the IMSI, the APN, or a characteristic of traffic associated with the M2M device,

the communications traffic, as a result of using a particular transmission protocol, is routed through a dedicated port of the APN, the dedicated port being dedicated for use by M2M device traffic which includes the communications traffic,

the dedicated port of the APN is configured to implement a short-lived default routing rule that causes all M2M device traffic routed through the dedicated port, including the communications traffic, to initially be sent to the intermediary default server, and

the intermediary default server is any one or more or a combination of servers selected from: a device management (DM) server; a bootstrapping server function (BSF) server; a DM bootstrapping server, a lightweight M2M (LWM2M) server; a LWM2M bootstrapping server; a network application function (NAF); a DM server; and a BSF server; and

after the intermediary default server provides the M2M device with address information of the preferred alternative server, cause the M2M device to subsequently communicate with the preferred alternative server instead of continuing to communicate with the intermediary default server.

11. The system of claim 10 further comprising a plurality of M2M devices configured to communicate with the interface and communicate with the intermediary default server.

12. The system of claim 10 further comprising a plurality of APNs selectable by the logic.

13. The system according to claim 10 further comprising a DM server and/or a BSF server.

14. The system of claim 13, wherein the intermediary default server is configured to indicate an address or addresses of the preferred alternative server or servers with which to route the communications traffic.

15. The system of claim 14, wherein the address or addresses of the preferred alternative server or servers is contained within a pre-shared key, PSK, hint indicated by the intermediary default server or is contained within a bootstrap message.

16. The system of claim 15, wherein the bootstrap message is a write logical operation or a write logical operation on custom resources.

17. The system of claim 15, wherein the bootstrap message is absent any security prompting a rejection of a write logical operation.

18. The system of claim 15 further comprising a lightweight machine to machine (LWM2M) server configured to deliver the bootstrap message.